78Winckworth v. Mills, 2 Esp. 484 (overruled); Fasten v. Clem (Ala.), 78 So. 883, 1 A. L. R. 381; May v. Williams, 61 Miss. 126, 48 Am. Rep. 80; Craft v. Lott, 87 Miss. 590, 40 So. 426,

6 Ann. Cos. 670; Gamer v. Hudgins, 46 Mo. 390, 2 Am. Rep. 520; Bissig v. Britton, 59 Mo. 204, 21 Am. Rep. 379; Hartley v. Sandford, 66 N. J. L. 627; 50 AH. 454, 55 L. R. A. 206; Draughan v. Bunting, 9 Ired. 10; Easter v. White, 12 Ohio St. 219; Ketaey v. Hibbs, 13 Ohio St. 340; Nugent v. Wolfe, 11 Pa. 471, 4 All. 15 (but see Elkin v. Timlin, 151 Pa. 491, 25 Atl. 139); Simpson v.

Nance, I Spoors, 4; Macey v, Childress, 2 Tenn. Ch. 438; Wolverton v. Davis, 85 Va. 64,6 S. E. 619 (overruled by Alphin v. Lowman, 115 Va. 441, 79 S. E. 1029, Ann. Cos. 1915 A. 863). In some of the States where a promise to indemnify a surety is held within the statute, a contrary result is reached if the promisor is a co-surety. Barry v. Ransom, 12 N. Y. 462; Ferrell v. Maxwell, 28 Ohio St. 383, 22 Am. Rep. 393. See also Alphin v. Lowman, 115 Va. 441, 79 S. E. 1029, Ann. Cas. 1915 A. 863. But in Posten v. Clem (Ala.), 78 So. 883,1 A. L. R. 381, such a promise was held within the statute. In so far as the new promise extends beyond the obligation to contribute imposed by law on the promisor, irrespective of his promise, the distinction has no foundation in reason.

If it be granted that where the promisor's undertaking is in part to pay for the debt of another, that part at least is unenforceable; the question then arises, can the other part be enforced? If the promise is indivisible, since it cannot be enforced as a whole, it obviously cannot be enforced in any part. Generally in such cases, however, the promise is divisible. In such a case it is important for the plaintiff to sue only upon the portion of the promise which is outside of the statute; for should he sue on the whole promise, as he could not prove the contract declared on, he could not recover at all without amending his declaration.81

79Clifford v. Luhring, 69 111. 401; Hill v. Bank of Seneca, 100 Mo. App. 230, 73 S. W. 307; Fitzgerald v. Morri-sey, 14 Neb. 198, 15 N. W. 233; Mor-rissey v. Kinsey, 16 Neb. 17, 19 N. W. 454; Wills v. Cutler, 61 N. H. 406; Crawford v. Edison, 45 Oh. St. 239, 13 N. E. 80; Pizzi v. Nardello, 209 Pa. 1, 57 Atl. 1100; Muller v. Riviere, 59 Tex. 640, 46 Am. Rep. 291.

Where as in McLaughlin v. Austin, 104 Mich. 489, 62 N. W. 719; Abbott v. Nash, 35 Minn. 451, 29 N. W. 65; Downes v. Elmira Bridge Co., 82 N. Y. App. D. 639, 81 N. Y. S. 834; Young v.

French, 35 Wis. 111, the creditor gives up the possibility of acquiring a lien to secure the back debt, relying upon the new promise, a new element enters into the case, and the discussion supra, Sec. 472, is applicable.

80Andre v. Bodman, 13 Md. 241, 71 Am. Dec. 628; Gill v. Herrick, 11 Mass. 501; Ruppe v. Peterson, 67 Mich. 437, 35 N. W. 82 (but see McLaughlin v. Austin, 104 Mich. 489, 62 N. W. 719); Belknap v. Bender, 75 N. Y. 446; Bir-chell v. Neaster, 36 Ohio St. 331.

81 See Lexington v. Clarke, 2 Vent. 223; Chater v. Beckett, 7 T. R. 201;