Me. 317, 24 Am. Rep. 31; Caves v.

Bartek, 85 Neb. 511, 123 N. W. 1031;

Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N. Y. 72,

84 Am. Dec. 330; Bates v. Fish, etc.,

Co., 60 N. Y. App. D., 38, 63 N. Y. S.

649, 169 N. Y. 587, 62 N. E. 1094;

Gusoo v. Bunting, 154 N. C. 530, 70

S. E. 923; Parker v. Meadow, 86 Tenn.

181, 6 & W. 40; Wright v. Computing

Scale Co., 47 Wash. 107, 91 Pac. 571;

Muth v. Frost, 68 Wis. 425, 32 N. W.

231; Northern Supply Co. v. Wangard,

123 Wis. 1, 100 N. W. 1066, 107 Am. St. Rep. 984.

63 In British Ac. Mfg. Co. v. Underground Electric Ac. Co., [1911] 1 K. B. 575, [1912] 3 K. B. 128, [1912] A. C. 673, the defendant furnished machines inferior to those contracted for. Expenses of trying to repair and perfect them for a time were allowed by each court which considered the case, though it would have avoided damage, as it afterwards appeared, to have bought new machines at once. See also Summers v. Tarney, 123 Ind. 560, 24 N. E. 678; Watson v. Lisbon Bridge, 14 Me. 201. The last two cases related to torts, but the principle involved is the same.

64 See supra, Sec. 1347, for cases where such notice has been given.

65 Peace River Phosphate Co. v. Grafflin, 58 Fed. 550; Connersville v. McFarlan Carriage Co., 166 Ind. 123, 76 N. E. 294, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 709; McFarlan Carriage Co. v. Connersville, 49 Ind. App. 418; Malueg v. Hatten Lumber Co., 140 Wis. 381, 122 N. W. 1057.

66 Clare v. Raymond, 6 A. & E. 519; Thol v. Henderson, 8 Q. B. D. 457; Reed Lumber Co. v. Lewis, 94 Ala. 626, 10 So. 333; Wallace v. Ah Sam, 71 Cal. 197, 12 Pac. 46, 60 Am. Rep. 534; Rahm v. Deig, 121 Ind. 283, 23 N. E. 141; Henry v. Hobbs, 165 Mich. 183, 130 N. W. 616; Devlin v. Mayor, 63 N. Y. 8; Brauer v. Oceanic etc. Co., 66 N. Y. App. D. 606, 73 N. Y. S. 1130; Goepel t/. Kurtz Action Co., 179 N. Y, App. D. 687,167 N. Y. S. 317; Waynes-ville Ac. Mfg. Co. v. Berlin etc. Works, 144 N. C. 689, 57 S. E. 455; Dean etc. Works v. Astoria etc. Works, 40 Qreg. 83, 66 Pac. 605; Clyde Coal Co. v.

Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 226 Pa. 391, 75 Atl. 596, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1191.

67 Mitchell v. Clarke, 71 Cal. 163,11 Pac. 882, 60 Am. Rep. 529; Liljehgren Ac. Co. v. Mead, 42 Minn. 420, 44 N. W.306.

68 J. P. Smith Shoe Co. v. Curme-feltman Shoe Co., (Ind. App. 1918), 118 N. E. 360.

69 Benton v. Fay, 64 HI. 417; Smith v. Flanders, 129 Mass. 322; Chalice v. Witte, 81 Mo. App. 84; and see supra, Sec. 1347.

70 Hammond v. Bussey, 20 Q. B. D. 79; Bagley v. Cleveland Rolling Mill Co., 21 Fed. 159; Olson v. Hurd, 20 Ida. 47, 116 Pac. 358; Lissberger p. Kellogg, 78 N. J. Law, 85, 73 Atl. 67; Reggio v. Braggiotti, 7 Cush. 166; Carleton v. Lombard, 19 N. Y. App' Div. 297, 46 N. Y. S. 120 (aff'd without opinion 162 N. Y. 628, 57 N. E. 1106); Reese v. Miles, 99 Term. 398, 41 S. W. 1065; Cleave v. King, 3 N. Z. L. R. 277. See also Nashua Steel Co. v. Brush, 91 Fed. 213,50 U. S. App.

