323, 325, the court said: "Id case of a promise to become liable for an existing debt or obligation, there must, in order to sustain such promise, and render it unobjectionable in view of the statute, be a substantial consideration moving to such promisor. In such transactions, the simple fact that a good consideration for the assumption exists, is not sufficient; but superadded to this, such consideration must be apparently beneficial to the party undertaking to pay the debt and assume the obligation. By force of the statute, an unwritten promise to pay the debt of another, is inefficacious; the new assumption, consequently, if it is to have any legal obligation, must not have such an object in view as its primary purpose, but the primary purpose must be to promote the interest of him who takes the burthen upon himself. Hence it is, that in such transactions, a mere detriment to the promisee, the original obligation remaining unextinguished, will not support a promise of this character. Such a consideration would be good at common law, independently of the effect of the statute, because before the passage of the act, any legal agreement to pay the debt of another was valid, but now such an agreement must be in writing. The consequence is, that agreements which will have the effect to discharge the debt of another, must be founded in a motive of interest, sel-fish in the promisor. The distinction is between a promise, the object of which is to promote the interest of another, and one in which the object is to promote the interest of the party making the promise. The former is within the operation of the statute. The latter is unaffected by it."

26a Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 Johns. 29, 5 Am. Dec. 317.

26b See Chamberlin v. Ingalls, 38 Ia. 300, 301; Peele v. Powell, 156 N. C. 553, 557, 73 So. 234.

26c In Brinkley etc. Mfg. Co. v. Cook, 110 Ark. 325, 161 S. W. 1065, however, the court applied this rule, enforcing a promise to pay another's debt though the consideration (surrender of a mechanic's lien on the debtor's property) apparently enured solely to the debtor's benefit. See also the following note, ad fin.

But the courts of many jurisdictions, including the Supreme Court of the United States, hold that for any consideration which is beneficial to the promisor and desired by him for some business reason, an oral promise to pay the debt of another may be enforced.26e

In England, however, the courts distinctly refuse to go to this extent, and hold that even where security is surrendered by the creditor as consideration for the new promise, and even though the promisor desired the consideration for a business reason, and it was beneficial to him in a business sense, the promise is within the statute if the tangible consideration moved to the original debtor and not to the promisor.26f Sim--

26d See, e. g. Mine & Smelter Supply Co. v. Stockgrowers' Bank, 173 Fed. 859, 98 C. C. A. 229; Dillaby v. Wilcox, 60 Conn. 71, 80, 22 Atl. 491, 13 L. R. A. 643, 25 Am. St. Rep. 299; White v. Rintoul, 108 N. Y. 222, 225, 15 N. E. 318; Conti v. Johnson, 91 Vt. 467, 100 Atl. 874; Mankin v. Jones, 63 W. Va. 373, 60 S. E. 248, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 214, and cases infra, a. 13. In Arkansas and North and South Carolina, however, it is still accepted and applied. Satterfield v. Kindley, 144 N. C. 455, 461, 57 S. E. 145; Marrow v. White, 151 N. C. 96, 65 S. E. 746; Ellis v. Carroll, 68 S. Car. 376, 47 S. E. 679, and see the preceding note.

26e Emerson v. Slater, 22 How. 28, 16 L. Ed. 360; Davis v. Patrick, 141 U. S. 479, 12 S. Ct. 58, 35 L. Ed. 826; Mine it Smelter Supply Co. v. Stock-growers' Bank, 173 Fed. 859, 98 C. C. A. 229; Zimmerman v. Holt, 102 Ark. 407, 144 S. W. 222; Holcomb v. Mashburn, 10 Ga. App. 781; Holt v. Smith, 74 Iowa, 667, 39 N. W. 81; Carraher v. Allen, 112 Iowa, 168, 171,

83 N. W. 902; Pratt v. Fishwild, 121 Iowa, 642, 648, 96 N. W. 1089; Flts-gerald v. Flanagan, 155 Ia. 217, 135 N. W. 738; Muuroe v. Mundy, 164 Ia. 707, 146 N. W. 819 (cf. Frohardt v. Duff, 156 Ia. 144, 135 N. W. 609, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 242, Ann. Cas. 1915 B. 254); Simpson v. Carr, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 849, 76 S. W. 346; Calkins v. Chandler, 36 Mich. 320, 24 Am. Rep. 593; Abbot v. Nash, 35 Minn. 451, 29 N. W. 65; Kansas City Company v. Smith, 36 Mo. App. 608; Moore v. McHaney, 191 Mo. App. 686,178 S. W. 258; Rogers v. Empkie Hardware Co., 24 Neb. 653, 39 N. W. 844; Olesou v. Oleson, 90 Neb. 738; Janvrin v. Powers (N. H.), 104 Atl. 252; Ludwick v. Watson, 3 Oreg. 256; Bailey v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 602, 34 Atl. 326; Sharp v. Levan, 236 Pa. 374, 378, 84 Atl. 915; Kirby v. Kirby, 248 Pa. 117, S3 Atl. 874; Spencer v. Nalle (Tex. Civ. App.), 143 S, W. 991; Lampson v. Hobart, 28 Vt. 697; Cross v. Richardson, 30 Vt. 641; Templeton v. Bascom, 33 Vt. 132. 26f In Harburg Comb Co. v. Martin, ilarly in the United States it is held in many jurisdictions that unless the new promisor receives a consideration that moves directly to himself, as distinguished from being benefited by a consideration moving to the original debtor, the promise is within the statute.26g Therefore, a promise to the creditor to

[1902] 1 K. B. 778, a promise to pay a debt of a corporation made by a shareholder in the corporation because of his financial interest therein in consideration of the . creditor's refraining from seising its property, was held within the statute.

