The rule requiring consideration in executory contracts is a rule of common law and equity, which are both subordinate to statute law. If the legislature sees fit to provide a means at law of enforcing promises which lack consideration, such promises are valid contracts. The chief examples of such contracts are public grants and subscriptions to the stock of corporations to be formed. A legislative grant needs no consideration other than the public good as viewed by the legislature.1 Where persons subscribe to corporations to be formed, there is no adversary party to the contract and nothing then in existence to serve as a consideration. There is not even an enforceable promise to issue the stock, since the company which is to issue it does not exist. Yet by general incorporation acts subscriptions to stock must be made before the corporation can be created. While it is sometimes sought to find a legal consideration in such subscriptions,2 the most logical view is that by statute such subscriptions become enforceable on the formation of the corporation, without any consideration.3 Where a statute requires a bond and provides what liability shall attach upon executing such bond, no consideration is necessary to support it.4 A contract to furnish gas at a certain price without specifying time or quantity, or imposing on the purchaser the duty to buy any gas at all, is valid under a statute which compelled gas companies to supply gas on demand and gave them the power to shut off gas if prompt payment therefor was not made.5

4 Polk v. Johnson, 160 Ind. 292, 66 N. E. 752; Richmond Guano Co. v. Bennett, 170 N. Car. 343, 87 S. E. 102; Cadle v. Black (Wyom.), 154 Pac. 997.

5 Atlantic Pebble Co. v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 89 N. J. L. 336, 98 Atl. 410.

6 Atlantic Pebble Co. v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 89 N. J. L. 336, 98 Atl. 410.

7 Polk v. Johnson, 160 Ind. 292, 66 N. E. 752.

8 Robinson v. Boyd, 60 O. S. 57, 53 N. E. 494.

9 United States, Swift v. Tyson, 41 U. S. (16 Pet.) 1, 10 L. ed. 865; Oates v. First National Bank, 100 U. S. 239, 25 L. ed. 580.

Alabama. Bynum Mercantile Co. v. First National Bank, 187 Ala. 281, 65 So. 815.

Illinois. Manning v. MoClure, 36 III. 490.

Indiana. Spencer v. Sloan, 108 Ind. 183, 58 Am. Rep. 35, 9 N. E. 150.

Massachusetts. Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass. 300, 7 Am. Dec. 74.

New York. Hickok v. Cowperthwait, 210 N. Y. 137, 103 N. E. 1111.

Vermont. Thomas v. Graves, 89 Vt. 339, 95 Atl. 643.

10 See Sec. 625 et seq.

11 Huntington v. Sherman, 60 Conn. 463, 22 Atl. 769.

Under some statutes no consideration is necessary to discharge a debt if a written acknowledgment of satisfaction is given.6

1 Roberts v. Brooks, 71 Fed. 914. {This question was not discussed on affirmance in Roberts v. Brooks, 78 Fed. 411, 24 C. C. A. 158.)

2 Walter A. Wood Harvester Co. v. Bobbins, 56 Minn. 48, 57 N. W. 317.

3 For different theories see I Thompson on Corporations (Second Edition), Sec. 523 et seq; I Cook on Corporations (Sixth Edition), Sec. 71 et seq; I Machen on Corporations, Sec. 238 et seq.

4 Thompson v. Blanchard, 3 N. T. 335; Buffington v. Bronson, 61 0. S. 231, 56 N. E. 762; Sterner v. Palmer, 34 Pa. St. 131. The consideration for an indemnity bond given to protect sureties on an executor's bond is the continuance of the executor in his trust; and that the indemnity is given -pursuant to an order of court. Buffington v. Bronson, 61 0. S. 291, 56 N.

E. 762. If the bond is not a good statutory bond, it needs a consideration, if not under seal, to be a good common-law contract. Mittnacht v. Kellermann, 105 N. Y. 461, 12 N. E. 28.

5 Gallagher v. Equitable Gas Light Co., 141 CaL 699, 75 Pac. 329.

6 So under Compiled Laws of North Dakota, Sec. 5827, 5828 and 5833. Stro* beck v. Blackmore, 38 N. D. 593, 165 N. W. 980.

Section 1177 of the Civil Code of South Dakota (Compiled Laws of South Dakota, 1913) has been amended by eliminating the words "or less than" the amount actually due, so that as it now stands, a consideration is necessary for a promise to accept less than the amount due in full satisfaction. Eggland v. South, 22 S. D. 467, 118 N. W. 719.

Under Section 122 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, the holder of an instrument may discharge a party by a written renunciation. Section 122 of the Negotiable Instrument Law is as follows: "The holder may expressly renounce his rights against any party to the instrument, before, at or after its maturity. An absolute and unconditional renunciation of his rights against the principal debtor made at or after maturity of the instrument discharges the instrument. But a renunciation does not affect the rights of a holder in due course without notice. A renunciation must be in writing, unless the instrument is delivered up to the person primarily liable thereon." Under this statute such renunciation is undoubtedly sufficient, although no consideration therefor exists. The question which has thus far arisen under this statute is whether it applies to agreements by which the holder agrees for value to discharge parties to the instrument.7 Under a statute which provides that part performance of an obligation may operate as a discharge if the creditor accepts such performance in writing as satisfaction, although no new consideration therefor exists, an oral agreement for an extension of time without consideration is inoperative.8

A legal transaction, which is not in the nature of a contract which does not require a valuable consideration, is not rendered inoperative by the fact that the parties enter into such transaction for what they regard to be a consideration, but which in legal effect is not a sufficient consideration.9 It is not necessary that there be a valuable consideration for a husband's written consent to his wife's devise of her realty; and such consent is not rendered inoperative by the fact that it was given in pursuance of a transaction by which one attempted to release to the other dower in the property of such other,10 at least in view of the fact that each party to such transaction had performed.