63 Baker v. Michigan Southern, etc., R. Co., 42 111. 73; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Frankenberg, 54 111. 88, & Am. Sep. 92; American Merchants' Express Co. v. Schier, 55 111. 140. In Chicago & Northwestern R. v. Simon,
160 HI. 648, 653, 43 N. E. 596, the court said: "where a contract limiting the liability of the carrier is contained in a bill of lading which, in its entirety, constitutes both a receipt and a contract, the onus is on the carrier to show the 'restrictions of the common liability were assented to by the consignor. (Field v. Chicago and Rock Island Railroad Co., 71 HI. 458; Bos-cowits v. Adams Express Co., 93 id, 623.) And whether there is such assent is a question of fact. The mere receiving the bill of lading, without notice of the restrictions therein contained, does not amount to an assent thereto. (United States Express Co. v. Haines, 67 111. 137; Anchor Line v. Dater,, 68 id. 369; American Merchants' Union Express Co. v . Schier, 55 id. 140; Merchants' Dispatch Transportation Co. v. Joesting, 89 id. 152; Erie and Western Transportation Co. v. Dater, 91 id. 105.)" This passage was quoted with approval and. followed in Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Calumet Stock Farm, 194 111. 9, 13, 61 N. E. 1095, 88 Am. St. Rep. 68. The same rule was applied in Plaff v. Pacific Express Co., 251 111. 243, 95 N. E. 1089; Pereira v. Central Pac. R. Co., 66 Cal. 92, 4 Pac. 988; Curtis v. United Transfer Co., 167 Cal. 112, 138 Pac. 726; Hill v. Adams Express Co., 82 N. J. L. 373, 81 Atl. 869; Wichern v. United States Express Co., 83 N. J. L. 241, 83 Atl. 776. In Georgia though for most purposes assent to the terms of the bill of lading is shown by the acceptance of the document without objection, in order to establish a limitation of liability further proof of assent is
Under the Interstate Commerce Acts the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that the Federal government has declared its purpose to exercise supervision over all interstate contracts of carriers and that, therefore, the Supreme Court will decide on writ of error to a State court not only the legality of a carrier's contract but also whether a contract has been made in fact. Under this ruling the court has held acceptance of a bill of lading or receipt sufficient to create a contract, if the formation of such a contract is permitted by law, that is if its terms have been filed in the schedules of the carrier with the Interstate Commerce Commission.64 It seems clear, therefore, that jurisdictions which previously have held the contrary must revise their rulings, so far as interstate contracts of carriage are concerned.65 A contract to pay freight may be created in the same way, not only on the part of the shipper who first receives the bill of lading, but, if the document so provides, on the part of the consignee who later receives it, and gets the goods under it.66 necesseary.The Georgia Code provides that a carrier may limit its liability by "express contract." The question, therefore, where a limitation of liability is concerned, is what amounts to an express contract within the terms of the code; and in Central of Georgia R. Co. v. City Mills Co., 128 Ga. 841, 846, 68 S. E. 197, the court say: "The mere acceptance of a bill of lading, or a ticket which contains a limitation upon liability will not amount, to an express contract." The court, however, held that when the shipper made out for the carrier's signature a receipt which read-"as per conditions of company's bill of lading" a charge was erroneous which left to the jury the question whether the plaintiff assented to a particular condition in the bill of lading. The question should have been-did he assent to adopt the conditions in the bill of lading, whatever they might be. 64 Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. 8. 491, 83 Sup. Ct. 148, 57 L.
Ed. 314; Wells Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U. S. 469, 33 Sup. Ct. 267, 57 L. Ed. 600. See also Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526, 58 L. Ed. 868, L. R. A. 1915 B. 450; and infra, Sec.Sec. 1073, 1107, 1116.
65 Spada v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 86 N. J. L. 187, 92 Atl. 379, overruling Hill v . Adams Express Co., 82 N. J. L. 373, 81 Atl. 859.
66 In New York, New Haven & H. R. v. Sampson, 222 Mass. 311, 313, the court said:-
"One of the terms of both the bills of lading was: 'Owner or consignee shall pay freight at the rate herein stated, and all other charges accruing on said property, before delivery.' The defendant, as purchaser and holder of the bills of lading, indorsed by the consignee, became the owner of the hay represented thereby; Forbes v. Boston & Lowell R. R., 133 Mass. 154; and his acceptance and receipt of the hay would warrant, if it did not re-
The acceptance of goods consigned to him may also indicate assent by the consignee to pay the freight charges, though he does not see' the bill of lading, if he is otherwise informed that the goods are offered to him only on the terms that he assume payment of the freight.67 Whether the same principle is applicable to a ticket, depends only upon the question whether the ticket is a mere check showing the points between which the passenger is entitled to be carried, and does not purport to be a contract stating the rights of the parties. If such is the true nature of the ticket, the passenger would not be required at his peril to read any stipulations upon it. Much might depend upon the appearance of the ticket and the nature of the trip contemplated.68
So the acceptance of a railroad pass involves assent to conditions printed upon it, so far as they are not opposed to public policy, irrespective of the acceptor's knowledge of them.69 And the taking of a warehouse receipt by a bailor binds him as an acceptor of the terms therein legibly stated.70 quire, a finding that he accepted the stipulations contained in the bills of lading and impliedly agreed to pay the freight. Cox v. Central Vermont R. R., 170 Man. 129, 49 N. E. 97; New York, N. H. A H. R. R. v. York A Whitney Co., 216 Mass. 36, 102 N. E. 366, and cases cited." See also New York Central Ac. R. R. v. York A Whitney Co., (Mass. 1919) 119 N. E. 866.
67New York Central &a. R. v. York A Whitney Co., (Mass. 1919) 119 N. E. 866; Pennsylvania R. v. Titus, 216 N. Y. 17, 109 N. E. 857, L. R. A. 1916, E. 1127, Ann. Can. 1917, C. 862; cf. Georgia R. v. Southern Ferro Concrete Co., 193 Ala. 108, 68 So. 981, Ann. Cas. 1916, E. 376; Central R. v. MacCartney, 68 N. J. L. 165, 173, 52 Atl. 675.
68 In Fonseca v. Cunard Steamship Co., 153 Mass. 563, 27 N. E. 665, 12 L. R. A. 340, the court held a passenger bound by the terms of a steamship "contract ticket" which was covered with print and writing for the greater part of two large quarto pages. The same principle was applied to the case of a passenger unable to read in O'Regan v. Cunard Steamship Co., 160 Mass. 356, 35 N. E. 1070, 39 Am. St. Rep. 484; and to one who could not understand the English language in Secoulsky p. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., 223 Mass. 465, 112 N. E. 151. See further Hood v. Anchor line,  A. C. 837; 4 Elliott on Railroads, Sec. 1661.
In the decisions on the subject betides the distinction taken is the text between a mere cheek or token, and a contract, there is also observable in some cases the same reasoning alluded to supra, in connection with the Illinois decisions on Bills of lading and telegraph blanks; namely, that some evidence of assent other than the acceptance of the document is necessary.
69 Quimmby v. Boston & Maine R. R., 150 Mass. 365,23 N. E. 206,5 L. R. A. 846.
70Taussig v. Bode, 134 Cal. 260,