Though acceptance will oridnarily take place after the buyer has sufficiently examined the goods to understand their nature and quality, it is obviously possible for a buyer to accept goods without making an examination. If he assents to take specified goods as bis, there seems no reason to doubt that he has accepted them within the terms of the statute. If, therefore, he does any act in relation to specified goods, which necessarily involves the conclusion that he has taken them as owner, there is an acceptance. Such an act is a resale of the goods by the buyer.25 So mortgaging the goods implies acceptance;26 or aswhich the Legislature has certainly not in terms expressed, that an acceptance prior to the receipt will not suffice."
21 Ex parte Safford, 2 Low. 663; Hewet v. Jordan, 39 Md. 472, 17 Am. Rep. 578; Ullman v. Barnard, 7 Gray, 554; Cross v. O'Donnell, 44 N. Y. 661, 4 Am. Rep. 721; Bristol v. Mente, 79 N. Y. App. Div. 67, 74, 80 N. Y. S. 52; affirmed, without opinion, 178 N. Y. 599, 70 N. E. 1096.
22 See Jones v. Mechanic's Bank, 29 Md. 287, 98 Am. Dec 533; Black v. Delbridge Co., 90 Mich. 56, 51 N. W. 269; Shepherd v. Pressey, 32 N. H. 49. In the case first cited, the court said: "There can be no acceptance under the statute without delivery by the seller," and this statement was quoted with approval in Richardson v. Smith, 101 Md. 15, 20, 60 Atl. 612, 70 L. R. A. 321, 109 Am. St. Rep. 552.
Too much importance should not be laid on such expressions, however. This is evident from the fact that, in spite of these remarks by the Maryland court, that very court has followed Cusaok v. Robinson, when the question was actually involved. See Hewes v. Jordan, supra, n. 21.
23Section 4 (3) of the Act. See supra, J 502.
24 See cases referred to in this and the following sections, passim.
25 The leading case upon this point is Morton v. Tibbett, 15 Q. B. 428. Lord Campbell following the earlier case of Blenkinsop v. Clayton, 7 Taunt. 597, held the resale an acceptance, saying: "He exercised an act of ownership over it by reselling
26 Wyler p. Rothschild, 53 Neb. 566, 74 N. W. 41.
senting to the deposit of goods in a warehouse for the buyer and paying part of the price,27 or removing, or otherwise dealing with property as owner.28 29 Even detention of the goods for an unreasonable time may indicate acceptance.30 In the cases that have just been put it will be observed that the buyer does not express satisfaction with the goods, he merely assumes ownership of them. If he does this it may be that in spite of objections and even refusal to accept there may, nevertheless, be an acceptance.31 Acts of any sort which not only indicate an assumption of ownership, but also indicate the buyer's satisit at a profit and altering its destination by Bending it to another wharf, there to be delivered to his vendee. The wheat was then constructively in his own possession; and could such a resale and order take place without his having accepted and received the commodity? Does it lie in his mouth to say that he has not accepted that which he has resold and sent on to be delivered to another? At any rate is not this evidence from which such an acceptance and receipt may be inferred by the jury?" To the same effect are Marshall v. Ferguson, 23 Cal. 65; Phillips v. Ocmulgee Mills, 55 Ga. 633; Taylor v. Mueller, 30 Minn. 343, 346, 16 N. W. 413, 44 Am. Rep. 199; Gray v. Davis, 10 N. Y. 286; Roman v. Breeder, 32 Neb. 240, 49 N. W. 368; Hill v. McDonald, 17 Wis. 97. But see Jones v. Mechanics' Bank, 29 Md. 287, 96 Am. Dec. 633.
27 Shaw Lumber Co. v. Manville, 4 Ida. 369, 39 Pac. 559. See also Castle v. Swift, 132 Md. 631,104 Atl. 187.
28 29Currie v. Anderson, 2 E. & E. 592; Corbett v. Wolford, 84 Md. 426, 36 Atl. 1088; Edwards v. Brown, 98 Me. 165, 66 Atl. 654.
30Coleman v. Gibson, 1 M. & R. 168; Norman p. Phillips, 14 M. & W. 277; Parker p. Wallis, 6 E. &. B. 21; Bushel v. Wheeler, 15 Q. B. 442; Tread-well p. Reynolds, 39 Conn. 31; Godkin v. Weber (Mich.), 114 N. W. 924;
Schwarti v. Church of Holy Cross, 60 Minn. 183, 62 N. W. 266; Small p. Stevens, 66 N. H. 209, 18 Atl, 196; Standard Wall Paper Co. v. Towns, 72 N. H. 324, 56 Atl. 744; Chambers v. Lancaster, 180 N. Y. 342, 54 N. E. 707; Lauar v. Richmond Cooperative Institution, 8 Utah, 305, 31 Pac. 397; Spencer v. Hale, 30 Vt. 314, 73 Am. Dec. 309. Compare Hinchman v. Lincoln, 124 U. S. 38, 52, 31 L. Ed. 337. But goods delivered to the purchaser may be rejected for defects within a reasonable time and it is not necessary that notice of rejection be given at once. Black v. Delbridge Co., 90 Mich. 56,51 N. W. 269.
31 Schwarts v. Church of Holy Cross, 60 Minn. 183, 63 N. W. 266. In this case altars were furnished to the defendant church and were actually Bet up in the church. The buyer objected to them and requested the seller to remove them. Meantime one altar was used but not is such a way as to injure it. It was held that there was no acceptance, but there was a dictum that unreasonable detention might be equivalent to acceptance, in spite of denials or objections; actions would speak louder than words. See also Harrison p. Scott, 203 N. Y. 369, 96 N. E. 755, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1036; White p. Schweitser, 147 N. Y. App. Div. 544, 132 N. Y. S. 644, 650; Patterson p. Sargent etc. Co., 83 Vt. 516, 77 Atl. 338,138 Am. St. Rep. 1102.
faction with the particular goods furnished him, after examination, even more clearly indicate acceptance.32 In connection with the question of acceptance under the Statute of Frauds by assuming ownership, cases involving acceptance as an indication of transfer of the properly apart from the statute may be examined.33