While consideration is the legal motive for a promise, a motive for a promise may exist and yet not amount to a consideration.1 Thus a desire to protect a

45Wooten v. S. R. Biggs Drug Co., 169 N. Car. 64, 85 S. E. 140.

46Wooten v. S. R. Biggs Drug Co., 169 N. Car. 64, 85 S. E. 140/ ideas has resulted in applying decisions in cases in which a stranger, both to the contract and to the consideration, sought to bring an action upon the contract, to cases in which a party to the contract who was a stranger to the consideration sought to bring an action upon the contract. Some courts have sometimes expressed the theory that a stranger to the contract can not sue thereon in the form that a consideration moving to the promisor from a third person will not support the promise. This rule has been laid down by the English courts,4 and is followed in some of the United States.1

47 See ch. LXIX.

1 Alabama. Thompson v. Hudgins, 116 Ala. 93, 22 So. 632.

California. Peek v. Peek, 77 Cal. 106, 11 Am. St. Rep. 244, 1 L. R. A. 185, 19 Pac. 227.

Connecticut. Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57, 18 Am. Dec. 79.

Georgia. Brosseau v. Jacobs' Pharmacy Co., 147 Ga. 185, 93 S. E. 293.

Illinois. Vehon v. Vehon, 70 111. App. 40.

Kentucky. Holloway v. Rudy (Ky.), €0 S. W. 650 [sub nomine, Trimble v. Rudy, 53 L. R. A. 353].

Maine. Warren v. Whitney, 24 Me. 561, 41 Am. Dec. 406.

Maryland. Duttera v. Babylon, 83 Md. 536, 35 Atl. 64.

Massachusetts. Hale v. Rice, 124 Mass. 292.

Pennsylvania. Martin's Estate, 131 Pa. St. 638, 18 Atl. 987.

Vermont. Cobb v. Cowdery, 40 Vt. 25, 94 Am. Dec. 370; Valentine v. Bell, 66 Vt. 280, 29 Atl. 251. "It is, however, not to be doubted that there is a clear distinction sometimes between the motive that may induce to entering into a contract and the consideration of the contract. Nothing is consideration that is not regarded as such by both parties. \ It is the price voluntarily paid for a promissor's undertaking. An expectation of results often leads to the formation of a contract, but neither the expectation nor the result is 'the cause or meritorious occasion requiring a mutual recompense in fact or in law.' Surely a creditor may do a favor to his debtor, or may enter into a new and independent contract with him, induced by which the debtor may assent to giving a note for the previously existing indebtedness. Without the favor or the new contract there is in such a case a full consideration for the note, and the parties may not have contemplated that the favor or the new contract was to be paid for. To regard husband's reputation,2 or to support an illegitimate child,3 or a desire to equalize distribution of maker's estate,4 or a desire to adjust the interest, of stockholders by having the corporation assume the debts of majority stockholders to minority stockholders, to be paid out of the profits of the corporation,5 are not considerations. Natural love and affection,6 or past considerations,7 or moral obligations,8 are motives of the strongest kind, but they are not considerations. Indeed, if a motive alone were equivalent to a consideration, every promise made free from fraud, duress, and the like, would necessarily be enforceable without any consideration. If a valuable consideration exists, the motive is immaterial.9