If general words are used in connection with specific words, the specific words generally follow the intention of the party with greater exactness, and accordingly the general terms thus used are to be regarded as limited by the specific words,1 whether the specific words precede the general words,2 or follow them.3 A provision to the effect that the promisor is not to be responsible for delays due to strikes, fires, floods, or to other circumstances beyond its control, does not apply to a delay in performance due to the promisor's bankruptcy,4 or to his inability to secure material.5 Such a provision, however, applies to a shortage of freight cars.6 General words in a release are limited by the particular description of the injuries.7 A release which describes certain injuries and which purports to release the employer from damages and liabilities of every character, "for and on account of the injuries," is to be construed as applying only to the injuries which are described specifically, and not to more serious injuries which develop after.9 If the contract, taken as a whole, shows that effect was intended to be given to both the general and the specific term, such effect must be given by the court.9 If the context shows that the general words were intended to control,10 or if an absurd result would follow from permitting the specific words to control,11 effect will be given to the general words. A release which specifies the extent to which the injured party claims to have been injured but which also provides for the release of all demands, rights of action, and causes of action by reason of such injuries, includes other and more serious injuries than those set forth in detail in the release.12 If the meaning of a to the former, is based on the fact in human experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization, and that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are centered. It is the foundation of the whole rule noscitur a sociis; but if the contrary appear to have been the intent, courts will defeat instead of execute the real contract of the parties by blind submission to any such rule." Hoffmann v. Eastern Wisconsin Ry. & Light Co., 134 Wis. 603, 115 N. W. 383.

9 Urquhart v. Marion Hotel Co., 128 Ark. 283, L. R. A. 1917F, 203, 194 S. W. 1.

10 Urquhart v. Marion Hotel Co., 128 Ark. 283, L. R. A. 1917F, 203, 194 S. W. 1.

11 See Sec. 2021.

12 Melick v. Foster, 64 N. J. L. 394, 45 Atl. 911.

1 United States. Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Dashiell, 198 U. S. 521, 49 L. ed. 1150.

Arkansas. English v. Shelby, 116 Ark. 212, 172 S. W. 817.

Connecticut. Easterbrook v. Hebrew Ladies' Orphan Society, 85 Conn. 289, 41 L. R. A. (N.S.) 615, 82 Atl. 561.

Illinois. Merle v. Beifeld, 275 111. 594, 114 N. E. 369.

Michigan. Cutler v. Spens, 191 Mich. 603, 158 N. W. 224.

Rhode Island. Railton v. Taylor, 20 R. I. 279, 39 L. R. A. 246, 38 Atl. 980.

Washington. Guie v. Byers, 95 Wash. 492, 164 Pac. 75.

West Virginia. Taylor v. Buffalo Collieries Co., 72 W. Va. 353, 79 S. E. 27; Jones v. Island Creek Coal Co., 79 W. Va. 592, 91 S. E. 391; Berry v. Humphreys, 76 W. Va. 668, 86 S. E. 568.

Wisconsin. Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin Ry. and Light Co., 134 Wis. 603, 115 X. W. 383.

2 Easterbrook v. Hebrew Ladies Orphan Society, 85 Conn. 289, 41 L. R.

A. (N.S.) 615, 82 Atl. 561; American Bridge Co. v. Glenmore Distilleries Co. (Ky.), 107 S. W. 279, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 873; Jones v. Island Creek Coal Co., 79 W. Va. 532, 91 S. E. 391; Hoffmann v. Eastern Wisconsin Ry. & Light Co., 134 Wis. 603, 115 N. W. 383.

3 Railton v. Taylor, 20 R. I. 279, 39 L. R. A. 246, 38 Atl. 980.

4 Ann Arbor Board of Commerce v. Security Trust Co., 225 Fed. 454.

5 American Bridge Co. v. Glenmore Distilleries Co. (Ky.), 107 S. W. 279, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 873.

6 Hatfield v. Thomas Iron Co., 208 Pa. St. 478, 57 Atl. 950.

7 Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Dashiell, 198 U. S. 521, 49 L. ed. 1150.

8 Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Dashiell, 198 U. S. 521, 49 L. ed. 1150.

9 English v. Shelby, 116 Ark. 212, 172 S. W. 817; Verbeck v. Peters, 170 Ia. 610, 153 N. W. 215.

10 Verbeck v. Peters, 170 Ia. 610, 153 N. W. 215; Emery v. American Ins. Co., 177 la. 4, 158 N. W. 748; Hoffmann v. Eastern Wisconsin Ry. & Light Co., 134 Wis. 603, 115 N. W. 383.

"The rule contended for, that par-ticularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be restricted term is clear the context will not be considered.18 The rule that general terms will be limited by specific terms and will be regarded as including only things of the kind enumerated in the specific terms, is to be used only in case of an ambiguity.14

11 Verbeck v. Peters, 170 Ia. 610, 153 X. W. 215.

12 Hoffmann v. Eastern Wisconsin Ry. & Light Co., 134 Wis. 603, 115 N. W. 383.