A method of fraud upon the seller not infrequently committed is for a fraudulent buyer to obtain goods by inducing the seller to believe that the sale is made to another person having good credit. If the buyer induces the seller to assent to the transfer of title in the goods to him under such a mistaken belief, title will pass although it will be voidable for fraud. Thus where the buyer in person obtains the assent of the seller to a sale to him of the goods by pretending to be some one else, title passes,73 although as between the parties the transaction is voidable.74 In such a case, though it is true the seller intends to transfer title to the person of good credit whom he supposes to be the person standing before him, his primary intent is to transfer title to the person before him.75 It frequently happens that a seller intends several things when professing to transfer title, and that all of these intentions cannot be effected. This is almost invariably true where the bargain is induced by fraud. Thus if the buyer is the person that he purports to be, 'but deceives the seller as to his pecuniary responsibility, the seller here also has a double intent; namely, to transfer title to the goods to the person before him, and also to transfer title to the goods to a person of pecuniary responsibility; but the primary intent is to transfer title to the person before him, and accordingly title will pass. On the other hand, if goods are ordered by mail by a fraudulent person, the name of a responsible buyer being used as a means of deception to induce the seller to send forward the goods, the seller's primary intent is to sell the goods to the person whose name appears to be signed to the letter. The seller also intends to sell the goods to the person who wrote the letter. He believes that these two intentions are harmonious because he believes the persons are one and the same. As they are not the same, both intentions cannot be made effectual; but the primary intent is to sell to the person whose name appears signed to the letter; that is the essential matter in the seller's mind. The belief that the writer of the letter is that person is rather an inducement to the intent to sell to the person indicated by the signature than itself the governing purpose.76 So where a person falsely represents that he is the agent

71 Pratt v. Metsger, 78 Ark. 177,06 S. W. 451; Kimmell v. Skelly, 130 Gal. 665, 62 Pac. 1067; Sanborn v. Sanborn, 104 Mich. 180, 62 N. W. 371; Quinby v. Shearer, 56 Minn. 534, 58 N. W. 155; Standard Mfg. Co. v. Slot, 121 Wis. 14, 98 N. W. 023, 105 Am. St. Rep. 1016.

72 Carlisle etc. Co. v. Bragg, [1911] 1 K. B. 489; American Fine Art Co. v. Beeves Pulley Co., 127 Fed. 808, 62 C. C. A. 488; Capital Security Co. v. Holland, 6 Ala. App. 197, 60 So. 495; Wenzel v. Shulz, 78 Cal. 221, 20 Pac. 404; Angier v. Brewster, 69 Ga. 362; McBride v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 102 Ga. 422, 30 S. E. 999; Chapman v. Atlanta Guano Co., 91 Ga. 821, 18 S. E. 41; New v. Wambach, 42 Ind. 456; Pictorial Review Co. v. Fitzgibbon, 163 la. 644, 145 N. W. 315; Disney v. St. Louis Jewelry Co., 76 Kan. 145, 90 Pac. 782; Western Mfg. Co. v. Cotton, 126 Ky. 749,104 S. W. 758,12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 427; Great Northern Mfg. Co. v. Brown, 113 Me. 51, 92 Atl. 993; Bixler v. Wright, 116 Me. 133, 100 Atl. 467; Rosenberg v. Doe, 148 Mass. 560,

20 N. E. 176; Maxfield v. Schwarts, 45 Minn. 150, 47 N. W. 448, 10 L. R. A, 606; Shrimpton & Sons v. Philbrick, 53 Minn. 366, 55 N. W. 551; Adolph v. Minneapolis & P. Ry. Co., 58 Minn. 178, 59 N. W. 959; Demaris v. Rod-gers, 110 Minn. 49, 124 N. W. 457; Eggleston v. Advance Thresher Co., 96 Minn. 241, 104 N. W. 891; Stamps v. Bracy, 1 How. (Miss.) 312; Tait v. Locke, 130 Mo. App. 273, 109 S. W. 105; Cole Bros. v. Williams, 12 Neb. 440, 11 N. W. 875; Dunston lithograph Co. v. Borgo, 84 N. J. L. 623, 87 Atl. 334; Albany City Sav. Inst. v. Burdick, 87 N. Y. 40; Griffin v. Lumber Co., 140 N. C. 514,53 S. E. 307,6 L. R. A. (N. S.), 463 (annotated); International & G. N. R. Co. v. Shuford, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 251, 81 S. W. 1189; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Milam (Tex. Civ. App.), 58 S. W. 735; Compagnie des Metaux Unital v. Victoria Mfg. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 107 S. W. 661; Warder Co. v. Whitish, 77 Wis 430, 46 N. W. 540; Standard Mfg. Co. v. Slot, 121 Wis. 14, 98 N. W. 923,105 Am. St. Rep. 1016.

73 Hickey v. McDonald, 151 Ala. 497, 44 So. 201, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 413; Martin v. Green, 117 Me. 138, 102 Atl. 977; Edmunds v. Merchants' Transportation Co., 135 Mass. 283; Brighton Packing Go. v. Butchers' Ac. Assoc., 211 Mass. 398, 402, 97 N. K 780; Phelps v. McQuade, 220 N. Y. 232, 115 N. E. 441. But see Loeffel v. Pohlman, 47 Mo. App. 574; Morrison v. Bobertson, [1908] S. C. 332 (Scotch Ct. of Sees.). This principle has been applied in the law of negotiable paper where it is held that if a note is made payable in terms to A, but is delivered to B on the supposition that he is A, title to the note is in B and may be transferred by B's indorsement. Emporia Bank v. Shotwell, 35 Kans. 360, 11 Pac. 141, 57 Am. Rep. 171; Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231, 4 N. E. 619, 55 Am. Rep. 471; Land Trust Co. v. Northwestern Bank, 796 Pa. St. 230, 46 Atl. 420, 50 L. R. A. 15, 79 Am. St. Rep. 717. Compare Tohnan v. American Bank, 22 R. I.

462, 48 Atl. 480, 62 L. R. A. 877, 84 Am. St. Rep. 850, where a contrary conclusion was reached; but this was based on the Negotiable Instruments Law, the wording of which affords some color for the decision, which must, however, be deemed erroneous.

74 So where in a contract of agency the agent assumed a false name the contract was held 'unenforceable by him or his assignee. Morgan Munitions Supply Co. v. Studebaker Corp. 226 N. Y. 94, 123 N. E. 146.

75 For the same reason where a loan of money was obtained on a mortgage bond signed by a real person (an infant) in his own name, by one who fraudulently pretended that he had signed it, and that the name was his, the court held that the lender's real bargain was with the borrower before him and not with the signer of the bond, and that the contract might be reformed to express this. Gotthelf v. Shapiro, 136 N. Y. App. D. 1,120 N. Y. S. 210.