461,33 C. G. A. 466; Ryeraon v. Chapman, 66 Me. 557. Cf. Smith v. Williams, 117 Ga. 782, 45 S. E. 394, 07 Am. St. Rep. 220. But where the buyer knew of the defective condition Wore reselling, his damages must be otherwise calculated. Cooper v. National Fertiliser Co., 132 Ga. 529, 64 8.E.650.

71 Randall v. Raper, E. B. & E. 84; Buckbee o. P. Hohenadel, Jr., Co., 224 Fed 14, 130 C. C. A. 478; Fassinger v. Thorburn, 34 N. Y. 634, 639, 90 Am. Dec. 753.

71a Safle v. Light's Ex., 4 Ala. 700, 39 Am. Dec. 317; Marlutt v. Clary, 20 Ark. 251; Thurston v. Spratt, 52

Me. 202; Fallon v. Murray, 16 Mo.

168 ; Kelly v. Forty-Second St. Ac. R.

&., 37 N. Y. App. D. 500, 55 N. Y. S.

1066; Buchanan v. Kauffman, 65 Tex.

235; Paraham v. Chapman, 60 Vt.

338,14 AtL 600. 79b Boyd v. Whitfield, 19 Ark. 447; foea v. Chabot, 63 Cal. 564; Hardin v Larian, 41 111 413; Marsh v. Smith,

73 la. 296, 34 N. W. 866; Elliot v.

Saufley, 89 Ky. 52, 11 S. W. 200, Richmond v. Ames, 164 Mass. 467, 41 N. E. 671; Lebanon v. Mead, 64 N. H. 8, 4 Atl. 392; Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 144 N. Y. 663,39 N. E. 360; Clark v. Mumford, 62 Tex. 531; Somen v. Schmidt, 24 Wis. 417, 1 Am. Rep. 191. It is universally true that notice to the covenantor is necessary to estop him. Many cases are collected in a note to Jones v. Caldwell, 176 Ky. 15, 195 S. W. 122, L. R. A. 1918 B. 50, in the report last cited. In some States an unequivocal demand that the covenantor defend the action is requisite; but this is not usually held necessary. The cases are collected in a note to Morgan v. Holey, 107 Va. 331, 58 S. E. 564, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 732, 122 Am. St. Rep. 846 in the report last cited. 71c Booth v. Scheer (Kans.), 185 Pac. 896; Smith v. Moore, 7 So. Car. 209, 24 Am. Rep. 479; Morgan v. Winston, 2 Swan, 472.

72 Weston v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 190 Mass. 298, 76 N. . 1050, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 669, 112 Am. St. Rep. 330, 5 Ann. Cas. 825; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Byrne, 205 111. 9,68 N. E. 720.

In Chapman v. Fargo, 223 N. Y. 32, 119 N. E. 76, the court said: 'As was pointed out in the Weston case, the ordinary result of failure to transport a traveling theatrical company or its properties would be prevention of a performance, and the loss of expected returns from such entertainment would not be special profits or damages, but ordinary damages such as were to be anticipated." But in the particular case before the New York court it was held that notification to an express company, upon delivery of moving picture films to it for shipment that the films were to be "rushed" because they were to be exhibited, was insufficient basis to render the express company liable, as special damages for delay, for prospective profits which the consignee lost by non-attendance in his theatre of a large number of persons paying a higher price than was charged for admission to the pictures necessarily shown in lieu of those shipped.

The court said: "Defendant, knowing that the package contained films which were passed around a circuit for exhibition and having been notified to 'rush' them on that account, is chargeable with such damages as would naturally result from unreasonable delay, and which, therefore, must be deemed to have been within the contemplation of the parties when the shipment was made. Sutherland on Damages (4th ed.), vol. 3, Sec.Sec.903, 905, 913; Hutchinson on Carriers (3d ed.), vol. 3, Sec. 1369; Harvey v. Connecticut, etc., R., 124 Mass. 421, 26 Am. Rep. 673; Pilcher v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 155 Ala. 316, 46 So. 765; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mink, 126 Ky. 337, 106 N. W. 294; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Farmers' Union Co., 33 Okl. 270, 125 Pac. 894. In the case of property like films intended for use as distinguished from sale or some other purpose, the ordinary damages would be the loss of rental value caused by the delay and perhaps certain incidental expenses if incurred. Sutherland on Damages, vol. 4, Sec.905; Hutchinson on Carriers, vol. 3, Sec. 1373. But before defendant could be held to special damages, such as the present alleged loss of profits on account of delay or failure of delivery, it must have appeared that he had notice at the time of delivery to him of the particular circumstances attending the shipment, and which probably would lead to such special loss if he defaulted. "It was not a sufficient basis for recovery for loss of special profits that the carrier should know of the general purposes for which the films were to be used. He should have been notified tract was entered into of circumstances rendering special damages probable, they cannot be recovered whether the delay is by a seller,73 or carrier.74

