It may properly be urged that the measure of damages in an action for deceit differs from that applicable to actions for breach of warranty or to actions based on estoppel. In an action of tort for deceit it may be said that the law should endeavor to place the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been in had no tort been committed; that is, if the plaintiff had not entered into the bargain at all. On the other hand, for misrepresentation which amounts to a warranty or estoppel the defendant is compelled to place the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been in had the misrepresentation been true. Undoubtedly this difference in theory exists, though as matter of fact the weight of authority in this country gives the plaintiff the same measure of damages in tort for deceit as it gives for breach of warranty.57 But the vital question concerns liability and not the measure of damages for it. If it be granted that the defendant should be liable for honest misrepresentation to the extent suggested, it is of little comparative importance whether the liability should be to make the representation good, or to make good the loss incurred by reliance upon it. There is authority for either way of dealing with the liability.
56 In Grosh v. Ivanhoe Land Co., 95 Va. 161, 27 S. E. 841, the vendor of town lots falsely represented that railroads and other enterprises were established in the town. He was held none the less liable because he believed that they soon would be. See also Whiting v. Price, 169 Mass. 576, 48 N. E. 772.
57 See supra, Sec. 1392.