Intent to deceive is often said to be an element of actual fraud.1 If this form of statement is used, it must be noted that, though it may seem to involve an intent to do wrong, it does not necessarily involve such intent.2 "A statement fraudulently made with knowledge of its falsity must necessarily be intended to deceive."3 If the statement has the elements of fraud hitherto discussed, it is sufficient if the party making it intends it to be believed and action in reliance thereon to be taken.4 Thus if he knows that the statement is false, but believes that it will come true hereafter, he is guilty of fraud.5 So, fraud exists where one intentionally misrepresents his financial condition in buying goods on credit, though he believes he will be able to pay for them.6 Where the party making the statement does not know that it is false, but is bound to know the fact in question, fraud exists even if he does not intend to deceive.7 However, a false statement made casually and at a time previous to the contract and in no way connected with it, is not intended to deceive, so as to make such subsequent contract voidable.8 If a false statement of a material fact is made knowingly to the adversary party to the contract, it is almost impossible to escape the inference that intent to induce action existed so as to constitute fraudulent intent.9 Since constructive fraud, so-called, often consists of mere non-disclosure,10 intent to deceive, as the term is ordinarily used, is not a necessary element thereof, though often present.

Pennsylvania. Weasels v. Weiss, 156 Pa. St. 591, 27 Atl. 535.

Tennessee. Leiker v. Hensom (Temn. Ch. App.), 41 S. W. 862.

5Union Ac. Ry. Co. v. Barnes, 64 Fed. 80; Nash v. Trust Co., 16a Mass. 574, 47 Am. St. Rep. 489, 28 L. R. A. 753, 40 N. E. 1039; same case, 159 Mass. 437, 34 N. E. 625.

6 Elwell v. Russell, 71 Conn. 462, 42 Atl. 862.

7 Kountze v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124, 49 Am. St. Rep. 651, 29 L. R. A. 360, 41 N. E. 414. (This case carries the doctrine to extreme limits. Fair dealing would seem to require that the facts be communicated to the adversary party and he be free on his own judgment to determine whether the claim is valid or not.)

8 Crist v. Dice, 18 O. S. 536.

9 Stevenson v. Marble, 84 Fed. 23.

10 Hope v. The Maccabees (N. J.), LR. 455, 102 Atl. 689.

1 United States. Lord v. Goddard, 54

U. S. (13 How.) 198, 14 L. ed. Ill; Nevada Nickel Syndicate v. Nickel Co., 96 Fed. 133.

California. Toner v. Meussdorffer, 123 Cal. 462, 56 Ac. 39.

Iowa. Clement, etc., Co. v. Swanson, 110 la. 106, 81 N. W. 233.

Kansas. Stevens v. Allen, 51 Kan. 144, 32 Ac. 922.

Massachusetts. Nash v. Trust Co., 163 Mass. 574, 47 Am. St. Rep. 489, 28 L. R. A. 753, 40 N. E. 1030.

Minnesota. Humphrey v. Merriam, 32 Minn. 197.

New York. Kelly v. Gould, 141 N. Y. 596, 36 N. E. 320.

Ohio. Welle v. Cook, 16 O. S. 67, 88 Am. Dec. 436.

Washington. Thorp v. Smith, 18 Wash. 277, 51 Ac. 381; see Intent to Deceive or Defraud, by Herbert Stephen, 20 Law Quarterly Review 186; Intent, to Defraud, by Henry T. Terry, 25 Yale Law Jour. 87.

2 CIaflin v. Ins. Co., 110 U. S. 81, 28 L. ed. 76; Sukeforth v. Lord, 87 Cal. 399, 25 Ac. 497; Heidenbluth v. Rudolph, 152 111. 316, 38 N. E. 930; Baldwin v. Marsh, 6 Ind. App. 533, 33 N. E. 973.

3 Bullis v. O'Beirne, 195 U. S. 606 (617), 49 L. ed. 340.

4 Sukeforth v. Lord, 87 Cal. 399, 25 Ac. 497; Mooney v. Davis, 75 Mich. 188, 13 Am. St. Rep. 425, 42 N. W. 802; Cowley v. Smyth, 46 N. J. L. 380, 50 Am. Rep. 432.

5 Peck v. Gurney, L. R. 6 H. L. 377; Pohill v. Walter, 3 B. & Ad. 114; Reid v. Cowduroy, 79 la. 169, 18 Am. St. Rep. 359, 44 N. W. 351; Grosh v. Improvement Co., 95 Va. 161, 27 S. E. 841.

6 Morris v. Posner, 111 la. 335, 82 N. W. 755; Gallipolia Furniture Co. v.

Symmes, 19 Ohio C. C. 659, 10 Ohio C. D. 514.

7 Vincent v. Corbett, 94 Miss. 46, 21 L. R. A. (N.S.) 85, 47 So. 641; Mc-Cready v. Phillips, 56 Neb. 446, 76 N. W. 885; Seale v. Baker, 70 Tex. 283, 8 Am. St. Rep. 592, 7 S. W. 742; Gid-dings v. Baker, 80 Tex. 308, 16 S. W. 33. (In such cases fraud does "not depend on a specific intent to deceive." Giddings v. Baker, 80 Tex. 308, 16 S. W. 33.)

8 Arnold v. Hagerman, 45 N. J. Eq. 186, 14 Am. St. Rep. 712, 17 Atl. 93.

9 Endsley v. Johns, 120 III. 469; 60 Am. Rep. 572, 12 N. E. 247; Baldwin v. Marsh, 6 Ind. App. 533, 33 N. E. 973; Atchison County Bank v. Byers, 139 Mo. 627, 41 S. W. 325.

10 See ch. XIV.