The carrier of passengers is not liable for them in the same way in which the carrier of goods is liable. The rule, the exception, and the limitation and reason of the exception are now all perfectly well settled. By the general rule, the liability of the common carrier does not depend upon his negligence, because he insures the owners of all the goods he carries against all loss or injury that does not come from the act of God or the public enemy. The exception to this, in the case of the carrier of passengers, is, that he is liable only where the injury has arisen from his own negligence; and the limitation to this exception is, that he is thus liable for injuries resulting from the slightest negligence on his part. (b) If the carrier cannot guard against a certain danger,

(a) Colgrove v. N. Y. & H. R. R. Co. 6 Duer, 382.

(aa) For recent cases as to notices by carriers of goods, see Judson v. Western R. R. Co. 6 Allen, 486; Steele v. Towns-end, 1 Ala. 1; Thayer v. St Louis, Ac. R. R. Co. 22 Ind. 26; Falvey v. Northern Co. 15 Wis. 129; Hays v. Kennedy, 8 Grant, 351; York Co. v. Central R. R Co. 3 Wallace, 100.

(b) Derwort v. Loonier, 21 Conn. 246; Fnller v. Naugatuck Railroad Co. id. 558; Caldwell v. Murphy, 1 Duer, 283; Hegeman v. Western R. R. Co. 16 Barb. 358; Nashville & C. R. R Co. v. Messino, 1 Sneed, 220. This was very authoritatively declared by Lord Chief Justice Eyref in the case of Aston v. Heavan, 2 Esp. 533. That was an action against the defendants, as proprietors of a stagecoach, to recover damages received by the plaintiff in consequence of the upsetting of the defendants' coach. The defence relied upon was, that the coach was driving at a regular pace on the Hammersmith road, but that on the side was a pump of considerable height, from whence the water was falling into a tub below; that the sun shone brightly, and being reflected strongly from the water, the horses had taken fright and run against the bank at the opposite side, where the coach was overset. And per Eyre, C. J.: "This action is founded entirely in negligence. It has been said by the counsel for the plaintiff, that wherever a case happens, even where there has been no negligence, he would take the opinion of the court whether defendants circumstanced as the present, that is, coach owners, should not he liable in all cases, except where the injury happens from the act of God or the king's enemies. I am of opinion, the cases of it is then his duty to warn the passengers of it, and if he fails to do this he is liable for injury to them. But if he gives this warnthe loss of goods by carriers, and the present, are totally unlike. When that case does occur, he will be told that carriers of goods are liable by the custom, to guard against frauds they might be tempted to commit, by taking goods intrusted to them to carry, and then pretending they had lost or been robbed of them; and because they can protect themselves; but there is no such rule in the case of the carriage of the persons. This action stands on the ground of negligence only." To the same effect is the ruling of Sir James Mansfield, in Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79. That was an action of assumpsit against the defendant as owner of the Blackwall stage, on which the plaintiff, a pilot, was travelling to London, when it broke down, and he was greatly bruised. The first count imputed the accident to the negligence of the driver; the second, to the insufficiency of the axle-tree of the carriage. The defendant introduced evidence to show that the axle-tree had been examined a few days before it broke, without any flaw being discovered in it; and that, when the accident happened, the coachman, a very skilful driver, was driving in the usual track, and at a moderate pace. And, per Mansfield, C. J., in summing up to the jury: "As the driver has been cleared of everything like negligence, the question for the jury will be as to the sufficiency of the coach. If the axle-tree was sound, as far as human eye could discover, the defendant is not liable. There is a difference between a contract to carry goods and a contract to carry passengers. For the goods the carrier is answerable at all events. But he does not warrant the safety of passengers. His undertaking as to them goes no further than this, that as far as human care and foresight can go, he will provide for their safe conveyance. Therefore, if the breaking down of the coach was purely accidental, the plaintiff has no remedy for the misfortune he has encountered." See also Harris v. Costar, 1 C. & P. 638 ; White v. Boulton, Peake, Cas. 81; Crofts v. Waterhouse, 3 Bing. 319. Such also has been repeatedly declared to be the law in this country. Thus, in the case of Derwort v. Looner, 21 Conn. 246, one of the latest cases on this subject, Ellsworth, J., says: "The rule of law on this subject is fully established in our own courts and elsewhere, and is not controverted by the learned counsel in this case. The principle is, that in the