Statutes restricting the number of hours per day or per week for which persons may contract to work are not uncommon. The validity of such statutes depends in the first instance on whether the contract is with a private person for private purposes, or whether it is with a public corporation, or with a contractor for working for a public corporation. Statutes which restrict the number of hours per day for which persons may contract to labor with private persons for private purposes1 making a violation of such statute a crime,2 or providing that the employer shall pay double wages for work overtime,3 have been generally held unconstitutional. Even a statute forbidding women employed in factories to work more than eight hours a day has been held invalid.4 In some cases the reason for holding such a statute invalid is that it " violates the right of parties to make their own contracts - a right guaranteed by our bill of rights,"5 or that it deprives the employe of a prop-, erty right.6 There have often been special reasons, quite apart from these, for holding such contracts invalid. Thus such statutes often discriminate unfairly against certain classes of employers or employes, as where they apply only to certain kinds of factories,7 or as to only workmen in underground mines and smelters,8 or as to all laborers except farm laborers and domestic servants,9 or as to women.10 Under the constitutions of some states, statutes restricting the hours of labor to eight have been upheld.11 The Utah statute applied to laborers in underground mines and smelters.12 So a restriction of the hours of labor for bakers to sixty hours a week,13 or for employes of a public service corporation to teu hours out of the twenty-four, to be employed within twelve consecutive hours,14 have each been held valid. Statutes limiting the hours for which women may be employed in any "mechanical or mercantile establishment, laundry, hotel or restaurant,"15 to ten hours a day,16 or to sixty hours a week and not over ten hours a day,17 have been held valid. Statutes restricting the hours of labor of persons employed by or on behalf of the public have been held valid.18 This holding is based on the theory "that the work, being of a public character, absolutely under the control of the state and its municipal agents acting by its authority, it is for the state to prescribe the conditions under which it will permit work of that kind to be done."19 Other courts have reached an opposite conclusion as to statutes limiting the number of hours of labor by persons employed by or on behalf of the public, and requiring such stipulations to be inserted in contracts with public contractors,20 or providing that a public contractor who violates such provision shall forfeit his contract,21 especially if the statute requires the wages to be not less than those prevailing for a legal day's work.22 Even if such provision has been incorporated in a contract between a city and a public contractor it has been held that it cannot be enforced,23 though if the bids are made and the contract awarded after the decision of the court of last resort declaring the law unconstitutional has been pronounced, and the city has given notice that it will not enforce such provision, it must be presumed that the contract price was not increased by reason of such provision, and hence the awarding of such contract should not be set aside.24 A statute intended to abolish sweatshops and the like, which forbade the manufacture of cigars in tenement houses containing more than three families, was held unconstitutional.25 A statute requiring a city to employ only citizens of the United States or persons who have made formal declaration of their intention to become citizens is invalid.26

5 " It would be presumptuous for any court to attempt to formulate an exact legal definition of the term 'police power of the state.' . . . But for all practical purposes the police power of the state may be shortly defined to be the power of the legislature to make such regulations relating to the personal and property rights as look to the public health, the public safety, and the public morals." State v. Dalton, 22 R. I. 77, 80; 84 Am. St. Rep. 818; 48 L. R. A. 775; 46 Atl. 234.

1 Ex parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274; 20 Am. St. Rep. 226; 9 L. R. A. 482;

24 Pac. 737; In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415; 77 Am. St. Rep. 269; 47 L. R. A. 52; 58 Pac. 1071; In re Eight Hours Bill, 21 Colo. 29; 39 Pac. 328; Ritchie v. People, 155 111. 98; 46 Am. St. Rep. 315; 29 L. R. A. 79; 40 X. E. 454; Low v. Printing Co., 41 Xeb. 127; 43 Am. St. Rep.' 670; 24 L. R. A. 702; 59 N. W. 362; Wheeling, etc., Ry. v. Gilmore, 8 Ohio C. C. 658.

