Agreements are not infrequently made for the sale of buildings or of the materials in standing buildings. If the contract is to sell and deliver a house, even though the house is at the time of the bargain affixed to the realty, it is a contract for the sale of goods, for the parties contract to buy and sell a house separated from the realty and moved from its foundations.56 On the other hand, if the parties attempt to make a present transfer of a building or materials fixed in a building, it is evident that they are attempting to make a sale of realty, even though it is also agreed that the subject-matter of the Bale shall be severed within a short time;57 and a parol reservation observe the importance of distinguishing between a sale of fixtures to the landlord and one to a thud person. See also Strong v. Doyle, 110 Mass. 92, 93; Morgan v. Russell, [1909] 1 K. B. 357.

54 Durkee v. Powell, 76 N. Y. App. Div. 176, 77 N. Y. S. 368. See also Strong v. Doyle, 110 Mass. 92.

55 Frear v. Hardenbergh, 5 Johns. 272, 4 Am. Dec. 356; Benedict v. Beebee, 11 Johns. 145; Lower v. Winters, 7 Cow. 263. See also Underfeed Stoker Go. v. Detroit Co., 135 Mich. 431,97 N. W. 959.

56 Scoggin v. Slater, 22 Ala. 687; Harris v. Powers, 57 Ala. 139; dements v. Morton (Ala.), 76 So. 306; Long v. White, 42 Ohio St. 59. See also Rogers v. Cox, 96 Ind. 157, 49 Am. Rep. 152; Whetmore v. Rhett, 12 Rich. L. 665; Brown v. Roland, 11 Tex. Civ.

App. 648, 33 S. W. 273. Compare Fen-lason v. Raokliff, 50 Me. 362; Powell v. MoAshan, 28 Mo. 70. The statement of law in this section was quoted with approval in Wetopeky v. New Haven Gas Light Co., 88 Conn. 1, 90 Atl. 30, where the sale of a house to be removed was held not to be a contract for the sale of realty.

57Lavery v. Puraell, 39 Ch. D. 508. In this case the defendant sold build' ing materials in a standing building. By the terms of the sale the materials were to be taken down and removed within two months. Chitty, J., held the contract to be one for the sale of an interest in land and refused to follow the doctrine applied to trees in Marshall v. Green, 1 C. P. D. 35, that the prospect of immediate severance took the case out of the fourth section. To the same effect as Lavery of a building is equally opposed to the section of the statute relating to land.58