Oklahoma. Osborne v. White, 54 Okla. 733, 154 Pac. 653.

Oregon. Hughes v. Lansing, 34 Or. 118, 75 Am. St. Rep. 574, 55 Pac. 95; Friendly v. Elwert. 57 Or. 599, 105 Pac. 404, 111 Pac. 690, 112 Pac. 1085; Collins v. Keller, 62 Or. 169, 124 Pac. 681; Elliott Contracting Co. v. Portland, 88 Or. 150, 171 Pac. 760.

Utah. Abba v. Smyth, 21 Utah 109, 59 Pac. 766.

• Levin v. Dietz, 194 N. Y. 376, 20

L. R. A. (N.S.) 251, 87 N. E. 454; De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431, 117 N. E. 807; Osborne v. White, 54 Okla. 733, 154 Pac. 653; John E. DeWolf Co. v. Harvey, 161 Wis. 535, 154 N. W. 988.

9 Buffington v. McNally, 192 Mass. 198, 78 N. E. 309; Feudtner v. Ross, 74 N. J. Eq. 214, 69 Atl. 190; Lombard v. Kies, 79 Or. 355; 154 Pac. 757; Barnes v. Rea, 219 Pa. St. 279, 68 Atl. 836; Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. St. 348, 92 Atl. 312.

10 Lemler v. Bord, 80 Or. 224, 156 Pac. 427, 156 Pac. 1034.

11 England. Pilkington v. Scott, 15 M. & W. 657 (used in argument of counsel for defendant).

United States. Erie City Iron Works v. Thomas, 139 Fed. 995 (used in contention of defendant).

Alabama. Consolidated Portrait & Frame Co. v. Barnett, 165 Ala. 655, 51 So. 936.

Arkansas. Trulock v. Parse, 83 Ark. 149, 11 L. R. A. (N.S.) 924, 103 S. W. 166.

Georgia. Brown v. Bowman, 119 Ga. 153, 46 S. E. 410 [explaining Peacock v. Deweese, 73 Ga. 570, as "purely unilateral when made"]; Swindell v. First Nat. Bank, 121 Ga. 714, 49 S. E. 673; Hardin v. Case, 134 Ga. 813, 68 S. E. 648, Cooper v. Dixie Cotton Co., 144 Ga. 33, 86 S. E. 242.

Illinois. Hills v. Hupp (111.), 122 N. E. 510.

Iowa. Burge v. Gough, 153 La. 183, 133 N. W. 340.

Kansas. Braniff v. Baier, 101 Kan. 117, L. R. A. 1917E, 1036, 165 Pac. 816.

Missouri. Underwood Typewriter Co, v. Century Realty Co., 220 Mo. 522, 119

S. W. 400.

North Carolina. Holt v. Wellons, 163 N. Car. 124, 79 S. E. 450.

Tennessee. Fourth Nat. Bank v. Stahlman, 132 Tenn. 367, 178 S. W. 942 (see use of word in fourth paragraph of syllabus).

Virginia. Watkins v. Robertson, 105 Va. 269, 115 Am. St. Rep. 880, 5 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1194, 54 S. E. 33.

"The contract • • • was not unilateral or without consideration or void. It was bilateral and bound both parties"; Holt v. Wellons, 163 N. Car. 124, 79 S. E. 450. .

A promise without a valuable consideration has been said to be a "pseudo-unilateral" contract: Gates v. Herr, 102 Wash. 131, 172 Pac. 912.

12 ln such case a unilateral contract is said to be "a contract binding only one of the parties to do anything"; Rehm-Zeiher Co. v. Walker Co., 156 Ky.

6, 49 L. R. A. (N.S.) 694, 160 S. W. 777.

