Barkalow v. Johnson, 1 Harr. 397; Gleadening v. Canary, 5 Daly, 489; Meyer v. Hibsher, 47 N. Y. 265; Leary v. Miller, 61N. Y. 488; Rosa v. Hurd, 71 N. Y. 14, 27 Am. Rep. 1; Baer v. Hoffman, 150 N. Y. App. D. 473, 135 N. Y. S. 28; Moore v. Tucker, 3 Ired. L. 347; Johnson v. Arrigoni, 5 Oreg. 485; Smith v. Lownsdale, 6 Oreg. 78; Sherer v. Easton Bank, 33 Pa. 134; Mayer's Appeal, 87 Pa. 129; Burgetts-town Nat. Bank 0. Nil], 213 Pa. 456, 63 Atl. 186, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1079, 110 Am. St. 554; Hall v. Freeman, 2 N. & McC. 479, 10 Am. Dec. 621; Stone v. Smith, 30 Tex. 138, 94 Am. Dec. 299; Blodgett v. Durgin, 32 Vt. 361; Bundy v. Buzzell, 51 Vt 128; Thompson 0. Curry, 79 W. Va. 771, 91 S. E. 801; Knapp v. Runals, 37 Wis. 135. A contrary decision is the Irish case of Don-elly v. Howie, Hayes & Jones, 436, and also Sebree Deposit Bank v, Moreland, 96 Ky. 150, 28 S. W. 153, 29 L. R. A. 305.

67Gunson v. Mets, 1 B. & C. 193; Rogers v. Hackett, 21 N. H. 100.

68Potter v. Rayworth, 13 East, 417; Rabey v. Gilbert, 6 H. & N. 536; Ken-non v. MnRae, 7 Porter, 175.

69Olendorf v. Swarts, 5 Cal. 480, 63 Am. Dec. 141; Miller p. Hackley, 5 Johns. 375, 4 Am. Dec. 372; Allwood v. Haseldon, 2 Bailey L. 457.

70Goodall v. Dolley, 1 T. R. 712; Borradaile v. Lowe, 4 Taunt. 93; Thornton v. Wynn, 12 Wheat. 183, 6L. Ed. 595; Martin 0. Winslow, 2 Mas. 241; Kennon v. MnRae, 7 Port. 175;

Walker v. Rogers, 40 111. 279, 89 Am. Dec. 348; Freeman v. O'Brien, 38 Ia. 406; Bank of Tennessee v. Smith, 9 B. Mon. 609; Landrum p. Trowbridge, 2 Met. (Ky.) 281; Blum p. Bid well, 20 La. Ann. 43; James v. Wade, 21 La. Ann. 548; Byram v. Hunter, 36 Me. 217; Lewis v. Brehme, 33 Md. 412, 3 Am. Rep. 190; Low p. Howard, 10 Cush. 159; Kelley v. Brown, 5 Gray, 108; Parks v. Smith, 155 Mass. 26, 28 N. E. 1044; Newberry p. Trowbridge, 13 Mich. 263; Hamilton v. Winona Lumber Co., 95 Mich. 436, 54 N. W. 903; Faningttm v. Brown, 7 N. H. 271; Norris v. Ward, 59 N. H. 487; United States Bank v. Southard, 2 Harr. 473; Tebbetts v. Dowd, 23 Wend. 379; Hunter v. Hook, 64 Barb. 468; Lilly v. Petteway, 73 N. C. 358; Loose v. Loose, 36 Pa. 538; Fotheringham v. Price, 1 Bay, 291, 1 Am. Dec. 618; Golladay v. Union Bank, 2 Head, 57; Ford v. Dallam, 3 Cold. 67; Commercial Bank v, Clark, 28 Vt. 325.

71 Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East, 469; Givens v. Merchants' Natl. Bank, 85 111. 442; Hughes v. Bowen, 15 Iowa, 446; Cheshire p. Taylor, 29 Iowa, 492; Davis v. Gowen, 17 Me. 387; Beck v. Thompson, 4 Har. & J. 537; Matthews v. Allen, 16 Gray, 594, 77 Am. Dec. 430; Third Natl. Bank v. Ashworth, 105 Mass. 503; Glidden v. Chamberlin, 167 Mass. 486, 46 N. E. 103, 57 Am. St. Rep. 479; Ladd v. Kenney, 2 N. H. 340,9 Am. Dec. 77; Edwards v. Tandy, 36 N. H. 540; Tebbetta p. Dowd, 23 Wend. 379; Richter v. Selin, 8 S. & R.

