The remaining contracts of an infant are neither valid nor void but are voidable.1 This implies that they may be disaffirmed or ratified by the infant; the methods and legal consequences of which will be discussed subsequently.2 By the great weight of authority not only executory contracts,3 but also contracts fully performed by one or both of the parties thereto,4 are voidable. So an infant's assignment of an insurance policy is voidable only, and not void.5 It will be seen from the special classes of contracts hereafter discussed that these contracts are voidable even if advantageous to the infant,6 as where he sold the goods, purchased by him, without loss,7 or profited by the services of an attorney in defending a foreclosure suit;8 or if the avoidance of such contracts is disastrous to the adversary party; as where he relied on the infant's contract and by delay lost his claim against the estate of the infant's father.9 The dissenting view which holds certain fair, reasonable and executed contracts of a minor to be valid is hereafter discussed.10 On sound legal principle and by the better reasoning, an infant's contract whether executed or executory is to be treated as binding until it is disaffirmed by him or some one authorized by law to act for him.11 This is on the theory that disaffirmance is a privilege which may be exercised by the infant at his discretion, but that subject to this right, a voidable contract of an infant stands on the same footing as any valid contract. The courts have said, however, in many cases, that an executory contract of an infant is not valid until it is ratified.12 An examination of these cases will, however, show that in every case this proposition is a mere dictum, as the contract in each case has been avoided by the infant in a proper manner. It may be doubted if even these courts really mean all that they say. If the infant's executory contract were of no validity until he affirmed, there would be no consideration for the promise of the adversary party, and he would be able to defeat any action against him by the infant - a conclusion to which no court has come. What is probably meant by this form of statement is that: An executory contract, unless ratified, is subject to the defense of infancy until the right of disaffirmance is barred by lapse of time.13 This right exists therefore either for a reasonable time or for the period prescribed by the statute of limitations. In the latter case, the right to plead infancy will not be extinguished until the right to sue on the contract is extinguished. In the former case, it might be possible that the right to disaffirm would cease before the right of action on the contract would be lost. The doctrine of a reasonable time is generally applied only to executed conveyances. If two infants contract with each other, either has the same right to disaffirm that he has in contracting with an adult.14

9 Root v. Stevenson's Admr., 24 Ind, 115; Kennedy v. Doyle, 10 All. (Mass.) 161; Turner v. Gaither, 83 N. C. 357; 35 Am. Rep. 574.

1 McGreal v. Taylor, 167 U. S. 688; Shropshire v. Burns, 46 Ala. 108; Savage v. Lichlyter, 59 Ark. 1; 26 S. W. 12; Barlow v. Robinson, 174 111. 317; 51 N. E. 1045; Cole v. Pennoyer, 14 111. 158; Alvey v. Reed, 115 Ind. 148; 7 Am. St. Rep. 418; 17 N. E. 265; Phipps v. Phipps, 39 Kan. 495; 18 Pac. 707; Breckinridge v. Ormsby, 1 J. J. Mar. (Ky.) 236; 19 Am. Dec. 71; McDonald v. Sargent, 171 Mass. 492; 51 N. E. 17; Dube v. Beaudry, 150 Mass. 448; 15 Am. St. Rep. 228; 6 L. R. A. 146; 23 N. E. 222; Owen v. Long, 112 Mass. 403; Reed v. Batchelder, 1 Met. (Mass.) 559; Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 457; 7 Am. Dec. 229; Bloomingdale v. Chittenden, 74 Mich. 698; 42 N. W. 166; Tyler v. Gallop, 68 Mich. 185; 13 Am. St. Rep. 336; 35 N. W. 902; Johnson v. Insurance Co., 56 Minn. 365; 43 Am. St. Rep. 473; 26 L. R. A. 187; 59 N. W. 992; 57 N. W. 934; Englebert v. Troxell, 40 Neb. 195; 42 Am. St. Rep. 665; 26 L. R. A. 177; 58 N. W, 852; Danville v. Mfg. Co., 62 N. H. 133; Patterson v. Lippincott, 47 N. J. L. 457; 54 Am. Rep. 178; 1 Atl. 506; Willard v. Stone.. 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 22; 17 Am. Dec. 496; Campbell v. Stokes,