13 Haynes Auto Co. v. Turner, 18 Ga. App. 22, 88 S. E. 717; Palmer Brick Co. v. Woodward, 138 Ga. 289, 75 S. E. 480.

14 Palmer Brick Co. v. Woodward, 138 Ga. 289, 75 S. E. 480.

15 Haynes Auto Co. v. Turner, 18 Ga. App. 22, 88 S. E. 717.

16 Johnson v. Johnson, - Neb. - , 168 N. W. 363; Elliott Contracting Co. v. Portland, 88 Or. 150, 171 Pac. 760.

17 McCormick v. Stephany, 57 N. J. Eq. 257, 41 Atl. 840. See also, Erie City Iron Works v. Thomas, 139 Fed. 995.

18 "A unilateral contract is a legal solecism. There is no such thing as a one-sided contract. The term, however, has found a place in the books as expressing the idea of a contract lacking in mutuality": High Wheel Auto Parts Co. v. Journal Co., 50 Ind. App. 396, 98 N. E. 442.

19 Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wil-shire, 135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1086; Plumb v. Campbell, 129 111. 101, 81 N. E. 790; Hornthal v. Howcutt, 154 N. Car. 228, 70 S. E. 171.

20 Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wil-shire, 135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1086.

The term "bilateral" has been suggested for contracts which are executory on both sides, in which acceptance furnishes the consideration but not the performance.26 The only objection to this term is that it is scarcely used at all outside of academic discussion of the law. Its use is increasing, and as a rule it is used with greater accuracy than the corresponding term "unilateral."27 It is sometimes, however, used of any enforceable contract, even if probably of the unilateral type.28 Occasionally we find both terms used with accuracy.29 Since we have two distinct classes of contracts, we need convenient and accurate names to distinguish them; either these names or others equally suitable.

21 Plumb v. Campbell, 129 111. 101, 81 N. E. 790.

22 Bateman v. Kramer Lumber Co., 154 N. Car. 248, 70 S. E. 474.

23 Newberry v. Webb, 68 W. Va. 209, 69 S. E. 792.

24 An option is said to be "unilateral and binding on one party only": Coleman v. Applegarth, 68 Md. 21, 11 Atl. 284; Lombard v. Kies, 79 Or. 355, 154 Pac. 757; Lemler v. Bord, 80 Or. 224, 156 Ac. 427; Boyer v. Nesbitt, 227 Pa. St. 398, 76 Atl. 103.

25 First National Bank v. Watkins, 154 Mass. 385, 28 N. E. 275; Buffing-ton v. McNally, 192 Mass. 198, 78 N. E. 309; Murphy v. Hanna, 37 N. D. 156, L. R. A. 1918B, 135, 164 N. W. 32; Neikirk v. Williams, 81 W. Va. 558, 94 S. E. 947.

26 Thus the court speaks of a "bilateral executory" contract in Thomas v. Barnes, 156 Mass. 581, 31 N. E. 683.

27 United States. Davis v. Wells, 104 U. S. 159, 26 L. ed. 686.

Massachusetts. Winston v. Pitts-field, 221 Mass. 356, 108 N. E. 1038.

New Jersey. Morecraft v. Allen, 78 N. J. L. 729, L. R. A. 1915B, 1, 75 Atl. 920.

North Carolina. Wiley v. Broaddus & Ives Lumber Co., 156 N. Car. 210, 72 S. E. 305.

North Dakota. Murphy v. Hanna, 37 N. D. 156, L. R. A. 1918B, 135, 164 N. W. 32.

Wisconsin. Foster v. Lowe, 131 Wis. 54, 110 N. W. 829.

28 "The promised consideration had been partly performed and the contract had taken on a bilateral character": Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654, 67 Ac. 1086. Thus the court speaks of "bilateral contracts where there is a promisor and promisee," as distinguished from a "unilateral contract" by which an unaccepted promise is intended: Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Century Realty Co., 220 Mo. 522, 119 S. W. 400 [dissenting opinion].

Occasionally the term "trilateral" is used. A building contract and a bond to secure performance by the contractor have been said to constitute "a trilateral contract."30