By a curious substitution of a word that seems similar, but means something different, Lord Campbell's decision and statement in Morton v. Tibbett,39 that an acceptance might take place though the light to object still remained, has been interpreted as deciding that acceptance could take place when a right to reject still existed.40 It is obvious that acceptance does preclude the possibility of any assertion by the buyer that he did not at the time of the acceptance assent to become the owner either then or thereafter. The definition previously given, which seems both to accord with the natural meaning of the language of the statute and to be supported by authority, requires that the buyer shall have assented to become the owner of the goods. Though it does not follow that the buyer may not claim that the goods do not fulfill a warranty, express or implied, in regard to them, nor that he may not rescind his assent to becoming the owner, if he has been induced by fraud, duress, or mistake to give such assent (or if there has been a breach of warranty in jurisdictions where breach of warranty justifies rescission of title), it does follow that he cannot assert that he did not agree to take the property in the very goods in question, if within the meaning of the statute he has accepted them.41

32 Beaumont v. Brengeri, 5 C. B. 301; Richards c. Burroughs, 62 Mich. 117, 28 N. W. 755; Gavlin v. Mac-Keiuie, 21 Or. 184, 27 Pac 1039; Schmidt v. Thomas, 75 Wis. 520, 44 N. W. 771; Walker v. Boulton, 3 U. C. Q. B. 262.

33 See infra, Sec.Sec. 700 et seq.

34 Howe v. Palmer, 3 B. & Ald. 321; Hanson v. Armitage, 5 B. 4 Ald. 557;

Smith v. Sunnan, 9 B. & C. 561, 577; Norman v. Phillips, 14 M. A W. 277.

35 15 Q. B. 428.

36Remick v. Sandford, 120 Mass. 309, 316, note.

37 See, infra, Sec. 712, also Edwards v. Brown, 93 Me. 165, 166, 56 Atl. 654.

38 Rodgers v. Phillips, 40 N. Y. 519, per Daniels, J.