Tennessee. Pittsburg Lumber Co. v Shell, 136 Tenn. 466, 189 S. W. 879.

Washington. Phillips v. Port Town-send Lodge, 8 Wash. 529, 36 Pac. 476; Anderson v. Freeman, 88 Wash. 608, 153 Pac. 307.

West Virginia. Smith v. Board of Education, 76 W. Va. 239, 85 S. E. 513.

Wisconsin. Coates v. Buck, 93 Wis. 128, 67 N. W. 23; Kropp v. Kropp, 97 Wis. 137, 72 N. W. 381; Grant Marble Co. v. Abbott, 142 Wis. 279, 124 N. W. 264.

5 California. Woerner v. Woerner,

171 Cal. 298, 152 Pac. 919. Maryland. White v. Shaffer, 130 Md.

351, 99 Atl 66.

Where the grantee assumes a specific mortgage, and a second mortgage exists of which the grantor was in ignorance when he executed the conveyance, the deed will not be reformed so as to require the grantee to assume such second mortgage.12 Thus where A intended that a clause should be inserted in a contract allowing him to draw certain additional funds ,13 or providing for a mortgage on land sold;14 or that a greater liability should be secured by a mortgage than was in fact secured;15 or that a certain clause in the printed form of the contract should be stricken out;16 or where A meant to have an assignment made to B and himself jointly, and by inadvertence had it made to B alone;17 or where A thinks that the price fixed in the contract is for a part of the buildings contracted for, when in fact it is for all the buildings;18 or where A does not understand the provision of the contract as to the time at which interest should begin to run;19 or thinks that certain goods are to be invoiced at the actual wholesale cost, when the contract provides for invoice "at wholesale cost as shown by cost marks on the goods";20 or that the area of a lot, which he offers for sale, is less than it really is, so that he offers it for sale for less than it is worth;21 or that land conveyed by a mortgage does not include certain lots actually covered by it;22 or that the amount of goods covered by his order is different from that expressed therein;23 or that a deed to him does not contain a clause whereby he assumes a mortgage, the grantor not knowing of such mistake;24 or where A thinks that his conveyance will be subject to an outstanding lease and the grantee believes that such conveyance will include a covenant of warranty against such lease;25 or where A thinks that he is buying from B a larger tract than B thinks he is selling;26 or where A believes that he is to convey an easement and B believes that he is to acquire the realty itself,27 he can not have the contract reformed to express his intention if B did not acquiesce therein. So a term to which B did not assent and which was inadvertently omitted from the written contract, can not be inserted by reformation, though A had offered such term and it was accepted by B's attorney, since the attorney had no authority to do anything but advise B, and he did not in fact communicate such offer to B.28 So if there is a mistake as to the identity of the realty conveyed,29 or leased,30 rescission may be had in a proper case, but not reformation. Reformation is even more clearly denied where one party believes that he will receive more than the contract provides for and the adversary party does not know of such mistake. Thus A agreed to convey to B four acres along a section line. B assumed that this excluded the area of a highway along such line, though there was nothing in the contract or negotiations to warrant such belief. Reformation was denied.31 Even if each party had intended that certain realty should be included in a given conveyance, reformation will not be given if such intention was not communicated by each to the other.32 Still less can the erroneous understanding of the parties after the execution of a contract, as to the legal effect thereof, give the right to reformation.33

Missouri. Stephens v. Stephens (Mo.), 183 S. W. 572.

North Carolina. Shook v. Love, 170 N. Cai. 99, 86 S. E. 1007; Allen v. Roanoke R. & Lumber Co., 171 N. Car. 339, 88 S. E. 492.

Oklahoma. Bell v. Bancroft, 55 Okla. 306, 155 Pac. 594.

Oregon. Hyde v. Kirkpatrick, 78 Or. 466, 153 Pac. 41 [rehearing denied, Hyde v. Kirkpatrick, 78 Or. 466, 153 Pac. 488]; Turner v. Hartog, 88 Or. 477, 172 Pac. 484.

Tennessee. Pittsburg Lumber Co. v. Shell, 136 Term. 466, 189 S. W. 879.

Washington. Kelley v. Smith, 101 Wash. 475, 172 Pac. 542.

West Virginia. R. D. Johnson Milling Co. v. Read, 76 W. Va. 567, 85 S. E. 726.

