It is often said that "notice" of acceptance is necessary for the completion of a contract, but it is not true and never has been true as a general proposition that where an offerer requests an act in return for his promise, and the act is performed, that notice to the offeror of the performance is necessary to create a contract.9 The performance of the act requested furnishes consideration for the offerer's promise, and is also an overt manifestation of assent. The general rule is that if the offeror wishes notice he must make that a condition of his offer, otherwise he must inform himself whether the act requested has been done.10

7 In Hewitt v. Anderson, 56 Gal. 476, 38 Am. Rep. 66, and in Vitty v. Eley, 51N. Y. App. 44, 64 N. Y. Supp. 397, it was held that in order for the plaintiff to become entitled to a reward the act must have been done with a view to obtaining it, and where the circumstances clearly showed another exclu-rive motive no recovery was allowed, and the same point seems involved in derisions denying recovery of a reward to one who had done the act requested in ignorance of the offered reward. See supra, Sec. 33. The contrary result has been reached in Williams v. Carwardine, 4 B. & Ad. 621; Gibbons v. Proctor, 64 L. T. (N. S.) 594, where the plaintiff knew of the offered reward and in several oases where the plaintiff did not know of it. See supra, Sec. 33.

8 See infra, Sec. 94.

9Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., 2 App. Cas. 666, 691; Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Co., [18921 2 Q. B. 484, (1893] 1 Q. B. 256, p. 262, per Lindley, L. J., p. 269, per Bowen, L. J.; Mathewson v. Fitch, 22 Cal. 86; Perkins v. Hadsell, 50 111. 216; Merchants Building Imp. Co. v. Chicago Exchange Building Co., 210 111. 26, 33, 71 N. E. 22; Harson v.