Such admission or part payment of a debt as is generally held sufficient to avoid the bar of the Statute of Limitations ought more clearly to determine the right of an infant to avoid an obligation, since it is only the continuance of the original obligation, not the creation of a new one, which the plaintiff seeks to show. But the weight of authority is otherwise,48 though many of the decisions are early ones, made at

44 Contracts of an infant not within the prohibited classes and which aside from statute were good unless avoided and therefore required no formal ratification, still have their common-law force in England. See Edwards v. Carter, 11893] A. C. 360; Vidits v. O'Ha. gan, [1900] 2 Ch. 87.

45 See infra, Sec.Sec. 234, 239.

46 See infra, Sec. 683.

46a See infra, Sec. 154.

47 See infra, Sec. 689.

48Thrupp v. Fielder, 2 Esp. 628; Kendrick v. Neisz, 17 Colo. 506, 30 Pac. 245; Catlin v. Haddox, 49 Conn. 492, 44 Am. Rep. 249; Ford v. Phillips, a time when the legal nature of an infant's contract had not yet been clearly formulated. If there are surrounding circumstances which, taken in connection with the payment, justify the inference of a promise implied in fact to pay the whole, it is probable that the original liability would be held to have been ratified.49