It has been said that "there is no legal obligation on the vendor to inform the purchaser that he is under a mistake, not inmisstatement of fait." Edgington v. Fitzmauriee, 29 Ch. D. 459, per Bowen, L.J.
59 Rogers v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 149 Fed. 1, 78 C. C. A. 615; Mamaux v. Cape May Real Est. Co., 214 Fed. 757, 131 C. C. A. 63; Ansley v. Bank of Piedmont, 113 Ala. 467, 21 So. 59, 59 Am. St. Rep. 122; Southern L. & T. Co. v. Giasendaner, 4 Ala. App. 523, 58 So. 737; Lawrence v. Gayetty, 78 Cal. 126, 20 Pac. 382, 12 Am. St. Rep. 29; Ruas Lumber Co. v. Mus-cupiable Land Co., 120 Cal. 521, 52 Pac. 995, 65 Am. St. Rep. 188; Lang-ley v. Rodriquez, 122 Cal. 580, 55 Pac. 406, 68 Am. St. Rep. 70; Sollies v. Johnson, 85 Conn. 77, 81 Atl. 974; McLaughlin v. Thomas, 86 Conn. 252, 85 Atl. 370; Hight v. Richmond Park Imp. Co., 47 App. Dist. Col. 518; National Bank v. Mackey, 5 Eans. App. 437, 49 Pac. 324; Holdham v. Bent-ley, 6 B. Mon. 428; Price v. Reed, 2 Harr. A G. 291; Laing v. McKee, 13 Mich. 124, 87 Am. Dec. 738; Cox v. Edwards, 120 Minn. 512, 139 N. W. 1070; Laswell v. National Handle Co., 147 Mo. App. 497,126 S. W. 969; Cerny v. Paxton & Gallagher Co. (Neb.), 110 N. W. 882, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 640; Ivancovich v. Stern, 14 Nev. 341; Goodwin v. Horn, 60 N. H. 485; Hill v. Chamberlain, 64 N. Y. App. Div. 609, 71 N. Y. S. 639, affd., 170 N. Y. 595, 63 N. E. 1117; Adams v. Gillig, 199 N. Y. 314, 92 N. E. 670, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 127; Troxler v. Building Co., 137 N. C. 51, 49 S. E. 58; White Sewing Mach.XJo. v. Bullock, 161 N. C. 1, 76 S. E. 634; Herndon v. Durham etc. Ry. Co., 161 N. C. 650, 77 S. E. 683; Hellebust v. Bonde, (N. Dak. 1919), 172 N. W. 812; Blackburn v. Morrison, 29 Okl. 510,118 Pac. 402; McFarland v. McGill, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 298, 41 S. W. 402. (See also Lott Town & Imp. Co. v. Harper, [Tex. Civ. App.] 204 S. W. 452); Hewett v. Dole, 69 Wash. 163, 124 Pac. 374.
60The decisions on this point are collected in infra, Sec. 1521.
61 Bellairs v. Tucker, 13 Q. B. D. 562; Terhune v. Coker, 107 Ga. 352, 33 S. E. 394; Romaine v. Excelsior Carbide Ac. Co., 54 Wash. 41,103 Pac. 32.
