1 England. Cooper v. Phibbs, L. R. 2 H. L. 149; Bingham v. Bingham, 1 Ves. Sr. 12(5; Cocking v. Pratt, 1 Ves. Sr. 400; Townshend v. Stangroom, 6 Ves. Jr. 328; Broughton v. Hutt, 3 DeG. & J. 501; Pusey v. Desbouvrie, 3 P. Wins. 315; Cann v. Cann, 1 P. Wms. 723.

Arkansas. Griffith v. Sebastian Co., 49 Ark. 24, 3 S. W. 886.

Connecticut. Blakeman v. Blakeman, 39 Conn. 320.

Maryland. Wilson v. Ins. Co., 60 Md. 150.

Massachusetts. Reggio v. Warren, 207 Mass. 525, 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 340, 93 N. E.; 805.

Michigan. Renard v. Clink, 91 Mich. 1, 30 Am. St. Rep. 458, 51 N. W. 692.

Minnesota. Gerdine v. Menage, 41 Minn. 417, 43 N. W. 91; Lane v. Holmes, 55 Minn. 379, 43 Am. St. Rep. 508, 57 N. W. 132.

Mississippi. Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. Co. v. Jones, 73 Miss. 110, 55 Am. St. Rep. 488, 19 So. 105; Hoy v. Hoy, 93 Miss. 732, 25 L. R. A. (N.S.) 182, 136 Am. St. Rep. 548, 48 So. 903.

New Hampshire Healy v. Healy, 76 N. H. 504, 85 Atl. 156.

Pennsylvania. Wilson v. Ott, 173 Pa. St. 253, 51 Am. St. Rep. 767, 34 Atl. 23.

Utah. Toland v. Carey, 6 Utah 392, 24 Pac. 190 [affirmed by divided United States Supreme Court without opinion, 154 U. S. 499].

Washington. Morgan v. Bell, 3 Wash. 554, 16 L. R. A. 614, 28 Pac. 925.

2 Kentucky. Bridgewater v. Byassee (Ky.), 93 S. W. 35.

Michigan. Renard v. Clink, 91 Mich. 1, 30 Am. St. Rep. 458, 51 N. W. 692.

Minnesota. Gerdine v. Menage, 41 Minn. 417, 43 N. W. 91.

Mississippi. Hoy v. Hoy, 93 Miss. 732, 25 L. R. A. (N.S.) 182, 136 Am. St. Rep. 548, 48 So. 903.

Pennsylvania, Wilson v. Ott, 173 Pa. St. 253, 51 Am. St. Rep. 767, 34 Atl. 23.

Washington. Morgan v. Bell, 3 Wash. 554, 16 L. R. A. 614, 28 Pac. 925.

"Here, the Compromise between the Brothers was grounded upon the Uncertainty of their Title in Point of Law, not upon any Doubt in Point of Fact; for one of the Parties to the Deed, namely, the Defendant, well knew all the Facts of the Case, and was in possession of all the Title Deeds, so that there was no Room for any Doubt upon that Head. Now, in such a Case, I apprehend, that in order to constitute a fair Compromise, and that a Deed of that Import should be binding upon both Parties, the Facts must be fairly stated in order to arrive at that, which is the Foundation of the Agreement, namely, that the Law resulting from those Facts is considered doubtful. Here, in neither of the Cases laid before Counsel, are the Facts correctly stated; I mean respecting the Title to the real Property." Leonard v. Leonard, 2 Ball. & B. 171.

3 Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 Pac. 190 [affirmed by divided court, Corey v. Toland, 154 U. S. 499].

4Lane v. Holmes, 55 Minn. 379, 43 Am. St. Rep. 508, 57 N. W. 132. In this case B gave A a note for $3,000, the rate of interest being left blank, and neither party expecting the note to bear interest. A sent the note to his attorney, X, to foreclose, and X computed the note at seven per cent. interest and bid in the property at this amount. B then sued A to recover the difference between this bid, and the true amount of the debt, $3,000, plus the costs of foreclosure. A sought to avoid his purchase. It was held that he could do so. In Gerdine v. Menage, 41 Minn. 417, 43 N. W. 91, X tried to foreclose a mortgage and thought he had done so in legal form. He then paid off liens on such property. The foreclosure being set aside, he was allowed subrogation to the liens thus paid off, But in Truesdale v. Sidle, 65 Minn. 315, 67 N. W. 1004, A, thinking that a note and mortgage given by B included attorney fees, added that amount to the debt, interest and costs of foreclosure, and bid that sum for the property. B sued A to recover the amount of the bid in excess of A's debt and costs, which amounted to the supposed attorney fees. The value of the lots having depreciated, A was not allowed to avoid his bid.