2 Wend. (N. Y.) 137; 19 Am. Dec. 561; Fonda v. Van Horne, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 631; 30 Am. Dec. 77; Har-ner v. Dipple, 31 O . S. 72; 27 Am. Rep. 496; Rush v. Wick, 31 O. S. 521; 27 Am. Rep. 523; Dolph v. Hand, 156 Pa. St. 91; 36 Am. St. Rep. 25; 27 Atl. 114; Curtin v. Pat-ton, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 305; Scott v. Buchanan, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) 468; Bonner v. Bryant, 79 Tex. 540; 23 Am. St. Rep. 361; 15 S. W. 49; Cummings v. Powell, 8 Tex. 80; Patchin v. Cromach, 13 Vt. 330; Mustard v. Wohlford, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 329; 76 Am. Dec. 209. "Many text-writers state the proposition that the contract of an infant is void, but upon a careful examination of the cases cited by them we are of the opinion that they do not support such a doctrine. To hold the executory contract of a minor void would unsettle the law in many of its branches. It would ne-cessitate the holding that the promise of a minor cannot furnish a consideration for the promise of an adult, and the latter's promise would be void, both for want of consideration and for lack of mutuality, whereas the contrary is the settled law based upon the proposition that the infant's contract is only voidable." Brown v. Bank. 88 Tex. 265, 274; 33 L. R. A. 359; 31 S. W. 285.

2 See Sec. 881 et seg.

3 Savage v. Lichlyter, 59 Ark. 1; 26 S. W. 12; Gregory v. Lee, 64 Conn. 407; 25 L. R. A. 618; 30 Atl. 53; Barlow v. Robinson, 174 111. 317; 51 N. E. 1045; Des Moines Ins. Co. v. McIntire, 99 Ia. 50; 68 N. W. 565; Danville v. Mfg. Co., 62 N. H. 133; Harner v. Dipple, 31 O. S. 72; 27 Am. Rep. 496; Rush v. Wick, 31 O. S. 521; 27 Am. Rep. 523.

4 Walker v. Pope, 101 Ga. 665; 29 S. E. 8; Hoffert v. Miller, 86 Ky. 572; 6 S. W. 447; Morse v. Ely, 154 Mass. 458; 26 Am. St. Rep. 263; 28 N. E. 577; Dube v. Beaudry, 150 Mass. 448; 15 Am. St. Rep. 228; 6 L. R. A. 146; 23 N. E. 222; Barney v. Rutledge, 104 Mich. 289; 62 X. W. 369; Bloomingdale v. Chittenden, 74 Mich. 698; 42 N. W. 166; Nichols, etc., Co. v. Snyder, 78 Minn. 502; 81 N. W. 516; Engle-bert v. Troxell, 40 Neb. 195; 42 Am. St. Rep. 665; 26 L. R. A. 177; 58 N. W. 852; Dolph v. Hand, 156 Pa. St. 91; 36 Am. St. Rep. 25; 27 Atl. 114; Grace v. Hale, 2 Humph.

(Tenn.) 27; 36 Am. Dec. 296; Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294; 5 L. R. A. 176; 11 S. W. 1101; Dar-raugh v. Blackford, 84 Va. 509; 5 S. E. 542. "It is wholly immaterial whether the contract of an infant is executed or executory. He has the right to avoid it." Leacox v. Griffith, 76 Ia. 89, 94; 40 N. W. 109.

5 Union, etc., Ins. Co. v. Hilliard, 63 O. S. 478; 81 Am. St. Rep. 644; 53 L. R. A. 462; 59 N. E. 230.

6 Magee v. Welsh, 18 Cal. 155; Price v. Jennings, 62 Ind. 1ll; Warnock v. Loar (Ky.), 11 S. W. 438; Morse v. Ely, 154 Mass. 458; 26 Am. St. Rep. 263; 28 N. E. 577; Tupper v. Caldwell, 12 Met. (Mass.) 559; 46 Am. Dec. 704; Phelps v. Worcester, 11 N. H. 51.

7 Morse v. Ely, 154 Mass. 458; 26 Am. St. Rep. 263; 28 N. E. 577.

8 Englebert v. Troxell, 40 Neb. 195; 42 Am. St. Rep. 665; 26 L. R. A. 177; 58 N. W. 852.

9 Dube v. Beaudry, 150 Mass. 448; 15 Am. St. Rep. 228; 6 L. R. A. 146; 23 N. E. 222.

10 See Sec. 891.

11 Viditz v. O'Hagan (1899), 2 Ch. 569; 68 L. J. Ch. N. S. 553; American, etc., Co. v. Dykes, 111 Ala. 178; 56 Am. St. Rep. 38; 18 So. 292; Amey v. Cockey. 73 Md. 297; 20 Atl. 1071; Englebert v. Troxell, 40 Neb. 195; 42 Am. St. Rep. 665; 26 L. R. A. 177: 58 N. W. 852; Logan v. Gardner, 136 Pa. St. 588; 20 Am. St. Rep. 939; 20 Atl. 625.

12 Morton v. Steward, 5 111. App. 533; Tyler v. Gallop, 68 Mich. 185; 13 Am. St. Rep. 336; 35 N. W. 902; Minock v. Shortridge, 21 Mich. 304; State v. Plaisted, 43 N. H. 413; Ed-gerly v. Shaw. 25 N. H. 514; 57 Am. Dec. 349: Beardsley v. Hotch-kiss. 96 N. Y. 201.

13 See Sec. 885.