The dispute may involve the existence of a claim, the amount of which is liquidated, or it may involve the amount due upon an unliquidated claim whose existence is conceded, or it may involve a claim for an unliquidated amount, the existence of which is disputed.1 In all cases in which the amount of the claim is in dispute, and in many of the cases in which the existence of a liquidated claim is in dispute, the parties may attempt to compromise the claim by agreeing to pay the minimum amount which is conceded by one of the parties to be due, or by paying the maximum amount which is claimed by the

2 Daniel v. Hughes, 106 Ala. 368, 72 So. 23.

3 Daniel v. Hughes, 196 Ala. 368, 72 So. 23.

4 Davisson v. Ford, 23 W. Va. 617.

5 McCloy's Admrx. v. Watkins, 88 Vt. 457, 92 Atl. 968.

6 Simmon's Ex'r v. Hunt, 171 Ky. 397, 188 S. W. 495.

7 Woodall v. Peden, 274 111. 301, 113 N. E. 608.

8 Fire Insurance Association v. Wickham, 141 U. S. 564, 35 L. ed. 860; Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Quinn, 130 Ky. 397, 113 S. W. 456. "If there be a bona fide dispute as to the amount due, such dispute may be the subject of a compromise and payment of a certain sum as a satisfaction of the entire claim, but where the larger sum is admitted to be due, or the circumstances of the case show that there was no good reason to doubt that it was due, the release of other parties to be due, or by paying an amount which is greater than the minimum and less than the maximum claim. If the amount which is agreed upon is between the minimum and the maximum claim, a consideration for such contract of compromise exists in the renunciation by each party of a part of the amount claimed by him if each claim meets the tests already indicated.2 The liquidation of an unliquidated demand is based upon sufficient consideration, since each party gives up a chance of proving that the unliquidated claim is larger or smaller, as the case may be, than the amount upon which the parties have agreed.3

■ the whole upon payment of part will not be considered as a compromise, but will be treated as without consideration and void." Fire Insurance Association v. Wickham) 141 U. S. 564, 33 L. ed. 860.

9 Union Collection Co. v. Buckman, 150 Cal. 159, 119 Am. St. Hep. 164, 9 L. R. A. (N.S.) 568, 11 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 609, 88 Pac. 708; Evering-ham v. Meighan, 55 Wis. 354, 13 N. W. 269.

1 Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Gibbs, 114 Ark. 659, 170 S. W. 574.

If the amount which is paid or promised by the debtor is the minimum amount which he concedes to be due, we find a conflict of authority upon the question of the existence of the consideration. In some cases, it is said that the compromise of the dispute is a sufficient consideration for such a contract.4 Where there was no dispute as to the existence or the amount of A's claim against B, and the amount of B's claim against A was conceded, but the existence of such claim was in dispute, it was held that B's payment of the exact difference between the amount of A's undisputed claim and the amount of B's disputed claim was sufficient consideration for B's promise to accept such payment in full.5 In other cases, the courts point out the fact that under such an alleged compromise, the debtor pays only the amount which he conceded to be due, and the creditor therefore receives nothing for his promise to forbear collecting the rest of the amount which he claims to be due; and for this reason it is held that no consideration exists in such a case.6 If A claims he owes to B a certain amount and sends a check therefor, while B claims that the amount is larger, B's act in making use of such check which is for the exact amount which A claims to be due does not prevent B from recovering the balance.7 If A claims a credit on an account which is due from him to B, and A sends to B a check for the amount of such claim which is not in dispute, and notifies B that it is in full settlement of the account, the fact that B retains such check and cashes it does not preclude him from recovering the balance of such account, if it is in fact due.8 Like considerations apply where the debtor promises to pay to the creditor the maximum amount which is claimed by the creditor to be due. In some cases it is held that the compromise of such claim is sufficient consideration for such a contract. In other cases it is pointed out that by such contract the creditor receives everything that he claims and that the debtor receives nothing for his promise to give up the claim which he asserts; and for this reason such a compromise is regarded as unenforceable as long as it remains executory.

2 United States. Chicago, etc., Ry. v. Clark, 178 U. S. 353, 44 L. ed. 1099.

Illinois. Ostrander v. Scott, 161 111. 339, 43 N. E. 1089.

Kansas. Kiler v. Wohletz, 79 Kan. 716, L. R. A. 1915B, 11, 101 Pac. 474.

