A threat of enforcing a bona fide claim by a civil action is not duress, so as to avoid a contract for the payment or compromise of such claim.1 "One party's threatening to bring a civil action against another, or threatening

13 Thorn v. Pinkham, 84 Me. 101, 30 Am. St. Rep. 335, 24 Atl. 718; Bodine v. Morgan, 37 N. J. Eq. 426.

14Lighthall v. Moore, 2 Colo. App. 554, 31 Pac. 511; Kronmeyer v. Buck, 258 111. 586, 45 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1182, 101 N. E. 995; Giddings v. Bank, 104 la. 676, 74 N. W. 21.

15Shattuck v. Watson, 53 Ark. 147, 7 L. R. A. 551, 13 S. W. 516.

16United States. Gregor v. Hyde, 62 Fed. 107, 10 C. C. A. 290.

Iowa. Giddings v. Bank, 104 la. 676, 74 N. W. 21; Wilson v. Calhoun, 170 la. 111, 151 N. W. 1087.

Kansas. Williamson, Halsell, Frazier Co. v. Ackerman, 77 Kan. 502, 20 L. R. A. (N.S.) 484, 94 Pac. 807; Heaton v. Bank, 5 Kan. App. 498, 47 Pac. 576.

Massachusetts. Taylor v. Jacques, 106 Mass. 291; Morse v. Woodworth, 155 Mass. 233, 27 N. E. 1010, 29 N. E. 525.

Michigan. Miller v. Lumber Co., 98 Mich. 163, 39 Am. St. Rep. 524, 57 N. W. 101.

Nebraska. Sanford v. Sornborger,

26 Neb. 295, 41 N. W. 1102; Beindorff v. Kaufman, 41 Neb. 824, 60 N. W. 101.

Ohio. Building Association v. Walters, 7 Ohio C. C. 202.

17 See Sec. 499.

18Henry v. State Bank, 131 la. 97, 107 N. W. 1034; Wilbur v. Blanchard, 22 Ida. 517, 126 Pac. 1069.

19Rendleman v. Rendleman, 156 111. 568, 41 N. E. 223. (In this case, however, the threats did not influence the mind of the person to whom they were made.)

1 United States. Manigault v. Ward, 123 Fed. 707.

Arkansas. Fender v. Helterbrandt, 101 Ark. 335, 142 S. W. 184; Brunson v. Board of Directors, 107 Ark. 24, 44 L. R. A. (N.S.) 293, 153 S. W. 828.

California. Holt v. Thomas, 105 Cal. 273, 38 Pac. 891.

Colorado. McClair v. Wilson, 18 Colo. 82, 31 Pac. 502.

Connecticut. Bestor v. Hickey, 71 Conn. 181, 41 Atl. 555.

Georgia. Bond v. Kidd, 122 Ga. 812, another with civil process, does not constitute duress,"2 even though made in a period of business depression.3 Thus a threat to foreclose a mortgage,4 such as a threat to begin foreclosure proceedings unless a new mortgage is given in payment of a prior mortgage;5 a threat to foreclose a chattel mortgage,6 or to institute proceedings in attachment,7 as threatening civil suit in admiralty, with attachment of a ship;8 or to retake a piano sold on the installment plan,9 even if the parties who are threatened believe that criminal proceedings also will be instituted;10 or to issue a capias in a civil proceeding,11 or to have a receiver appointed;12 or to sue a stockholder of a bank on behalf of its creditors to enforce a stock liability;13 or to drive a debtor into bankruptcy;14 or to contest a will;15 or to bring an action for fraudulent representations;16 or to charge adultery in a suit for divorce,17 are none of them duress. The threat of an agent to bring an action against his principal for wrongful discharge, does not amount to duress, even if a receiver would have been appointed as a result of such action.18 A's fear that B could by injunction prevent him from making a certain disposition of a by-product in violation of A's contract with B, does not amount to duress.19 The threat of the court in which A is administering the estate of his brother X, to proceed against A for contempt if he does not settle X's estate, is not duress, although by such threat A's mother, B, is induced to sign a second receipt, A having lost a prior receipt signed by B.20 A threat by a husband, whose wife is about to sue for divorce, to seek to obtain the custody of the children in such divorce proceedings, is said not to be duress.21 A threat to collect a claim prima facie means to collect it by the legal remedies which are appropriate thereto.22 The cases which take this view assume that the test of duress, at least in cases of this sort, is the nature of the threat or its effect upon the mind of the average man, rather than its effect upon the mind of the person upon whom duress was exerted. The result, however, may be justified on the theory that the action at law or the suit in equity is the means provided by law for adjusting disputes as to civil rights, and that, even if duress exists, the policy of the law requires the submission of such disputes to the courts in the first instance, rather than after new transactions have been entered into by way of adjustment of such disputed claims. The practical result, however, often is that duress is said not to exist, as a matter of law, in cases of this sort, although the actual pressure and coercion may be much greater than in some cases of threatened arrest or of threatened criminal prosecution.