case of common carriers of passengers, the highest degree of care which a reasonable man would use, is required. This rule applies alike to the character of the vehicle, the horses and harness, the skill and sobriety of the driver, and to the manner of conducting the stage under every emergency or difficulty. The driver must, of course, be attentive and watchful. He has, for the time being, committed to his trust the safety and lives of people, old and young, women and children, locked up as it were in the coach or rail-car, ignorant, helpless, and having no eyes or ears or power to guard against dangers, and who look to him for safety in their transportation. The contract to carry passengers differs, it is true, from a contract to carry freight; but in both cases the rule is rigorous and imperative; in the latter, the carrier is answerable at all events, except for the act of God and the public enemy; while in the former, the most perfect care of prudent and cautious men is demanded and required. The stage owner does not warrant the safety of passengers; yet his undertaking and liability as to them go to this extent, that he, or his agent, shall possess competent skill, and that, as far as human foresight and care can reasonably go, he will transport them safely. He is not liable for injuries happening to passengers, from sheer accident or misfortune, where there is no negligence or fault, and where no want of caution, foresight, or judgment, would prevent the injury. But he is liable for the smallest negligence in himself or his driver." See also Fuller v. The Naugatuck Railroad Co. 21 Conn. 657; Hall v. Connecticut River Steamboat Co. 13 Conn. 819; McKinney v. Neil, 1 McLean, 640; Maury v. Talmadge, 2 id. 167; Farish v. Reigle, 11 Gratt. 697; Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181; Stockton v. Frey, 4 Gill, 406; Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Burke, 13 Wend. 626; Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 236; Hegemann v. W. R. R. Co. 8 Kern. 9; Curtis v. R. & S. R. R. Co. 20 Barb. 282; Frink v. Potter, 17 Ill. 406; Martin v. G. N. R. Co. 30 E. L. & E. 473; 8. c. 16 C. B. 179; Willis v. L. I. R. R. Co. 32 Barb. 398. -In the case of Boyce v. Anderson, 2 Pet. 160, the question arose, whether the rule applicable to the carriage of goods, or that applicable to the carriage of passengers, should be applied to the case of negro slaves. That was an action brought by the owner of slaves, against the proprietor of a steamboat on the Mississippi, ing, a passenger who voluntarily encounters the danger cannot to recover damages for the loss of the slaves, alleged to have been caused by the negligence or mismanagement of the captain and commandant of the boat. The case came up on error from the Circuit Court for the District of Kentucky. The court below instructed the jury, among other things, "that the doctrine of common carriers did not apply to the case of carrying intelligent beings, such as negroes;" and the Supreme Court held this instruction to be correct. Marshall, C. J., said: "There being no special contract between the parties in this case, the principal question arises on the opinion expressed by the court, 'that the doctrine of common carriers does not apply to the case of carrying intelligent beings, such as negroes.' That doctrine is, that the carrier is responsible for every loss which is not produced by inevitable accident. It has been pressed beyond the general principles which govern the law of bailment, by considerations of policy. Can a sound distinction be taken between a human being in whose person another has an interest, and inanimate property? A slave has volition, and has feelings which cannot be entirely disregarded. These properties cannot be overlooked in conveying him from place to place. He cannot be stowed away as a common package. Not only does humanity forbid this proceeding, but it might endanger his life or health. Consequently, this rigorous mode of proceeding cannot safely be adopted, unless stipulated for by special contract. Being left at liberty, he may escape. The carrier has not and cannot have the same absolute control over him that he has over inanimate matter. In the nature of things, and in his character, he resembles a passenger, not a package of goods. It would seem reasonable, therefore, that the responsibility of the carrier should be measured by the law which is applicable to passengers, rather than by that which is applicable to the carriage of common goods. There are no slaves in England, but there are persons in whose service another has a temporary interest. We believe that the responsibility of a carrier for injury which such person may sustain, has never been placed on the same principle with his responsibility for a bale of goods. He is undoubtedly answerable for any injury sustained in consequence of his negligence, or want of skill; but we have never understood that he is responsible further. The law applicable to common carriers is one of