In Davys v. Buswell, [1913] 2 K. B. 47, this case was followed though the promisor was not only a shareholder but the holder of debentures which gave him a direct interest, it was urged, in the property of the corporation, since the assets of the corporation were mortgaged to secure the debencreditor to seize his debtor's property or enforce a lien against it, has been held sufficient consideration in some jurisdictions when such forbearance enabled the promisor to obtain an advantage or benefit.26i

26g Murto v. McKnight, 28 111. App. 238 (the court saying at page 246, that to be withdrawn from the statute a promise must be founded upon a valuable consideration received by the promisor himself}; Lowe v. Turpie, 147 Ind. 662, 683, 44 N. E. 26, 47 N. E. 160 (reported on a later appeal in 168 Ind. 47, 62 N. E. 628). (The court said: "If the conveyance by Horner {the creditor] to appellant [the new promisor] had the effect to abandon any lien or interest in the Monon lots, yet appellant having no interest in, or title to said lots, subordinate to Homer's lien or interest therein, the rule urged would not apply to this case.") Stewart v. Jerome, 71 Mich. 201, 38 N. W. 895,15 Am. St. Rep. 252 (a promise by a mortgagee to pay a supply bill in consideration of forbearance by the creditor to attach property not covered by the mortgage, was held within the statute); Draggo v. West Bay City Sugar Company, 144 Mich. 196, 107 N. W. 911 (a promise to pay rent of land leased to another though made to promote promisor's business interest as he had a contract right to a share of the proceeds of the land, was held insufficient where he failed to receive directly the consideration. Cf. Monroe Lumber Co. v. Beseau, 192 Mich. 307, 168 N. W. 880); Citisens' Nat. Bank v. Abeel (Tex. Civ. App.), 160 S. W. 609 (the defendant's promise that the plaintiff should lose nothing if it cashed a draft for a produce company in which the defendant was financially interested, was held within the statute). In Westmoreland v. Porter, 75 Ala. 452, 459, Somerville, J., said, "The old rule was that a verbal promise to pay another's debt would be supported by a mere surrender of a lien on the property of the original debtor, whether made for his benefit, or that of the new promisor. Perhaps a case of this kind would come within the rule settled by our own decisions. But the great current of modern authority clearly sustains the view, that the new promisor must have an interest of some kind in the property to which the lien attached, so that its surrender will enure to his benefit. He thus becomes the purchaser of the lien, or of the interest of the promisee in the property thus encumbered at a price measured by the amount of the original debt, which he agrees to pay." In Curtis *. Brown, 5 Cush. 488, 491, the court said: "It is no sufficient ground, to prevent the operation of the Statute of Frauds, that the plaintiff has relinquished an advantage, or given up a lien, in consequence of the defendant's promise, if that advantage has not also directly enured to the benefit of the defendant, so as in effect to make pay his claim in consideration of mere forbearance to sue bis original debtor, is within the statute.26h But forbearance by a it a purchase by the defendant of the plaintiff. Fish v. Hutchinson, 2 Wils. 84; Jackson v. Rayner, 12 Johns. 291; Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Met. 396, 403, 37 Am. Dec. 148." To the same effect is George Lawley and Son Corp. v. Buff, 230 Mass. 21, 119 N. E. 186. In Carleton v. Floyd, 192 Mass. 204, 78 N. E. 126, the defendant's oral promise to pay a debt of a corporation in which he was a stockholder, and otherwise pecuniarily interested, was held within the statute. To similar effect is Richardson Press v. Albright, 224 N. Y. 497, 121 N. E. 362. In Paul v. Wilbur, 189 Mass. 48, 62, 70 N. E. 63, the court said: "That section does not apply where the promisor receives something from the promisee for his own benefit. The point is settled by a number of authorities beginning with Alger v. Sooville, 1 Gray, 391, and ending with Stratton v. Hill, 134 Mass. 27." And see - Ribock v. Canner, 218 Mass. 6,105 N. E. 462. In Corkins v. Collins, 16 Mich. 478, 482, the court said: "When, by the release of property from a lien, the party promising to pay the debt is enabled to apply it to his own benefit, so that the release enures to his own advantage, it is quite easy to see that a promise to pay the debt in order to obtain the release may be properly regarded as made on his own behalf, and not on behalf of the original debtor, and any possible advantage to the latter is merely incidental and is not the thing bargained for. That promise is, therefore, in no proper sense a promise to answer for anything but the promisor's own responsibility, and need not be in writing. So when a person Bells a claim and guarantees its payment, the guaranty is collateral to his own contract, and is not intended for the debtor's advantage. But where the entire transaction, both promise and consideration, is intended and operates exclusively for the advantage and on behalf of the debtor whose debt is guaranteed, there seems to be no plausible ground for holding that the promise is anything but collateral." In Goldie-Klenert Co. 0. Bothwell, 67 Wash. 264, 121 Pac. 60, the promise of the promoter, and principal stockholder of a corporation to indemnify and hold harmless "the seller of goods to the corporation" was held within the statute. To similar effect is Hurst Hardware Co. v. Goodman, 68 W. Va. 462, 69 S. E. 898, 32 L. R, A. (N. 8.) 598, Ann. Can. 1912 B. 218.