50 S. E. 934; Hinkle v. Hinkle, - Ga. - , 96 S. E. 340.

Illinois. Kreider v. Fanning, 74 111. App. 230.

Indiana. Snyder v. Bradew, 58 Ind. 143; Peckham v. Hendren, 76 Ind. 47; Buck v. Axt, 85 Ind. 512; Wilson, etc., Co. v. Curry, 126 Ind. 161, 25 N. E. 896; Darling v. Hines, 5 Ind. App. 319, 32 N. E. 109.

Iowa. James v. Dalbey, 107 la. 463, 78 N. W. 51.

Kansas. Kiler v. Wohletz, 79 Kan. 716, L. R. A. 1915B, 11, 101 Pac. 474; United States Banking Co. v. Veale, 84 Kan. 385, 37 L. R. A. (N.S.) 540, 114 Pac. 229.

Kentucky. Edwards v. Handley, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 602, 3 Am. Dec. 745; Ripy Bros. Distilling Co. v. Lillard, 149 Ky. 726, 149 S. W. 1009; Hamilton v. Kentucky Title Sav. Bank & T. Co., 159 Ky. 680, L. R. A. 1915B, 498, 167 S. W. 898.

Massachusetts. Morse v. Woodworth, 155 Mass. 233, 27 N. E. 1010, 29 N. E. 525.

Missouri. Wood v. Kansas City Home Telephone Co., 223 Mo. 537, 123 S. W. 6.

Nebraska. Pryor v. Hunter, 31 Neb. 678, 48 N. W. 736.

New York, Dunham v. Griswold, 100 N. Y. 224, 3 N. E. 76.

Oklahoma. Zebold v. Hurst, - Okla. - , L. R. A. 1917F, 579; 166 Pac. 99.

Oregon. Jackson v. Siglin, 10 Or. 93.

Tennessee. Barrow v. Loan Association (Tenn. Ch. App.), 48 S. W. 736.

Utah. Flack v. Bank, 8 Utah 193, 17 L. R. A. 583, 30 Pac. 746.

Washington. Walla Walla Fire Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 52 Wash. 369, 100 Pac.

741; Cornwall v. Anderson, 85 Wash. 369, 148 Pac. 1; Zent v. Lewis, 90 Wash. 651, 156 Pac. 848.

West Virginia. Whittaker v. Improvement Co., 34 W. Va. 217, 12 S. E. 507; Schuttler v. Brandfass, 41 W. Va. 201, 23 S. E. 808; Crookshanks v. Rans-barger, 80 W. Va. 21, 92 S. E. 78.

Wisconsin. York v. Hinkle, 80 Wis. 624, 27 Am. St. Rep. 73, 50 N. W. 895.

2 Zebold v. Hurst, - Okla. - , L. R. A. 1917F, 579, 166 Pac. 99 [citing, Atkinson v. Allen, 36 U. S. App. 255, 71 Fed. 58, 17 C. C. A. 570; Snyder v. Braden, 58 Ind. 143; Buck v. Axt, 85 Ind. 512; New Orleans & Northeastern R. Co. v. Louisiana Construction & Improvement Co., 1C9 La. 13, 94 Am. St. Rep. 395, 33 So. 51; Fisher v. Bishop,

43 N. Y. Supr. Ct. (36 Hun) 112; F. B. Collins Investment Co. v. Easley,

44 Okla. 429, 144 Pac. 1072].

3 Morton v. Norris, 72 Fed. 392, 18 C. C. A. 611.

4 California. Rodgers v. Wittenmyer, 88 Cal. 553, 26 Pac. 369; Burke v. Gould, 105 Cal. 277, 38 Pac. 733.

Georgia. Savannah Savings Bank v Logan, 99 Ga. 291, 25 S. E. 692.

