The practical application of the principles with reference to the necessity of notice by an assignee to the debtor to protect his rights against third persons, depends in part upon the theory of the necessity of notice which the particular jurisdiction adopts, and also upon the relation of the parties between whom the question of the priority of the first assignment is raised. In jurisdictions in which notice is regarded as necessary solely in order to protect the debtor, a logical application of this theory would require priority to be given to the first assignee in point of time; and this result is usually reached in these jurisdictions. In jurisdictions in which the theory prevails that notice to the debtor is necessary to divest the title of the assignor, a logical application of this theory would result in denying to the first assignee in point of time priority over a subsequent claimant who had acquired a complete title. This result can be avoided only by contending that the first assignee acquires at least an equitable interest and that the "title" which he gains by notice is something different from an equitable interest even where the right which is assigned is an equitable right, or by restating the general principle so as to make it apply only to protect subsequent bona fide purchasers for value. Except in cases in which the prior claimant in point of time is an attaching creditor, the theory that notice to the debtor is necessary to divest the title of the assignor is limited on one ground or the other, and it is generally held that the first assignee in point of time, who took for value, has priority as against a claimant other than a bona fide purchaser for value, who is subsequent in point of time.1 As between the assignor and the assignee, the title of the assignor is divested in favor of the assignee by the assignment itself, and notice to the debtor is not necessary to perfect the title of the assignee.2

1 England. Hobson v. Bell, 2 Beav. 17; Burn v. Carvalho, 4 Myl. & Cr. 690; Rodick v. Gandell, 1 De G. M. & G. 703; Gorring v. Irwell, 34 Ch. D. 128; Ar-den v. Arden, 29 Ch. Div. 703: In re Wallis [1002], 1 K. B. 710; Brandt's (William) Rons & Co. v. Dunlop Rubber Co. [1905], A. C. 454; In re Bristow [1906], 2 I. R. 215; Justice v. Wynne, 12 Ir. Ch. 280.

United States. Greev v. Doekendorff, 231 U. S. 513, 58 L. ed. 330; In re Cincinnati Iron Store Co., 167 Fed. 486, 93 C C. A. 122.

Maryland. Werntz v. Wells, 130 Md. 53, 99 Atl. 956.

Massachusetts. Wakefield v. Martin, 3 Mass. 558.

Minnesota. MacDonald v. Kneeland, 5 Minn. 352; Quigley v. Welter. 95 Minn. 383, 104 N. W. 236.

New Jersey. Copan v. Conover Mfg. Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 809, 115 Am. St. Rep. 629, 64 Atl. 973.

North Carolina. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. McNair, 139 N. Car. 326, 51 S. E. 949.