2 Ritchie v. People, 155 111. 98; 46 Am. St. Rep. 315; 29 L. R. A. 79;

40 N. E. 454; Low v. Printing Co.,

41 Neb. 127; 43 Am. St. Rep. 670; 24 L. R. A. 702; 59 N. W. 362.

3 Low v. Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127; 43 Am. St. Rep. 670; 24 L. R. A. 702; 59 N. W. 362.

4 Ritchie v. People, 155 111. 98; 46 Am. St. Rep. 315; 29 L. R. A. 79; 40 N. E. 454.

5 In re Eight Hours Bill, 21 Colo. 29, 32; 39 Pac. 328. So Ritchie v. People, 155 111. 98; 46 Am. St. Rep. 315; 29 L. R. A. 79; 40 N, E. 454.

6 Ritchie v. People, 155 111. 98; 46 Am. St. Rep. 315; 29 L. R. A. 79; 40 N. E. 454.

7 Ritchie v. People. 155 111. 98; 46 Am. St. Rep. 315; 29 L. R. A. 79; 40 N. E. 454.

8 In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415; 77 Am. St. Rep. 269; 47 L. R. A. 52; 58 Pac. 1071.

9 Low v. Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127; 43 Am. St. Rep. 670; 24 L. R. A. 702; 59 N. W. 362.

10 Ritchie v. People. 155 111. 98; 46 Am. St. Rep. 315; 29 L. R. A. 79; 40 N. E. 454.

11 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 306 (under the constitution of Utah, affirming State v. Holden, 14 Utah 96; 37 L. R. A. 108; 46 Pac. 1105; and State v. Holden, 14 Utah 71; 46 Pac. 756; sub nomine, Holden v. Hardy, 37 L. R. A. 103) ; In re Dal-ton, 61 Kan. 257; 47 L. R. A. 380; 59 Pac. 336; Opinion of the Justices, 163 Mass. 589; sub nom., In re House Bill 1230; 28 L. R. A. 344; 40 N. E. 713; State v. Mfg. Co.. 120 Mass. 383; State v. Holden. 14 Utah 96; 37 L. R. A. 108; 46 Pac. 1105.

12 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (affirming State v. Holden, 14 Utah 71; 46 Pac. 756; sub nomine, Holden v. Hardy, 37 L. R. A. 103; and State v. Holden, 14 Utah 96; 37 L. R. A. 108; 46 Pac. 1105); Short v. Mining Co., 20 Utah 20; 45 L. R. A. 603; 57 Pac. 720. A similar act was held valid in Nevada. In re Boyce, - Nev. - ; 75 Pac. 1.

13 people v. Lochner, 177 N. Y. 145; 69 N. E. 373.

14 Opinion to the Governor (In re Ten-Hour Law), 24 R. I. 603; 61 L. R. A. 612; 54 Atl. 602 (applying to employes of a street railway).

15 State v. Buchanan, 29 Wash. 602; 92 Am. St. Rep. 930; 59 L. R. A. 342; 70 Pac. 52.

16 State v. Buchanan, 29 Wash. 602; 92 Am. St. Rep. 930; 59 L. R. A. 342; 70 Pac. 52.

17 Wenhan v. State, 65 Neb. 394; 58 L. R. A. 825; 91 N. W. 421.

18 Atkin v. Kansas. 191 U. S. 207 (affirming State v. Atkin. 64 Kan.

174; 97 Am. St. Rep. 343; 67 Pac. 519, which followed In re Dalton, 61 Kan. 257; 47 L. R. A. 380; 59 Pac. 336).

19 Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207 (224).

20 Cleveland v. Construction Co., 67 O. S. 197; 93 Am. St. Rep. 670; 59 L. R. A. 775; 65 N. E. 885; Seattle v. Smyth, 22 Wash. 327; 79 Am. St. Rep. 939; 60 Pac. 1120.

21 Fiske v. People. 1S8 111. 206; 52 L. R. A. 291; 58 N. E. 985.

22 People v. Coler, 16G N. Y. 1; 82 Am. St. Rep. 605; 52 L. R. A. 814; 59 N. E. 716.