Illinois. Hart v. Strong, 183 111. 349, 55 N. E. 629.

Indiana. Buck v. Axt, 85 Ind. 512.

Kansas. Stout v. Judd, 10 Kan. App. 579, 63 Pac. 662.

Michigan. Vereycken v. Vanden-Brooks, 102 Mich. 119, 60 N. W. 687.

North Dakota. Weasel v. Mtge. Co., 3 N. D. 160, 44 Am. St. Rep. 529, 54 N. W. 922.

Oklahoma. F. B. Collins Investment Co. v. Easley, 44 Okla. 429, 144 Pac. 1072.

5F. B. Collins Investment Co. v. Eas-ley, 44 Okla. 429, 144 Pac. 1072.

6 Pease v. Francis, 25 R. I. 226, 55 Atl. 686.

7 Post v. Bank, 38 111. App. 250; W. W. Kimball Co. v. Raw (Kan.), 51 Pac. 789; Weber v. Kirkendall, 44 Neb. 766, 63 N. W. 35; same case, 39 Neb. 193, 57 N. W. 1026; Flack v. Bank, 8 Utah 193, 17 L. R. A. 583, 30 Pac. 746.

8 The Quevilly, 95 Fed. 182.

9 W. W. Kimball Co. v. Raw (Kan.), 51 Pac. 789.

10 Post v. Bank, 38 111. App. 259.

11 Beer v. McLeod, 22 N. S. 535.

12Fuller v. Roberts, 35 Fla. 110, 17 So. 359.

Contra, that a threat of bringing an action for the appointment of a receiver is duress. See Rose v. Owen, 42 Ind. App. 137, 83 N. E. 129.

13 Holt v. Thomas, 105 Cal. 273, 38 Pac. 891.

14 Wilson, etc., Co. v. Curry, 126 Ind. 161, 25 N. E. 896.

15 Layer v. Layer, 184 Mich. 663, 151 N. W. 759.

16 Crookshanks v. Ransbarger, 80 W. Va. 21, 92 S. E. 78.

17Thompson v. Brozo, 92 Wash. 79, 159 Pac. 105.

18 Walla Walla Fire Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 52 Wash. 369, 100 Pac. 741.

19Ripy Bros. Distilling Co. v. Lillard, 149 Ky. 726, 149 S. W. 1009.

20Hessig v. Hessig's Guardian, 131 Ky. 514, 115 S. W. 748.

21 Bonney v. Bonney, 237 111. 452, 86 N. E. 1048 [affirming Bonney v. Bon-ney, 141 111. App. 476].

Some courts have carried the doctrine of duress by threats farther than is indicated here. Some courts which take advanced position as to what constitutes duress have held that a threat to institute a civil action may constitute duress. Thus threatening suit against a person of rather inferior intelligence, in such sum as would exhaust his property may act as duress in coercing him into giving a note and mortgage for such claim.23 Under circumstances of especial hardship, a threat of civil litigation may amount to duress. Thus threatening an insured with litigation while he is ill, and thereby forcing him to surrender his policy, may amount to duress.24 Thus duress existed where A had given to a bank a mortgage in the form of a deed, and the bank threatened a sale of such realty unless A paid a larger sum of money than that due, and A being necessitous made a payment to the bank and entered into a new contract with the bank on its terms;25 or where A is necessitous and wishes to obtain a loan on certain property as collateral security, on which property B wrongfully claims a mechanic's lien, thus taking advantage of A's necessities to force A to pay an unjust claim.26 So a threat to attach the store of one not liable on a debt has been held to amount to duress if a payment of such debt was caused by such threats.27

22 Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Shea, 174 Ind. 303, 91 N. E. 1081.

23Galusha v. Sherman, 105 Wis. 263 47 L. R. A. 417, 81 N. W. 495. The claim in question was an alleged cause of action for illness caused by a meal at defendant's hotel.

24Heinlein v. Ins. Co., 101 Mich. 250, 45 Am. St. Rep. 409, 25 L. R. A. 627, 59 N. W. 615.

25 First National Bank v. Sargent, 65 Neb. 594, 91 N. W. 596.