Where a defendant has repudiated the contract after an actual breach but before the time for full performance has arrived, there seems no doubt that this repudiation can be withdrawn before the other party has either manifested an election to rescind the contract, or changed his position in reliance on the repudiation in such a way as to make performance more burdensome.93 And presumably if the repudiation was wholly anticipatory the same privilege would be allowed.94 If, however, the injured party has changed his position such withdrawal is ineffectual.95
99 Va. 208, 37 S. E. 854; Walsh v. Myers, 92 Wis. 397, 66 N. W. 250. Cf. Chicago Washed Coal Co. v. Whitsett, 278 111. 623, 116 N. £. 115.
87 The importance of this qualification is shown by Rubber Trading Co. v. Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co., 221 N. Y. 127,116 N. E. 789. The defendant repudiated, but the plaintiff apparently still wishing to continue the contract made a tender of performance, but with an unwarranted condition vitiating the tender. He later sought to recover on the ground that the defendant's repudiation excused the necessity of tender; but was rightly denied recovery. See supra, Sec. 677.
88 Bernstein v. Meech, 130 N. Y. 354, 29 N. E. 255.
89 See supra, Sec. 688.
90 See supra, Sec.Sec. 700 el seq. 91 See infra, Sec. 1337.
92 See supra, Sec. 1296.