Louisiana. Daley v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 133 La. 270, 62 So. 903.

Michigan. Tanner v. Merrill, 108 Mich. 58, 62 Am. St. Rep. 687, 31 L. R. A. 171, 65 N. W. 664.

Minnesota. Marion v. Heimbach, 62 Minn. 214, 64 N. W. 386 [obiter, as no contract to release balance was shown].

New York. Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 148 N. Y. 326, 51 Am. St. Rep. 695, 42 N. E. 715; Post v. Thomas, 212 N. Y. 264, 106 N. E. 69.

Ohio. Seeds, Grain & Hay Co. v. Conger, 83 O. S. 169, 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 380, 93 N. E. 892. See Sec. 560.

3 Root v. New Haven Trust Co., 82 Conn. 600, 74 Atl. 950; Castelli v.

Jereissati, 80 N. J. L. 295, 78 Atl. 227; Rose v. American Paper Co., 83 N. J. L. 707, 86 Atl. 354; Paulson v. Ward County, 23 N. D. 601, 137 N. W. 486; Seeds, Grain & Hay Co. v. Conger, 83 O. S. 169, 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 380, 93-N. E. 892.

4 United States. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Clark, 178 U. S. 353, 44 L. ed. 1099.

Alabama. Brackin v. Owens Horse & Mule Co., 196 Ala. 579, 71 So. 97.

Colorado. Stanley-Thompson Liquor Co. v. Southern Colorado Mercantile Co. (Colo.), 178 Pac. 577.

Illinois. Janci v. Cerny (111.), 122 N. E. 507.

Kansas. Neely v. Thompson, 68 Kan. 193, 75 Pac. 117.

Michigan. Tanner v. Merrill, 108 Mich. 58, 62 Am. St. Rep. 687, 31 L. R. A. 171, 65 N. W. 664.

Nebraska. Treat v. Price, 47 Neb. 875, 66 N. W. 834.

5 Tanner v. Merrill, 108 Mich. 58, 62 Am. St. Rep. 687, 31 L. R. A 171, 65 N. W. 664.

6 Dakota. Jones v. Matthieson, 2 Dak. 523, 11 N. W. 109.

Georgia. Robinson v. Leatherbee Tie & Lumber Co., 120 Ga. 901, 48 S. E. 380.

Iowa. Walston v. F. D. Calkins Co., 119 la. 150, 93 N. W. 49; Cartan v. Wm. Tackaberry Co., 139 la. 586, 117 N. W. 953.

Massachusetts. Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204, 51 L. R. A (N.S.) 315, 103 N. E. 695.

Minnesota. Ness V.Minnesota & Colorado Co., 87 Minn. 413, 92 N. W. 333; Demeules v. Jewel Tea "Co., 103 Minn. 150, 14 L. R. A. (N.S.) 954, 114 N. W. 733.

Mississippi. Collins v. Union & Farmers' Bank, 110 Miss. 506, 70 So. 581.

North Carolina. Moore v. Maryland Casualty Co., 150 N. Car. 153, 24 L. R. A. (N.S.) 211, 63 S. E. 675; Bogert v. Henderson Mfg. Co., 172 N. Car. 248, 90 S. E. 208.

South Dakota. Hagen v. Townsend, 27 S. D. 457, 131 N. W. 512.

Wisconsin. Weidner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 130 Wis. 10, 110 N. W. 246.

7 Robinson v. Leatherbee Tie and Lumber Co., 120 Ga. 901, 48 S. E. 380.

8 Cartan. v. Wm. Tackaberry Co., 139 la. 586, 117 N. W. 953; Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204, 51 L. R. A. (N.S.) 315, 103 N. E. 695; Demeules v. Jewel Tea Co., 103 Minn. 150, 14 L. R. A (N.S.) 954, 114 N. W. 733.

If the contract of compromise provides for a change in the liabilities of both parties as fixed by the original transaction,9 such contract is valid and does not need the support of the doctrine of compromise of disputed claims, since the mutual renunciation of rights under the original contract is a sufficient consideration.10 If the original contract was to the effect that A should support B and should retain B's rents as a consideration, a subsequent agreement, rescinding the first contract and providing that B should pay to A a certain sum for the support actually received by B, has sufficient consideration.11 Contracts of this sort are supported by sufficient consideration without relying upon the doctrine of compromise.12