6See Sec. 2218.

7Newsome v. Harrell, 146 Ga. 189, 90 S. E. 855. See Sec. 270 et seq.

9 Bivins v. Kerr, 268 111. 164, 108 N. E. 996; Mighill v. Rowley, 224 Mass. 586, 113 N. E. 569; Kelley v. Smith, 101 Wash. 475, 172 Pac. 542.

9 Bivins v. Kerr, 268 111. 164, 108 N. E. 996.

10 Mighill v. Rowley, 224 Mass. 586, 113 N. E. 569.

11 Kelley v. Smith, 101 Wash. 475, 172 Pac. 542.

12 Moore v. Graves, 97 Ia. 4, 66 N. W. 1008.

13 Mitchell v. Holman, 30 Or. 280, 47 Pac. 616.

14Breja v. Pryne, 94 Ia. 756, 64 N. W. 669.

15Conrada v. Green, 92 Wash. 269, 159 Pac. 102.

16 Crane v. McCormick, 92 Cal. 176, 28 Pac. 222.

17Kropp v. Kropp, 97 Wis. 137, 72 N. W. 381.

18 Whitworth v. Lowell, 178 Mass. 43, 59 N. E. 760.

19Laackmann v. Glasshoff, 182 Ia. 093, 164 N. W. 768.

20 Simpson v. Kane, 98 Ia. 271, 67 N. W. 247.

21 Chute v. Quincy, 156 Mass. 189, 30 N. E. 550.

See also, McMillon v. Flagstaff, 18 Ariz. 536, 164 Pac. 318; Harding V.

Robinson, 175 Cal. 534, 166 Pac. 808; Schlossman v. Rouse, 197 Mich. 399, 163 N. W. 889.

22 Ocean Beach Association v. Safe Deposit Co. (N. J. Eq.), 48 Atl. 559.

23Coates v. Buck, 93 Wis. 128, 67 N. W. 23.

24 Green v. Stone, 54 N. J. Eq. 387, 55 Am. St. Rep. 577, 34 Atl. 1099 [reversing, 32 Atl. 706, and distinguishing Bull v. Titsworth, 29 N. J. Eq. 73, on the ground that in the earlier case the grantee had demanded rescission promptly].

See also, Manley v. Smith, 88 Or. 176, 171 Pac. 897.

28 Weinhard v. Summerville, 46 Wash. 127, 13 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1089, 89 Pac. 490.

26 Page v. Higgins, 150 Mass. 27, 5 L. R. A. 152, 22 N. E. 63. The court said that this was "not one and the same mistake * * * but two different mistakes." In this case A and B owned tracts near each other but not adjoining, and A thought that B owned an intermediate tract, while B thought C owned it. Hence in their negotiations both referred to B's tract as beginning at A's boundary. A drew the deed and inserted the description and B, being illiterate, thought that the land conveyed was what he had agreed to sell, namely, "what he owned" east of a given wall.

27 Louisiana Sulphur Mining Co. v. Brimstone R. & Canal Co., 143 La. 743, 79 So. 324.

28 Ward v. Yorba, 123 Cal. 447, 56 Pac. 58.

29 Cherry v. Brizzolara, 89 Ark. 309,

21 L. R. A. (N.S.) 508, 116 S. W. 668; Page v. Higgins, 150 Mass. 27, 5 L. R. A. 152. 22 N E. 63: R. M. Cobban Realty Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 52 Mont. 256. 157 Pac. 173; Stewart v. Gordon, 60 O. S. 170, 53 N. E. 707.

30 Morris v. Kettle, 56 N. J. Eq. 826, 34 Atl. 376.

31 Clark v. Mossman, 58 Neb. 87, 78 N. W. 399 [citing, Huyck v. Andrews, 113 N. Y. 81, 10 Am. St. Rep. 432, 3 L. R. A. 780, 20 N. E. 581; Wilson v. Cochran, 46 Pa. 220; Seribner v. Holmes, 16 Ind. 142; Kutz v. MeCune,

22 Wis. 628, 99 Am. Dec. 85].

32 Citizens' National Bank v. Judy, 146 Ind. 322, 43 N. E. 250.

33 Gaffney Mercantile Co. v. Hopkins, 21 Mont. 13, 52 Pac. 561.