A contract for the transportation of a passenger may provide that he shall establish his identity to the satisfaction of some specified agent of the carrier.1 Pull effect is given to such provision, and a passenger in such case establishes his identity to the satisfaction of such agent if the latter acts honestly and in good faith.2 It will not be presumed, however, that the parties agree to make the agent of the carrier the judge of the facts unless the contract clearly provides therefor.3 A provision in a ticket which requires the passenger to sign his name or otherwise to identify himself on demand, does not make the agent of the carrier the judge, of his identity.4 A contract of insurance, especially in a mutual benefit society, may provide, if the insured has ceased to be a member, as by reason of non-payment of dues, that he may be reinstated by furnishing the certificate of a physician, stating that he is in good health.5

17 Am. St. Rep. 634, 8 L. R. A. 591, 24 N. E. 195 (obiter, as the title was not, in fact, marketable).

1 Bethea v. Northeastern Ry., 26 S. Car. 91, 1 S. E. 372.

2 Bethea v. Northeastern Ry., 26 S. Car. 91, 1 S. E. 372.

3 Marlow v. Southern Pacific Co., 151 Cal. 383, 121 Am. St. Rep. 127, 90 Pac. 928 [ distinguishing. Southern Ry. Co. v. Barlow, 104 Ga. 213, 69 Am. St. Rep. 16G, 30 S. E. 732, and Central Georgia Ry. Co. v. Cannon, 106 Ga. 828, 32 S. E. 8741.

4 Marlow v. Southern Pacific Co., 151 Cal. 383, 121 Am. St. Rep. 127, 90 Pac. 928 [distinguishing, Southern Ry. Co. v. Barlow, 104 Ga. 213, 69 Am. St. Rep. 166, 30 S. E. 732, and Central Georgia Ry. Co. v. Cannon, 106 Ga. 828, 32 S. E. 874].

5 Lyon v. Supreme Assembly, 153 Mass. 83, 26 N. E. 236; Societa Unione Fratellanza Italiana v. Leyden, 225 Mass. 540, L. R. A. 1917C, 256, 114 N. E. 738; Jackson v. Northwestern Mutual Relief Association, 78 Wis. 463, 47 N. W. 733.

Full effect is given to such provisions.6 A certificate by a physician, to the effect that the member is still sick with a specified ailment, but is improving, is not a performance of such condition.7 Under a provision which requires the insured to furnish a satisfactory certificate of health, the insurance company can not refuse reinstatement on the ground that the company does not consider it sufficient, if in fact it is sufficient.8

A contract by which a railway employs a surgeon, may provide that his fees are to be fixed ultimately by the chief surgeon and other designated officials.9

Contracts of sale occasionally contain provisions by which questions as to quality,10 or quantity,11 are to be submitted to the determination of a third person. If such determination is exercised in good faith, it is final and conclusive,12 at least if it is free from evident and gross mistake. Under a contract by which A is to raise a certain quantity of peas and is to deliver them to B for canning, a provision that B's superintendent shall be the sole judge as to the proper condition of the crop for canning, is valid and his judgment, if fairly exercised and free from gross mistake, is conclusive.13 Under a contract referring questions as to the measurement of logs delivered under such contract to a third person, his decision is conclusive in the absence of fraud or evident mistake.14 A provision in a contract with the United States, may confer upon the quartermaster the power to ascertain and to determine the distance for which property is transported.11 Under such a clause the determination of the quartermaster is final in the absence of fraud or gross mistake; and the fact that the quartermaster fixes the distance according to direction in an air line instead of direction along the route by which the property was in fact transported, is not sufficient to show bad faith on his part.18

6 Lyon v. Supreme Assembly, 153 Mass. 83, 26 N. E. 236; Societa Unioine Fratellanza Italiana v. Leyden, 22.1 Mass. .140, L. R. A. 1917C, 250, 114 N. E. 738; Jackson v. Northwestern Mutual Relief Association, 78 Wis. 463, 47 N. W. 733.

7 Societa Unione Fratellanza Italiana v. Leyden, 225 Mass. 540, L. R. A. 1917C, 266, 114 N. E. 73S.

8 Jackson v. Northwestern Mutual Relief Association, 78 Wis. 463, 47 N. W. 733.

9 Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 11 Colo. 293, 18 Pac. 24.

10 Colorado. Empson Packing Co. v. Clawson, 43 Colo. 188, 95 Pac. 546.

Michigan. Robinson v. Detroit, Lansing & Northern Ry. Co., 84 Mich. 658, 48 N. W. 205.

