Since the object of construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties, the contract must be considered as an entirety. The problem is not what the separate parts of the contract mean, but what the contract means when considered as a whole.1

10 Andrews v. Robertson, 111 Wis. 334; 87 Am. St. Rep. 870; 54 L. R. A. 673; 87 N. W. 190.

11 McCutsky v. Klosterman, 20 Or. 108; 10 L. R. A. 785; 25 Pac. 366. (To show that it meant accounts outstanding after charging the bad accounts to profit and loss.)

12 Quarry Co. v. Clements, 38 O. S. 587; 43 Am. Rep. 442. (In this case evidence was admitted to show that the parties had agreed that stone should be furnished at eighteen cents per cubic foot, and that the scrivener who drew the contract of his own motion, stated this rate by the perch and assumed that twenty-five cubic feet made a perch. Accordingly he stated the rate at four dollars and fifty cents a perch. The evidence showed that in cellar walls and foundations by the local usage the term "perch" meant sixteen and a half feet; in railroad masonry it meant twenty-five feet; and in bridge masonry, which was the subject of the contract, the term was ambiguous.)

13 Barrett v. Allen, 10 Ohio 426.

14 See Sec. 1131.

1 O'Brien v. Miller, 168 U. S. 287; Brush, etc., Co. v. Montgomery, 114 Ala. 433; 21 So. 960; Siegel, etc., Co. v. Colby, 176 111. 210; 52 N. E. 917; affirming, 61 111. App. 315; St. Landry State Bank v. Meyer, 52 La. Ann. 1769; 28 So. 136; Tete v. Lan-aux, 45 La. Ann. 1343; 14 So. 241; Jackson v. Phillips, 57 Neb. 189; 77 N. W. 683; Ballou v. Sherwood, 32 Neb. 666; 49 N. W. 790; 50 N. W. 1131; Monmouth Park Association v. Iron Works, 55 N. J. L. 132; 39 Am. St. Rep. 626; 19 L. R

A contract must be thus construed even if the separate parts are clear and free from ambiguity.2 Thus the name given by the parties to the contract is not conclusive, and if, considering it as a whole, it is evidently an instrument of a sort different from that which the parties have called it, it must be treated as what it is and not what it is called.3 Thus an instrument called a "special selling factor appointment" may be construed as a contract of sale,4 or an instrument called a lease may be construed as a conditional sale, the title being reserved for security.5 So money paid by an insurer to an insured equal in amount to the loss under the policy may be construed as payment, though it was called a "loan" by the contract under which it was paid, which provided that so much thereof as might be recovered from the carrier, whose liability for the loss was then under investigation should be repaid by the insured to the insurer.6 So the fact that the language used in the instrument under consideration is in part appropriate and peculiar to a certain kind of instrument is not of itself conclusive that the instrument is of that kind.7

A. 456; 26 Atl. 140; Chism v. Schip-per, 51 N. J. L. 1; 14 Am. St. Rep. 66S; 2 L. R. A. 544; 16 Atl. 316; Sattler v. Hallock, 160 N. Y. 291; 73 Am. St. Rep. 686; 46 L. R. A. 679; 54 N. E. 667; German Fire Ins. Co. v. Roost, 55 O. S. 5S1; 60 Am. St. Rep. 711; 36 L. R. A. 236; 45 N. E. 1097; Arbuckle v. Kirkpat-rick, 98 Tenn. 221; 60 Am. St. Rep. 854; 36 L. R. A. 285; 39 S. W. 3; McKay v. Barnett, 21 Utah 239; 50 L. R. A. 371; 60 Pac. 1100; Kentz-ler v. Accident Association, 88 Wis. 589; 43 Am. St. Rep. 934; 60 N. W. 1002.

2 O'Brien v. Miller, 168 U. S. 287.

3 Herryford v. Davis, 102 U. S. 235, 244; Hervey v. Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664; Stockton Savings Society v. Purvis, 112 Cal. 236; 53 Am. St. Rep. 210; 44 Pac. 561;

Dederiek v. Wolfe, 68 Miss. 500; 24 Am. St. Rep. 283; 9 So. 350; Arbuckle v. Kirkpatrick, 98 Tenn. 221; 60 Am. St. Rep. 854; 36 L. R. A. 285; 39 S. W. 3; Cowan v. Mfg. Co., 92 Tenn. 376; 21 S. W. 663; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Cole, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 439; 40 Am. Rep. 20.

4 Arbuckle v. Kirkpatrick, 98 Tenn. 221; 60 Am. St. Rep. 854; 36 L. R. A. 285; 39 S. W. 3.

5 Fidelity, etc., Co. v. R. R., 86 Va. 1; 19 Am. St. Rep. 858; 9 S. E. 759.

6 Lancaster Mills v. Cotton Press Co., 89 Tenn. 1; 24 Am. St. Rep. 586; 14 S. W. 317.

7 Burlington University v. Barrett, 22 Ia. 60; 92 Am. Dec. 376; Lauck v. Logan, 45 W. Va. 251; 31 S. E. 986.