24 United States. Bowen v. Bank, 87 Fed. 430; Dunlap v. Hopkins, 95 Fed. 231, 37 C. C. A. 52.

Alabama. McDonald v. Wood, 118 Ala. 589, 24 So. 86.

California. Lompoc Valley Bank v. Stephenson, 156 Cal. 350, 104 Pac. 449.

Illinois. Dillman v. Nadelhoffer, 160 111. 121, 43 N. E. 378.

Kansas. Winans v. Mfg. Co., 48 Kan. 777, 30 Pac. 163.

Kentucky. Allen v. Pryor, 10 Ky. (3 A. K. Mar.) 305.

Maine. International Harvester Co. v. Fleming, 109 Me. 104, 82 Atl. 843.

Maryland. Union Trust Co. v. Knabe, 122 Md. 584, 89 Atl. 1106.

Minnesota. Bowen v. Thwing, 56 Minn. 177, 57 N. W. 468.

Nebraska. Lindsey v. Heaton, 27 Neb. 662, 43 N. W. 420.

North Carolina. Partin v. Prince, 159 N. Car. 553, 75 S. E. 1080.

Utah. Gogan v. Stevens, 4 Utah 348, 9 Pac. 706.

25Williams v. Perkins, 21 Ark. 18; J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Patterson, 137 Ky. 180, 125 S. W. 287; Paul v. Stackhouse, 38 Pa. St. 302. See Sec. 629 et seq.

26Beatty v. Coble, 142 Ind. 329, 41 N. E. 590.

27 McKenzie v. Stewart, 196 Ala. 241, 72 So. 109.

28Phelps v. Lowell Institution for Savings, 198 Mass. 179, 83 N. E. 989.

29 Schlatter v. Triebel, 284 111. 412, 120 N. E. 289.

30Boyd v. Watson, 101 la. 214, 70 N. W. 120.

31 Lee v. United States Graphite Co., 161 Mich. 157, 125 N. W. 748.

32Blackwell v. Kercheval, 27 'Ida. 537, 149 Pac. 1060.

33 Atlantic Pebble Co. v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 89 N. J. L. 336, 98 Atl. 410.

34 See Sec. 643.

35 Cuthbertson v. First National Bank, 158 la. 144, 138 N. W. 1000.

36 Farabee-Treadwell Co. v. Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 135 Tenn. 208, L. R. A. 1916F, 501, 186 S. W. 92.

37 Feigenspan v. Nizolek, 71 N. J. Eq. 382, 65 Atl. 703.

If, by the terms of the contract, the consideration which A furnishes is apportioned to one of B's covenants exclusively, and the other covenant is avowedly gratuitous, and this appears to be the actual intention of the parties from the entire contract, the courts will not treat a consideration as supporting such gratuitous covenants.40 If a contract between A and B, whereby B agrees to do certain specified work for A at a certain specified price, and A agrees to pay therefor, contains a further provision by which B promises to do certain other work for A at a certain specified price if A requests him so to do, it has been held that such offer is to be treated as an independent offer, and accordingly that it is not supported by B's promise to pay the stipulated price for the remaining work.41 If, by the terms of an oil lease,, the lessee is to pay a certain sum for the right to occupy such land during a certain period in order to complete a well, the payment of such sum can not be regarded as a consideration for the remaining covenants of such lease.42 The courts, however, will, ignore specific provisions of a contract reciting an insufficient consideration for a covenant if a sufficient consideration appears to be taken as a whole.43 The promise of A, who is a promoter of a corporation, to purchase the stock of B, a subscriber, is supported by B's promise to sell it, and the contract is supported by sufficient consideration, although the contract provides that the consideration for such promise is that B shall pay his subscription.44

38 See Sec. 740 et seq.

39Roae v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 35 Mont. 70, 119 Am. St. Rep. 830, 88 Pac. 767.

40Lemler v. Bord, 80 Or. 224, 156 Pac. 427, 1034.

41Lem1er v. Bord, 80 Or. 224, 156 Pac. 427, 1034.

42 Brown v. Wilson, - Okla. - , L. R. A. 1917B, 1184, 160 Pac. 94.

43 Fourth National Bank v. Stahl-man, 132 Tenn. 367, L. R. A. 1916A, 568, 178 S. W. 942.

44 Fourth National Bank v. Stahl-man, 132 Tenn. 367, L. R. A. 1916A, 568, 178 S. W. 942.

It has been said that if A makes two promises to B and that B furnishes a consideration, such consideration will not support both promises unless it is shown that both promises were considered in fixing the amount in the consideration.45 This rule, however, has been laid down where the consideration and one of such promises appeared in a written contract and the other of such promises was oral.46 Under such circumstances the result is probably correct, since, at law, under the parol evidence rule,47 such oral promise can not be shown to be a part of the original transaction. This principle can not be applied generally, where all the covenants are in writing or where they are all oral. As is shown by the authorities already cited in this section, the consideration furnished by the one party is presumed to support all the covenants of the adversary party unless it is expressly apportioned to less than all.