Oklahoma. Citizens' Independent Mill & Elevator Co. v. Perkins, 52 Okla. 242, 152 Pac. 443.

South Carolina. Brooke v. Laurens Milling Co., 78 S. Car. 200, 125 Am. St. Rep. 780, 58 S. E. 806.

Washington. Tacoma & Eastern

Lumber Co. v. Field, 100 Wash. 79, 170 Pac. 360.

11 Bullock v. Consumers' Lumber Co., (Cal.), 31 Pac. 367; Nadeau v. Pingree, 02 Me. 100, 42 Atl. 3.13; Boyle v. Mun-ser-Sanntry, etc., Co., 77 Minn. 206, 79 N. W. 650.

12 California. Bullock v. Consumers' Lumber Co. (Cal.), 31 Pac. 367.

Colorado. Empson Packing Co. v. Clawson, 43 Colo. 188, 05 Pac. 546.

Maine. Nadeau v. Pingree, 92 Me. 196, 42 Atl. 3.13.

Michigan. Robinson v. Detroit, Lansing & Northern Ry. Co., 84 Mich. 658, 48 N. W. 205.

Minnesota. Boyle v. Musser-Sauntry, etc., Co., 77 Minn. 206, 79 N. W. 659.

Oklahoma. Citizens' Independent Mill & Elevator Co. v. Perkins, 52 Okla. 242, 152 Pac. 443.

South Carolina. Brooke v. Laurens Milling Co., 78 S. Car. 200, 125 Am. St. Rep. 780, 58 S. E. 806.

Washington. Tacoma & Eastern Lumber Co. v. Field, 100 Wash. 79, 170 Pac. 360.

13 Empson Packing Co. v. Clawson, 43 Colo. 188, 95 Pac. 546.

14 Bullock v. Lumber Co. (Cal.), 31 Pac. 307; Nadeau v. Pingree, 02 Me. 196, 42 Atl. 353; Boyle v. Musser-Sauntry, etc., Co., 77 Minn. 200, 70 N. W. 659.

15 Kihlberg v. United States, 07 U. S. 308, 24 L. ed. 1106.

16 Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U. S. 398, 24 L. ed. 1106.

"The contract which is the foundation of this action provides that transportation shall be paid 'in all cases according to the distance from the place of departure to that of delivery.' But no specific rule is prescribed for the ascertainment of distances. The contract is silent as to whether they shall be estimated by an air line, or by the route usually traveled by contractors in conveying government stores, or by the road over which troops ordinarily marched when going from one post or station to another. The parties, however, concurred in designating a particular person - the chief quartermaster of the district of New Mexico - with power not to simply ascertain, but to fix, the distances which should govern in the settlement of the contractor's accounts for transportation. The written order of General Easton to the depot quartermaster at Fort Leavenworth was an exertion of that power. He discharged a duty imposed upon him by the mutual assent of the parties. The terms by which the power was conferred and the duty imposed are clear and precise, leaving no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties. They seem to be susceptiblo of no other interpretation than that the action of the chief quartermaster, in the matter of distances, was intended to be conclusive. There is neither allegation nor proof of fraud or bad faith upon his part. The difference between his estimate of distances and the distances by air line, or by the road usually traveled, is not so material as to justify the inference that he did not exercise the authority given him with an honest purpose to carry out the real intention of the parties, as collected from their agreement. His action can not, therefore, be subjected to the revisory power of the courts without doing violence to the plain words of the contract. Indeed, it is not at all certain that the government would give its assent to any contract, which did not confer upon one of its officers the authority in question. If the contract had not provided distinctly, and in advance of any services performed under it, for the ascertainment of distances upon which transportation was to be paid, disputes might have constantly arisen between the contractor and the government, resulting in vexatious and expensive and, to the contractor, often times, ruinous litigation. Hence the provision we have been considering. Be this supposition as it may, it is sufficient that the parties expressly agreed that distances should be ascertained and fixed by the chief quartermaster, and in the absence of fraud or such gross mistake as would necessarily imply bad faith, or a failure to exercise an honest judgment, his action in the premises is conclusive upon the appellant as well as upon the government.

If the judgment of such third person is not exercised in good faith, it is not conclusive as between the parties.17 Where the scaler agreed upon by the parties to measure logs acts solely under the direction of an agent of the vendee, his determination as to quantity is not binding.18

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