5 Rees v. De Bernardy [1896], 2 Ch. 437. (Where two illiterate old women were induced to agree to pay one-half of an interest in an estate for information of their interest, and afterward ratified such agreement by drawing money thereunder.) Alabama, etc., Ry. v. Jones, 73 Miss. 110, 55 Am. St. Rep. 488, 19 So. 105. (In this case, A who had been injured was induced to give a release while under the influence of opium: Subsequently, not knowing that he could rescind his release he ratified. It was held that in an action at law he could avoid the release and the ratification thereof.) According to some authorities ratification after majority of a contract made during infancy, by one who does not know that infancy is a defense, may be avoided on the ground of mistake of law.

Alabama. Eureka Co. v. Edwards, 71 Ala. 248; Flexner v. Dickerson, 72 Ala. 318.

Indiana. Fetrow v. Wiseman, 40 Ind. 148.

Kentucky. Petty v. Roberts, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 410.

Massachusetts. Morse v. Wheeler, 86 Mass. (4 AH.) 570; Owen v. Long, 112 Mass. 403.

Missouri. Baker v. Kennett, 54 Mo. 82; Ring v. Jamison, 66 Mo. 424.

North Carolina. Alexander v. Hutch-eson, 9 N. Car. (2 Hawks) 535; Dunlap v. Hales, 47 N. Car. (2 Jones L.) 381; Turner v. Gaither, 83 N. Car. 357, 35 Am. Rep. 574.

Ohio. Anderson v. Soward, 40 Ohio St. 325, 48 Am. Rep. 687.

Pennsylvania. Curtin v. Patten, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 305; Hinely v. Marga-ritz, 3 Pa. St. 428.

Tennessee. Scott v. Buchanan, 30 Tenn. (11 Humph.) 468; Reed v. Bos-hears, 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed) 118.

Vermont. Hatch v. Hatch, 60 Vt. 160, 13 Atl. 791.

Contra, Clark v. Van Court, 100 Ind. 113, 50 Am. Rep. 774.

6Tucker v. Denton (Ky.), 15 L. R. A. (N.S.) 289, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 521, 106 S. W. 280.

While this distinction is indorsed by excellent authority, it is, nevertheless, a difficult one to apply as a test. In order to be mistaken as to a private right, when all the facts are known, one must generally be mistaken as to some rule of general law and mistakes as to the rules of general law are material, as a rule, only when they cause mistake as to private rights. The commonest form of so-called mistake as to private right is where one party is mistaken as to the ownership of property. Now the question of ownership of property is often treated as an ultimate question of fact, even when its determination depends solely on questions of law.12 Under statutes which provide that "an apparent consent is not real or free, when obtained through * * * (5) mistake," and that "mistake may be either of fact or of law," a contract entered into under a mistake as to the owner of the legal title of the property in question is invalid.13 Yet even mistakes as to ownership, due to mistake of law, are not relieved against in equity according to some authorities.14 It seems rather that there is a conflict of authority on the question of how far relief will be given against mistakes of law in the inducement, and that, as a means of reconciling the conflicting decisions, the distinction under discussion is supported rather by obiter, and by the reasons assigned by the courts for their decisions than by the principles actually involved in the facts presented for adjudication. The fact is that many courts wish to give relief against mistake of law, but they dislike to admit that they are doing it. Hence, the attempt to treat the general rule as law and to avoid applying it in the particular cases as they arise for decision.

7 Lewis v. Mate, 140 la. 698, 119 N. W. 152.

8 Reggio v. Warren, 207 Mass. 525, 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 340, 93 N. E. 805.

9 See Sec. 290.

10 Hoy v. Hoy, 93 Miss. 732, 136 Am. St. Rep. 548, 25 L. R. A. (N.S.) 182, 48 So. 903.

11 Noecker v. Wallingford, 133 la. 605, 111 N. W. 37.

12 "Such mistakes are classed with mistakes of fact and are frequently relieved from where the equity is clear." Gerdine v. Menage, 41 Minn. 417, 43 N. W. 91.