As the force of an acknowledgment depends in most States upon the inference to be drawn from it of an intention to pay,

47 Cripps v. Davie, 12 M. & W. 159; In re River Steamer Co., L. R. 6 Ch. 822; Deebon v. Eaton, 4 Me. 413; Bradley v. Field, 3 Wend. 272; Eckert v. Wilson, 12 Serg. & R. 393; Lee v. Polk, 4 McCord, 215.

48 Nicholls v. Warfield, 18 Fed. Cas. No. 10, 234, 2 Crunch C. C. 429; Stiles v. Laurel Fork Oil, etc., Co., 47 W. Va. 838, 35 S. E. 986.

49See infra, Sec. 188.

50See Teessen v. Camblin, 1 111 App.

424, 428; Davidson v. Morris, 5 Sm. & M, 564; Gordon's Estate, 3 Fa. Co. Ct. 160; Sutton c. Burruss, 9 Leigh, 381, 33 Am. Dec. 246.

51 White v. Potter, Coxe (N. J.), 159; Johnson's Adm. v. Bounethea, 3 Hill (S. C), 15, 30 Am. Dec. 347; Jones v. Brown, 9 U. C. C. P. 201.

52Collegev. Horn, 3 Bing. 119; Gardner v. M'Mahon, 3 Q. B. 561; Skeet v. Lindsay, 2 Ex. D. 314.

if there is anything tending to negative such an inference in the surrounding circumstances even though not in the words of the acknowledgment, the indebtedness will not be revived.53 The admission of a witness that he is indebted, being made under the compulsion of an oath, does not afford any warrant for the implication of a promise.54 An acknowledgment in an answer to a bill in equity, being also made under compulsion, affords no implication of a new promise,55 except in jurisdictions where an admission of indebtedness even though no implication of a promise to pay can be made from it, imposes a fresh liability on the debtor.56 Though a new promise should not be implied from an admission compulsorily made under such circumstances, there seems no reason why a debtor may not in a pleading, as well as elsewhere, effectively make a new promise, by words sufficiently express.57 In order to amount to a new promise the words of the debtor in a pleading must conform to the ordinary requirements of a new promise.58 If, therefore, any part of the statement of the debtor indicates an intention not to pay the debt, it is abundantly clear that no new liability is created.59 Allowing judgment to go by default involves no promise of payment;60 but confessing judgment

53 Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, 362, 7 L. Ed. 174; Goldsby v. Gentle, 5 Blackf. 436; Johnston v. Hussey, 89 Me. 488, 36 Atl. 993.

54Sanford v. Clark, 29 Conn. 467; Bloodgood v. Bmen, 8 N. Y. 362; Walter v. Whitacre, 113 Va. 160, 73 S. E. 984. Aa to what will amount to a withdrawal by the testimony of a defendant of a plea of the statute, see Moore v. Stuart, 216 Mass. 456, 102 N. E. 658.

55 Commercial Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brett, 44 Barb. 489; Holberg v. Jaf-fray, 65 Miss. 626, 6 So. 94.

56 See supra, a 167, and especially see McMillan v. Toombs, 74 Ga. 635; Roberts v. Leak, 108 Ga. 806, 33 S. E. 995; Blakeney v. Wyland, 115 Ia. 607, 89 N W. 16; Bisaell v. Jaudon, 16 Oh. St. 498; Blair v. Nugent, 9 Irish Eq. 400.

57 Thus where in a pleading a debtor asserts an indebtedness to the creditor and claims the right to deduct it from another claim made against himself, Brigham v. Hutehins, 27 Vt. 509; Din-guid v. Schootfield, 32 Gratt, 803; or asserts in a bill in equity as a ground for relief, his own indebtedness. Brad58ley v. Briggs, 22 Vt. 95.

58Thornton v. Nichols, 119 Ga. 60, 45 S. E. 785; McMillan . Leeds, 58 Kans. 815, 49 Pac. 159.

59 Hinkle v. Currin, 2 Humph. 137. As where the debtor admitting an obligation to pay the debt asserts a right of set-off exceeding it in amount, Bad-ford v. Spyket's Adm'r, 32 Ala. 134, or where the debtor though confessing the debt pleads an.avoidance of liability upon it. Southern Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pike, 34 La. Ann. 826.

60 Boone v. Colehour, 166 111. 305, 46 does,61 as does signing a statement of indebtedness intended as a basis for a judgment by confession though no judgment was in fact entered.62 A schedule of debts made by one who assigns his property for the benefit of creditors,62a or in compliance with a bankruptcy law,63 will not revive a debt listed therein. Though it is essential to an effective acknowledgment that the court shall be able to infer from it the debtor's intention to pay, it is not necessary that the debtor should have known when he expressed such an intention that the claim was barred.64