426; Schmidt v. Radcliff, 4 Strob. 296, 53 Am. Deo. 678. But see contra, Spurlock v. Union Bank, 4 Humph. 336; Williams v. Union Bank, 9 Heisk. 441.

72Keyes v. Feostermaker, 24 Cal. 329; Brooks v. Laws, 202 111. App. 448; Campbell v. Varney, 12 Ia. 43; Creamer v. Perry, 17 Pick. 332,28 Am. Dec. 297; Carter v. Burley, 9 N. H. 658; Richardson v. Kulp, 81 N. J. L. 123, 78 Atl. 1082; Whittier v. Collins, 15 R. I. 90, 23 Atl. 47, 2 Am. St. Rep. 879. In Glidden v. Chamberlm, 167 Mass. 486, 46 N. E. 103, 67 Am. St. Rep. 479, a discharged endorser promised to "do what he could" to secure payment of the note tor the holder. This was held not to amount to a new promise. In Bank of Gilby v. Farnsworth, 7 N. D. 6, 72 N. W. 901, 38 L. R, A. 843, a drawer discharged by the laches of the holder of a draft drew a duplicate draft to take the place of the original which had been lost. It was held this did not amount, as matter of law, to a new promise by the drawer. And similarly discharged indorsers were held not to renew their liability by indorsing new checks which had been drawn to take the place of the lost originals. Lewis v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 241, 83 S. W. 423; Aebi v. Bank of Evaosville, 124 Wis. 73, 102 N. W. 329, 68 L. R, A. 964, 109 Am. St. Rep. 926.

73Brooks v. Laws, 202 111. App. 448; Crandall v. Moeton, 24 N. Y. App. D. 547, 50 N. Y. S. 146. But a statement by the drawer of a bill, when, informed of its dishonor that "it must be paid" has bees held sufficient to charge him. Rogers v. Stephens, 2 T. R. 713. In Reynolds v. Douglass, 12 Pet. 497, 606, 9 L. Ed. 1171, the court said: "A party to a note entitled to notice, may waive it by a promise to see it paid; or an acknowledgment that it must be paid; or a promise that 'he will set the matter to rights,' or by a qualified promise, having knowledge of the laches of the holder."

In Sigerson v. Mathews, 20 How. 496, 15 L. Ed. 989, the defendant indorser answered a question of the holder's agent as to "what he was going to do," by saying that "in a few days he would see the witness, and arrange it." The court said (p. 500): "This was an unconditional promise to pay the note which no one could misunderstand."

In Parsons v. Dickinson, 23 Mich. 56, an indorser discharged by failure to give notice stated to the holder that he expected to have to pay the note but wished the holder to try to get payment from the maker. This statement was held sufficient to sustain a judgment against the indorser.

74Holdsworth v. Dimsdale, 24 L. T. N. S. 360, 19 W. R. 798; Dixon v. Elliott, 5 C. 4 P. 437; Long v. Dinner, 71 Mo. 452; Agan v. M'Manus, 11 John. 180; Shaw v. McNeill, 96 N. C. 536; Tardy v. Boyd, 26 Gratt. 631. But see Campbell v. Vamey, 12 Ia. 43, where the court says that a new promise to be effective "must be unqualified.1'

75 Fletcher v. Froggatt, 2 C. & P. 569. See also Zacharie v. Kirk, 14 La. Ann, 433; Holdsworth v. Dimsdale, 24 L. T. N. S. 360, 19 W. R. 798. In the two cases last cited a discharged indorser requiring acceptance by the creditor, reference may be made to the corresponding question arising where debts are barred by the Statute of Limitations.76 Part payment by a drawer or indorser is not only evidence that he was duly charged and is therefore liable, but even though it be proved that due diligence to charge the drawer or indorser was not used, it seems that part payment is sufficient evidence of a new promise to pay the whole indebtedness to render the discharged drawer or indorser liable,77 unless the payment is explained or qualified by accompanying words or circumstances manifesting an intention not to become liable for the whole.