Either prior to the expiration of the statutory period or subsequently, a debtor may promise not to plead the Statute of Limitations. He may make such a promise for sufficient consideration, or he may make it for no consideration. If the promise is made for sufficient consideration the only questions that can arise are whether such a promise is altogether opposed to public policy, and, if not, for how long a period the promise is effective. There seems no reason to distinguish in this respect between promises made at the time of the creation of the debt 60 and promises made subsequently, but for good consideration.61 To some courts it has seemed that as the Statute of limitations is founded in part at least on principles of public policy, and not simply as a protection to the debtor, the period of limitation prescribed by statute cannot be changed by contract or action in reliance on a promise though an agreement to this end subsequent to the creation of the debt if in writing and if fairly to be construed as including an admission of the debt, might have the same effect as a new promise or acknowledgment.62 But more commonly such agreements have been held valid contracts.63 If such a contract is valid and ordinary principles are applicable "the Statute of Limitations would not begin to run upon [it] so long as it remained unbroken," 64 and since if the creditor forbore to sue indefinitely, the contract not to plead the Statute would never be broken, in effect the creditor would require a perpetual cause of action. It is not likely, however, that most courts would accept this logical consequence of the premise, and thereby allow the creditor a perpetual right. In California, indeed, it has been said that the promise not to plead the Statute is binding so long as the creditor acts upon it,65 but more commonly the contract is treated as limited by the same term as it would be if merely a new promise to pay the debt.66
Rep. 407; Tompkins v. Brown, 1 Denio, 247; Tebo v. Robinson, 29 Hun, 243; Scott v. Thornton, 104 Tenn. 547, 58 8. W. 236. The North Carolina court apparently does not recognize the validity of conditional promises to pay even though the condition has happened. Cooper v. Jones, 128 N. C. 40,38 S. E. 28. See also Simrell v. Miller, 169 Pa. St. 326, 32 At). 548. A few decisions holding that such a promise is in effect an absolute one, creating an immediate liability can be supported only on the assumption not now generally permissible that the mere admission of indebtedness revives it. Horner v. Starkey, 27 111. 13 (see Walker v. Freeman, 209 111. 17, 70 N. E. 595, and cases cited); Norton v. Shepard, 48 Conn. 141, 40 Am. Rep. 157; First Congl. Society v. Miller, 15 N. H. 520 (overruled in Barker v. Heath, 74 N. H. 270, 67 Att. 222); Cummings v. Gos-sett, 19 Vt. 310. In Boynton v. Moul ton, 159 Mass. 248, 34 N. E. 361, the defendant promised to pay on a certain barred claim "such amount as I can." It was held this was a promise merely to pay what the defendant could pay on the particular day when the promise was made, and, it being found as a fact that on that day he could pay nothing, the plaintiff was held entitled to recover nothing.
57 Francis v. Rycroft, 148 N. Y. App. Div. 65, 132 N. Y. S. 14.
58 Thyng v. Hussey, 76 N. H. 572, 79 Atl. 690.
59See Irving v. Veitch, 3 M. & W. 90; Re Stock, 3 Manson, 324; Matter of Nargones, 161 N. Y. App. Div. 563, 565, 146 N. Y. S. 922, affd. 213 N. Y. 659, 700, 107 N. E. 1082, 108 N. E. 1101; M'Donnell v. Broderick,  2 I. R. 136.
60 Such were the promisee in Quick v. Codies, 39 N. J. L. 11; State Trust Co. v. Sheldon, 68 Vt. 259, 35 Atl. 177.
See also Newell v. Clark, 73 N. H. 289, 61 Atl. 555.
61See cases cited in the following notes in this section.
62 Green v. Coos Bay Wagon Road Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 07, 70; Moxley v. Ragan, 10 Bush, 156,159,19 Am. Rep. 61; Wright v. Gardner, 98 Ky. 454, 33 S. W. 622, 35 8. W. 1116; Carraby p. Navarre, 3 La. 362; Crane v. French, 38 Miss. 503; Shapley v. Abbott, 42 N. Y. 443, 452, 1 Am. Rep. 548; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. United States Hotel Co., 82 N. Y. Misc. 632, 644, 144 N. Y. S. 476; Nunn v. Edmiston, 9 Tex. Civ. App.562, 29 S. W. 1115. See also Hodgdon v. Chase, 29 Me. 47, 32 Me. 169.
63Waters v. Thanet, 2 Q. B. 757; Eandon v. Toby, 11 How. 493, 13
L. Ed. 784; Wells, Fargo ft Co. v. En-right, 127 Cal. 669, 60 Pac. 439; State Trust Co. v. Cochran, 130 Cal. 245, 62 Pac. 466,600; Mann v. Cooper, 2 Dist. Col. App. 226; Holman v. Omaha, etc., Ry. Bridge Co., 117 Ia. 268, 90 N. W. 833, 62 L. R. A. 395, 94 Am. St. Rep. 293; Webber v. Williams College, 23 Pick. 302; Bridges v. Stephens, 132 Mo. 524, 34 S. W. 555; Quick v. Corlies, 39 N. J. L. 11; State Trust Co. v. Sheldon, 68 Vt. 259, 36 Atl. 177.
64Kellogg v. Dickinson, 147 Mass. 432, 435, 18 N. E. 223; 1 L. R. A. 346.
65State Trust Co. v. Cochran, 130 Cal. 245, 253, 62 Pac. 466, 600. See also Holman v. Omaha, etc, Ry. & Bridge Co., 117 la. 268, 90 N. W. 833, 62 L. R. A. 395, 94 Am. St. Rep. 293.
66Waters v. Thanet, 2 Q. B. 757;