Where a consideration of one dollar, or indeed any named consideration, would be valid if actually given, the question has been raised how far a recital of such consideration in a written instrument precludes the promisor from showing not only that he did not receive that consideration, or any consideration, but that he did not agree to receive it or anything else as the consideration for his promise. Presumably under the early common law, any recital in a deed estopped a party to the deed from showing it to be untrue.82 It is at least well settled that the recital of consideration in a deed of conveyance estops the grantor to deny the existence of that consideration for the purpose of impeaching the validity of the deed, as a deed of bargain and sale.83
Lord Hardwicke was of the opinion that for whatever purpose such evidence was offered, proof could not be given that the consideration stated in a deed was in fact not the whole consideration, unless such words as "and other considerations " followed the statement of specific consideration.84 But so strict a rule is no longer applied either in England or America. By a relaxation originating in equity and extending to courts of law, additional consideration may be shown which is not repugnant to the consideration named.85
81 Sec infra, Sec. 1425.
82 Early cases are collected and commented upon in: MeCrea v. Purmont, 16 Wend. 460, 467, 30 Am. Dec. 103. But see also Hawley v. Dibble, 184 Mich. 298, 151 N. W. 712; 1 ID. Law Bulletin, 142, by Edward H. Decker.
833 Washburn on Real Property (6th ed.), Sec. 2283; Stannard v. Aurora, etc., R. Co., 220 111. 469, 77 N. E. 254.
84 Peacock p. Monk, 1 Ves. Sr, 127,
128. And see for the strict rule at law, Rowntree v. Jacob, 2 Taunt. 141; Baker v. Dewey, 1 B. & C. 704.
85 Clifford v, Turrell, 1 Y. & C. (C. C.) 138, affd. 9 Jur. 633; Leifchild's Cas. L. R. 1 Eq. 231; Peters v. McLaren, 218 Fed. 410,134 C. C. A. 198; Cheese-man v. Nicholl, 18 Col. App. 174, 70 Pac. 797; Belden v. Seymour, 8 Conn. 304, 21 Am. Dec. 661; Hays v. Peck, 107 Ind. 389,8 N. E. 274; Nichols, etc.,
And, generally, At the present time, even though the consideration in fact was entirely different from the consideration named in the deed, and not merely additional to it, the truth may be shown for any purpose except the impeachment of the validity of the deed for lack of consideration,86 unless the stated consideration is promissory in character and not merely a recital of fact.87 Other recitals in a deed than those of consideration preclude an attempt to affect the validity of the instrument by denying their truth in any controversy between the parties.88 A statement of a doctrine similar to that applicable to deeds is common in regard to insurance policies. It is held that the acknowledgment in a policy of the receipt of the premium estops the company to deny the validity of the policy on the ground of non-payment of the premium.89
Co. p. Burch, 128 Ind. 324, 27 N. E. 737; Bourne p. Bourne, 92 Ky. 211, 17 8. W. 443; Hodges p. Heal, 80 Me. 281, 14 Atl. 11, 6 Am. St. Rep. 199; Miller v. Goodwin, 8 Gray, 542; Bar-bee v. Burbee, 109 N. G. 290, 13 S. E. 792; Hayden p. Mentzer, 10 S. & R. 329; Harwood v. Harwood's Est., 22 Vt. 507; Wilfong v. Johnson, 41 W. Va. 283, 23 S. E. 730. And see decisions in the following note.
86 Mason v. Buchanan, 62 Ala. 110; Mobile Savings Bank v. McDonnell, 89 Ala, 434, 8 So. 137, 9 L. R. A. 645; Mewes v. Home Bank (Ark.), 172 S. W. 853; Lay p. Gaines, 130 Ark. 167, 196 S. W. 919; Howell v. Moores, 127 111. 67, 19 N.E. 863; Lloyd v. Sandusky, 203 111 621, 631, 68 N. E. 154; Fleming v. Reheis, 275 111. 132, 113 N. E. 923; Poor's Exr, v. Scott, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 239,68 S. W. 397; Goodapeed v. Fuller, 46 Me. 141,71 Am. Deo. 572; Cardinal p. Hadley, 158 Mass. 352, 35 Am. St. Rep. 492; Stotts v. Stotts, 198 Mich. 605, 165 N. W. 761; Houston v. Greiner, 73 Or. 304, 144 Pac. 133; Bibelhausen v. Bibelhausen, 159 Wig. 365, 150 N. W. 516; Chapman p. Schroder, 166 Wis. 330,165 N. W. 295.
Cf. Myron p. Union R. Co., 19 R. 1.125, 32 Atl. 165. Where a deed is attacked for fraud or illegality the stated consideration may of course be contradicted for the purpose of impeaching the validity of the deed.
87 The parol evidence rule which is equally applicable to sealed and unsealed writings here comes into play. See the following section.
88 Green v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 92 Fed. 873, 35 C. C. A. 68; State p. United States, etc., Co., 81 Kans. 660, 670,106 Pac. 1040, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 865; Jefferson v. McCarthy, 44 Minn. 26, 46 N. W. 140; Board v. American L. & T. Co., 75 Minn. 489, 78 N. W. 113; Blaco v. State, 58 Neb. 557, 78 N. W. 1056.
89 Roberta v. Security Co., Ltd.,  1 Q. B. 111; Farnum v. Insurance Co., 83 Cal. 246, 23 Pac. 869, 17 Am. St. Rep. 233; Provident Life Ins. Co. p. Fennell, 49 111. 180; Teutonic Life Ins. Co. p. Mueller, 77 111. 22, 24; Home Ins. Co. p. Oilman, 112 Ind. 7, 13 N. E. 118; Michael v. Mutual Ins. Co., 10 La. Ann. 737; Consolidated, etc., Ins. Co. v. Cashow, 41 Md. 59, 76; Basch v. Humbolt, etc., Co., 35 N. J. L. 429;
Insurance polices are almost invariably written by corporations and under seal, so that the principle generally applicable to deeds might properly be held applicable to most insurance polices. Even though not under seal, an insurance policy may fairly be regarded as a mercantile speciality partaking rather of the character of a sealed instrument than of an ordinary written contract which is merely evidence of the contract and not itself the contract. It should also be observed that neither in the case of the insurance policy, nor of the deed of conveyance, is the question one of consideration for a contract. No policy of the law forbids a gratuitous conveyance, and in the insurances cases there is no question of gratuitous insurance. In all the cases unquestionably, if the insured had not paid the premium he had expressly or impliedly agreed to pay it; and the only question related to the enforcement of a condition in the policy that it should be invalid until the premium had been paid. Such a condition may of course be waived. It may also be added that if a contract in writing is made by statute the equivalent of a contract under seal at common law, so far as concerns the necessity of consideration, it may be that the rule of the common law in regard to estoppel by deed, so far as it still survives, should also be applied to any written conveyance or contract.