For the same reason defects in goods sold will not justify the recovery of consequential damages,75 other than those which might be expected to flow from the defects.76 A failure by an employee to fulfill a contract of service will ordinarily cause merely the expense of securing a substituted employee, and therefore the consequences which follow from leaving the proposed work wholly undone cannot be recovered.77 So the deof the particular circumstances and purpose already recited making important their delivery by a certain day and which have been made the foundation of the special damages which have been allowed. In effect he should have been made aware that plaintiff had made certain plans based upon the arrival of the films at a certain time, and that in case of non-arrival these plans would be destroyed in all probability, causing certain damages. Hutchinson on Carriers, vol. 3, Sec.1360; Booth v. Spuyten Duyvil Rolling Mill Co., 60 N. Y. 487; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Nelson, 139 Ky. 449, 97 8. W. 757; Express Co. v. Jennings, 86 Miss. 329, 38 So. 374, 109 Am. St. Rep. 708; Higging v. United States Express Co., 83 N. J. L. 398, 85 Atl. 450; Thomas, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 62 Wis. 642, 22 N. W. 827, 51 Am. St. Rep. 725; Simpson v. London & N. It Co., 1 Q. B. 274; Hadley v. Baxen-dale, 9 Exch. R. 341; Gee v. Lancashire, etc., Ry. Co., 6 H. & N. 210; Mather v. Amer. Express Co., 138 Mass. 55, 52 Am. Rep. 258; Swift River Co. v. Fftchburg R. Co., 169 Mass. 326, 47 N. E. 1015, 61 Am. St. Rep. 288." In Orbach v. Paramount Pictures Corp., (Mass. 1919), 123 N. E. 669, the plaintiff was allowed recovery of prospective profits for failure of the defendant to deliver "star" films to him as it had contracted to do. See also supra, } 1345, n. 31.

73 Howard v. Stillwell, etc., Mfg. Co., 139 U. S. 199, 35 L. Ed. 147, 11 Sup. Ct. 500; Central Trust Co. v. Clark, 92 Fed. 293, 34 C. C. A. 354; Acme Cycle Co. v. Clarke, 157 Ind. 271, 61 N. E. 561; Simpson Brick-Press Co. v. Marshall, 5 S. D. 528, 59 N. W. 728. See also infra, Sec. 1390.

74 Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341; Gee p. Lancashire etc. R., 6 H. & N. 211; Great Western R. v. Redmayne, L. R. 1 C. P. 329; Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co. v. Whorton, 184 Ala. 439, 63 So. 1016; Williams v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 66 Fla. 735, 48 So. 209, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 134* 131 Am. St. Rep. 169; Goodin v. Southern Ry. Co., 125 Ga. 630, 54 S. E. 720, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1054; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mink, 126 Ky. 337, 103 S. W. 294, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 833; Braooo v. Merchants' Despatch Co., 113 N. Y. S. 131, 61 N. Y. Misc. 60; Sharpe v. Southern Ry., 130 N. C. 613,41S. E. 799.

75 Fuller v. Curtis, 100 Ind. 237, 50 Am. Rep. 786; Wilson v. Reedy, 32 Minn. 256, 20 N. W. 153; Sycamore & Co. v. Sturm, 13 Neb. 210, 13 N. W. 202; Brayton v. Chase, 3 Wis. 456.

76 See infra, Sec.Sec. 1393, 1394.

77 Riech v. Bolch, 68 la. 526, 27 N. W. 507; Peters v. Whitney, 23 Barb. 24. See also Tennessee v. Ward, 9 struction of goods which would not have occured had a contract been carried out to remove them from the place in which they were at the time of the accident cannot be compensated,78 unless the possibility of accident should have been reasonably foreseen as a consequence of failing to remove them.79