62 Smith v. Hughes, L. R. 6 Q. B. 597, 607, per Blackburn, J. Cf. supra, Sec. 1426.
63 The leading case for this doctrine is Laidlaw v. Organ, 2 Wheat. 178, 4 L. Ed. 214. This was an action by the buyer of tobacco against the sellers to gain possession of it. There was evidence that before the sale the buyer, upon being asked by one of the sellers whether there was any news calculated to enhance its value, was silent although he had received news which the seller had not of the treaty of Ghent which terminated the War of 1812. The court below, on the ground that there was no evidence that the plaintiff had asserted or suggested anything to the sellers, calculated to impose upon them in regard to this news, directed a verdict for the plaintiff. On exceptions, the direction of the court was held erroneous. The question whether any imposition was practiced by the buyer upon the seller it was held should have been submitted to the jury. Though the actual decision of the case thus tends to the enlargement of the rights of the deceived party, the case is usually cited for the statement of Marshall, C. J., that it could not be laid down as matter of law that intelligence of extrinsic circumstances which might influence the price of the commodity and were exclusively within the buyer's knowledge must have been communicated to the seller. The case of Smith v. Hughes, L. R. 6 Q. B. 597, from which a quotation has been made in the text, is even more explicit. This was an action for the price of oats. The defendant (the buyer) refused to accept the oats or pay the price because he had been under the impression when he agreed to buy the oats that they were old oats, whereas, in fact, they were new oats. The jury found that the seller believed the defendant to be under this impression. The judge at the trial directed the jury on this finding to return a verdict for the defendant. It was held by the Court of Appeals that there must be a new trial. The self-deception of the buyer did not enable him to avoid the contract even though known to the seller. See also Turner v. Green,  2 Ch. 205; Greenhalgh v. Brindley,  2 Ch. 324; Cleveland v. Richardson, 132 U. S. 318, 329, 10 S. Ct. 100, 33 L. Ed. 384; Blydenburgh v. Welsh, Baldwin (U. S.), 331; Wilson v. Higbee, 62 Fed. 723; Heydenfeldt v. Osmont (Cal.), 175 Pac. 1; Morris v. Thompson, 85 111. 16; Dayton v. Kidder, 105 HI. App. 107; Fhinney v. Friedman, 224 Mass. 531, 113 N. E. 285. 286; Redfield v. Engel, 171 Mich. 207, 137 N. W. 60; Benoit*. Perkins (N. H.), 104 Atl. 254; Beninger v. Corwin, 24 N. J. L. (4 Zab.) 257; Paul v. Had-ley, 23 Barb. 521; People's Bank v. Bogart, 81 N. Y. 101; Smith v. Alpin, 150 N. C. 425,64 S. E. 210; Kintzing v. McElrath, 5 Pa. St. 467; Neill v. Sham-burg, 158 Pa. St. 263, 27 Atl. 992; Rose v. Barclay, 191 Pa. St. 594, 43 Atl. 385, 45 L. R. A. 392; Fisher v. Budlong, 10 R. I. 525, 527; Fell v.
- with obvious justice that mistake by one party and knowledge of the mistake by the other, will justify relief as fully as mutual mistake.69 The importance of distinguishing whether the transaction can be called fraudulent as distinguished from one based on mistake without fraud, even where no other remedy than rescission is sought, lies in the fact that fraud as to any circumstances actually inducing a bargain may justify relief,70 while mistake must be as to a matter which formed a fundamental basis of the bargain.71
Lloyd, 4 Comm. (Australia) 572. A contrary decision is Davis v. Reis-inger, 120 N. Y. App. Div. 766, 106 N. Y. S. 603, where one who had agreed to buy Bassein rice like a sample which owing to the seller's mistake was Java rice, a more valuable kind, was not allowed to enforce the contract because he knew the sample was Java rice. The Civil Code of Georgia provides that "where one party knows that the other party is laboring under a delusion in respect to the property sold or the condition of the other party, and yet keeps silence1' such silence amounts to fraud. See Marietta Fertiliser Co. v. Beckwith, 4 Ga. App. 245,61S. E. 149.
64 Laidlaw v. Organ, 2 Wheat. 178, 4 L. Ed. 214.
65 A false denial of knowledge is unquestionably fraudulent. Dunlap v. Richmond Ac. R., 81 Ga. 136, 7 S. E. 283.
66 Reynell v. Sprye, 1 D. M. & G. 656, 660, 709, 712; Davies v. London Ins. Co., 8 Ch. D. 469, 475; Redgrave v. Hurd, 20 Ch. D. 1, 12, 13; Loewer v. Harris, 57 Fed. 368, 6 C. C. A. 394; Mudsill Min. Co. v. Watrous, 61 Fed. 163,189, 9 C. C. A. 415. Cf. Pettigrew v. Chellis, 41 N. H. 95.
67 Wald's Pollock Cont. (3d Am. ed.), 682.
68 See infra, Sec. 1578.
69 See infra, Sec.51548, n. 47, 1557, n. 89.