To constitute fraud, the party alleging fraud must have believed such representations to be true, and so believing must have acted in reliance thereon.1 If, in fact, action is taken in reliance solely upon the representations, fraud exists although the party to whom such representations were

4 Sprague, etc., Co. v. Kempe, 74 Minn. 465, 77 N. W. 412.

5 Davis v. Louisville Trust Co., 181 Fed. 10, 104 C. C. A. 24, 30 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1011.

1 United States. Smith v. Richards, 38 U. S. (13 Pet.) 26, 10 L. ed. 42; Supreme Council v. Casualty Co., 63 Fed. 48; Hawkins v. Mtge. Co., 84 Fed. 526, 28 C. C. A. 484.

Alabama. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 111 Ala. 456, 20 So. 651.

Arkansas. Wright v. Boltz, 87 Ark. 567, 113 S. W. 201.

California. Estep v. Armstrong, 69 Cal. 536, 11 Ac. 132; Spinks v. Clark, 147 Cal. 439, 82 Ac. 45; San Diego County v. Utt, 173 Cal. 554, 160 Ac. 657; Thomas v. Hacker, 178 Ac. 855.

Colorado. Bank v. Hammond, 25 Colo. 367, 55 Ac. 1090.

Connecticut. Bennett v. Gibbons, 55 Conn. 450, 12 Atl. 99.

Illinois Dady v. Condit, 163 111. 511, 45 N. E. 224; Crocker v. Manley, 164 111. 282, 56 Am. St. Rep. 196, 45 N. E. 577; Hale Elevator Co. v. Hale, 201 111. 131, 66 N. E. 249 [affirming, 98 111 App. 430]; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Seitz, 214 111. 350, 105 Am. St. Rep. 108, 73 N. E. 585; Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., 215 111. 444, 106 Am. St. Rep. 170, 74 N. E. 445; Van

Gundy v. Steele, 261 111. 206, 103 N. E. 754; Hansen v. Gavin, 280 111. 354, 117 N. E. 513; Mucisk v. Gatzmeyer, 47 111. App. 329.

Indiana. Newman v. Sylvester, 42 Ind. 106; Craig v. Hamilton, 118 Ind. 565, 21 N. E. 315; Kain v. Rinker, 1 Ind. App. 86, 27 N. E. 328.

Iowa. Blaul v. Wandel, 137 la. 301, 114 N. W. 899.

Kansas. Wood v. Staudenmayer, 56 Kan. 399, 43 Ac. 760; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Goodholm, 61 Kan. 758, 60 Ac. 1066; Provident Loan Trust Company v. Mcintosh, 68 Kan. 452, 75 Ac. 498.

Kentucky. Salyer v. Salyer, 141 Ky. 648, 133 S. W. 556.

Louisiana. Laenger v. Laenger, 138 La. 532, 70 So. 501.

Maine. Flanders v. Cobb, 88 Me. 488, 51 Am. St. Rep. 410, 34 Atl. 277.

Massachusetts. Crehore v. Crebore, 97 Mass. 330, 93 Am. Dec. 98; Burns v. Dockray, 156 Mass. 135, 30 N. E. 551; Beacon Falls Rubber Shoe Co. v. Pratte, 190 Mass. 72, 76 N. E. 285; Harvey v. Squire, 217 Mass. 411, 105 N. E. 355.

Michigan. De Grasse v. Verona Mining Co., 185 Mich. 514, 152 N. W. 242.

Minnesota. Kelson v. Berkner, 139 Minn. 301, 166 N. W. 347.

Missouri. Younger v. Hoge, 211 Mow made testifies, "I could not believe him, for I did not know."2 If the party who claims to have been misled acted when he did not know that such false statement had been made,3 as where he acts before the representation has been made,4 or if knowing that the statements have been made he does not rely on them, but by contract he makes his liability contingent on the truth of such statements;5 or if he disbelieves the statements,6 or relies solely on some collateral inducement, such as a guaranty;7 or on a contract made by the original vendor to repurchase the property at a certain price

444, 18 L. R. A. (N.S.) 94, 111 S. W. 20.

Montana. Lindsay v. Kroeger, 37 Mont. 231, 95 Ac. 839.

Nebraska. American, etc., Association v. Bear, 48 Neb. 455, 67 N. W. 500; Davidson v. Crosby, 49 Neb. 60, 68 N. W. 338; Spencer v. Johnston, 58 Neb. 44, 78 N. W. 482.

New Mexico. Berrendo Irrigated Farms Co. v. Jacobs, - N. M. - , 168 Ac. 483.

Oregon. Pearce v. Buell, 22 Or. 29, 29 Ac. 78; Waymire v. Shipley, 52 Or. 464, 97 Ac. 807; Hegdale v. Wade, 78 Or. 349, 153 Ac. 107.

Tennessee. Chamberlain v. Coal Co., 92 Tenn. 13, 20 S. W. 345.

Texas. Calhoun v. Quinn (Tex. Civ. App.), 21 S. W. 705; Schwartz v. Mit-tenthal (Tex. Civ. App.), 50 S. W. 182.

West Virginia. Pennybacker v. Laid-ley, 33 W. Va. 624, 11 S. E. 39; Crotty v. Effler, 60 W. Va. 258, 54 S. E. 345; Stalnaker v Janes, 68 W. Va. 176, 69 S. E. 651.

Wisconsin, Bush v. Maxwell, 79 Wis. 114, 48 N. W. 250.

2 Lund v. Davis, 47 Minn. 290, 50 N. W. 79.

3 Burnett v. Hensley, 118 la. 575, 92 N. W. 678; Scott v. Brusse, 148 Mich. 529, 112 N. W. 117; Peerless Casualty Co. v. Howard, 77 N. H. 355, 92 Atl. 165.

4Porter v. Collins, 90 Ala. 510, 8 So. 80; Soule v. Harrington, 135 Mich. 155, 97 N. W. 357; Manhattan Brass within a certain time;8 or knows that they are either false, or else mere matters of opinion, inferred from facts known to him;9 or if he acts solely in reliance on other information,10 or on the judgment of others,11 as on the opinion of his own physician, instead of on that of the physician of the railway corporation which has injured him;12 or disregards the false statement made to him,13 he can not be said to be defrauded. Thus where vendee knows all the material facts, a false statement as to the title to land,14 or power to convey it,15 or the taxes thereon,16 or the area thereof,17 or value,18 or quality,19 or that it was a continuous tract,20 or a false statement as to the condition of a business made to one who is familiar therewith,21 can not be fraud. So one who knows that the only supply of water is from a cistern can not avoid a lease for fraud when the water becomes impure for want of rain, though the landlord represented the water supply as excellent.22 A false statement that a railroad would be diverted unless a certain amount was subscribed to aid its construction is said not to amount to fraud as to one who subscribed for a different motive.23 A claim in excess of the true amount, which is the basis of a contract of compromise, does not constitute fraud.24 If A sells B and C property which is being used in a business and represents that such property is in good condition, and C knows of the condition of such property while B has an opportunity to inspect it, B can not avoid such contract on the ground that such representations are fraudulent.25 If a vendor has set a price upon his land before the vendee has made representations to him concerning it and has refused the counter offers of the vendee and has finally sold at the price originally set by the vendor, he can not have rescission, even if such representations by the vendee were fraudulent.26 If the original offer which was induced by fraud, is rejected, and the parties make another contract, not in reliance upon such fraudulent statements, the contract thus made can not be avoided for the original fraud.27