The disabilities of married women are elsewhere discussed.1

6 Hindman v. O'Connor. 64 Ark. 627; 13 L. R. A. 490; 16 S. W. 1052.

7 Wilkinson v. Buster, 124 Ala. 574; 26 So. 940.

8 Doles v. Hilton. 48 Ark. 305; 3 S. W. 193; to the same effect is Pochelu's Emancipation. 41 La. Ann. 331; 6 So. 541.

9 State ex rel. Lamson v. Baker, 25 Fla. 598; 6 So. 445.

10 Hindman v. O'Connor, 54 Ark.

627; 13 L. R. A. 490; 16 S. W. 1052.

11 Cox v. Johnson. 80 Ala. 22.

12McKamy v. Cooper, 81 Ga. 679; 8 S. E. 312. So where his parents consent. Jimmerson v. Lawrence, 112 Ga. 340; 37 S. E. 371.

13 Ullmer v. Fitzgerald. 106 Ga. 815; 32 S. E. 869.

14 Burr v. Wilson. 18 Tex. 367.

15 Beickler v. Guenther, 121 la. 419: 96 N. W. 895.

1See Ch. XLI.

The statutes which modify the Common Law rules of coverture in some states specifically apply to infants and remove together the disabilities of infancy and coverture.2 Thus in Nebraska the statute removes the disabilities of a married woman over sixteen years of age,3 while in Alabama the limit is eighteen years, and the statute applies to married women of that age even if married before they were eighteen.4 In states in which the statute removing the disabilities of a married woman does not specifically apply to infants, it is held that notwithstanding the statute, the disability of infancy remains.5 "Where the party is an infant as well as feme covert, the disability arising from infancy remains, although she execute and acknowledge a deed in the form prescribed by statute."6 A proviso in a deed to a married woman that "nothing herein shall prevent her selling said land ... by her husband uniting with her " does not remove the disability of infancy.7