If the offeror prevents the offeree from accepting an offer, given for value, the expiration of the time fixed by the offer may not cause the offer to lapse.1 If the offeror leaves his home or his usual place of residence before the expiration of the time fixed by the offer, and the offeree is unable to find the offeror to accept such offer, the offer does not lapse with the expiration of such time, but the offeree may accept as soon as it is possible for him to find the offeror.2 This rule has been applied without justification in case of an offer not for value.3 If the offeror avoids the offeree until the time fixed by the offer has elapsed, it has been said that such conduct does not amount to revocation and does not cause the offer to lapse; and that it may be accepted after the efflux of such time.4 Since the offeror could revoke such offer directly by communicating his intention to revoke, no good reason appears why he should not be per-mitted to produce the same result indirectly, by making acceptance impossible until after lapse.

20 Loring v. Boston, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 409.

21 Philips v. Newoc Co., 101 Wash. 234, 172 Ac. 355.

1 Morrell v. Studd (1913), 2 Ch. 648 [citing Bruner v. Moore (1904), 1 Ch. 305, and distinguishing Goss v. Nugent, 5 B. & Ad. 58]; McCarty v. Helbling, 73 Or. 356, 144 Ac. 499.

2 Morrell v. Studd (1913), 2 Ch. 648 [citing Bruner v. Moore (1904), 1 Ch.

305, and distinguishing Gass v. Nugent, 5 B. & Ad. 58].

3 Morrell y. Studd (1913), 2 Ch. 648.

4 Page v. Shainwald, 169 N. Y. 246, 57 L. R. A. 173, 62 N. E. 356.

1 Holmes v. Miles, 141 Ala. 401, 37 So. 588; Sizer v. Clark, 116 Wis. 534, 93 N. W. 539.

2 Sizer v. Clark, 116 Wis. 534, 93 N. W. 539.

3 Omer v. Farlow, 46 III. App. 122.

4 Omer v. Farlow, 46 111. App. 122.

The act or fault of the offeror in making it impracticable for the offeree to accept an offer given for value in the manner which he had contemplated when the offer was made, may make the mailing of the acceptance within the time specified sufficient, even if it is not received until after the expiration of such period. If A gives an option to B for a certain time and A then leaves his residence and goes to a remote place, so that it is impracticable for B to accept in person, it has been held that B's letter of acceptance left at A's residence on the last day in which such option was in force, was sufficient.5