great rigor. Though to the extent to which it has been carried, and in the cases to which it has been applied, we admit its necessity and its policy, we do not think it ought to be carried further, or applied to new cases. We think it has not been applied to living men, and that it ought not to be applied to them." The learned judge, in a subsequent part of his opinion, intimated that the carrier of passengers was bound only to ordinary diligence; but whatever he said to that effect cannot be considered as law, and was virtually overruled in the subsequent case of Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181, 192. See also, as to the liability of a carrier of slaves, Clark v. McDonald, 4 McCord, 223; Williams v. Taylor, 4 Port. (Ala.) 234. If any portion of a carrier's route is attended with peculiar danger, he is bound to give his passengers notice thereof. Thus, in Laing v. Colder, 8 Penn. St. 479, which was an action on the case for negligence, whereby the plaintiffs arm was broken while he was travelling in the railroad car of the defendants, it appeared that the accident occurred while the car was passing over a bridge, which was so narrow that the plaintiff's hand, lying outside of the car-window, was caught by the bridge, and his arm broken. The defendants gave evidence to show that, during the journey, warning had been given by their agent to a passenger named Long, of the danger of putting his feet or arms out of the window, and that he sat so near the plaintiff, that the warnings must have been heard by the latter. They also proved that printed notices were put up in the cars warning passengers not to put their arms or heads outside the windows, and that, immediately before reaching the bridge, notice was given in a loud voice to passengers to keep their heads and arms inside the car. Upon this evidence, Eldred, P. J., instructed the jury, "that a carrier of passengers was bound to furnish suitable conveyances, such as with due care and proper attention would carry passengers safely, unless interrupted by some accident which no human wisdom could foresee. That he must give notice of approaching danger, or of the dangerous places on the route, if some are more dangerous than others. This notice must be full and complete to all persons who travel, whether learned or unlearned. The slightest negligence in any of these particulars makes him liable for all damages. That in the present case the presumption was there had been negligence, and it was for the defendants to show they had done everything in their power hold the carrier responsible. (bb) It is no defence to the carrier, that the negligence was that of his agent (as of the conductor of a car), or that it was wilful on the part of the agent. (c) And a railroad company which permits another company to use its road, is liable for damage caused to passengers itself is carrying, by the negligence of the servants of the other company which is permitted to use the road. (cc) 1 to relieve themselves, or that it resulted from the plaintiff's negligence and folly. That a printed notice of the danger of passengers putting their hands out of the windows was not sufficient; but if they had given the plaintiff sufficient warning as they approached the bridge, this would discharge them." The case was carried up to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and that court held the instruction to be correct. Bell, J., in delivering the judgment said: "The slightest neglect against which human prudence and foresight may guard, and by which hurt or loss is occasioned, will render them (common carriers) liable to answer in damages. Nay, the mere happening of an injurious accident raises prima facie a presumption of neglect, and throws upon the carrier the onus of showing it did not exist. Above all, if there be in any part of the road a particular passage more than ordinarily dangerous, or requiring superior circumspection on the part of a passenger, the conductor of the vehicle is bound to give due notice of it, and a failure to do so will make his principal responsible." See also Dudley v. Smith, 1 Camp. 167; Derwort v. Loomer, 21 Conn. 246; Maury v. Talmadge, 2 McLean, 157; Sales v. Western Stage Co. 4 Iowa, 547; Johnson v. Winona R. R. Co. 11 Min. 296. So, if through the default of a coach-proprietor in neglecting to provide proper means of conveyance, a passenger be placed in so perilous a situation as to render it prudent for him to leap from the coach, whereby his leg is broken, the proprietor will be responsible in damages, although the coach was not actually overturned. Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stark. 493. This case was much considered in Stokes v. Saltanstall, 13 Pet 181, and the doctrine it contains fully confirmed. See also to the same effect, Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Met. 1; Eldridge v. Long Island Railroad Co. 1 Sandf. 87; Edwards v. Lord, 49 Me. 279; Alden v. New York, etc. R. R. Co. 26 N. Y. 102; Thayer v.