A contract which is made in time of war between persons who are subjects of the respective belligerent powers or who are domiciled in the territory of the respective belligerent powers, is illegal.1 In many of the cases in which this question is presented, the contract is also invalid because it is made between one who is a citizen of the country in which it is sought to enforce the contract, and who is domiciled therein, and who has made such contract across the lines of war, and another who is a subject of the belligerent power and who is domiciled within the territory of such power.2 While the illegality of such contracts is most clear where they are not only made across the lines of war, but where "they are also made with the purpose of aiding the enemy,3 their illegality is not limited to cases in which they aid the enemy. If one who resides within the Union lines advances the purchase price for goods which are to be delivered to him later, in the Union lines, by one who resides within the Confederate lines, and such advance is secured by a mortgage upon the lands of the vendor, such debt and mortgage are illegal and can not be enforced in time of peace.4 Even if the contract will enure exclusively to the benefit of the subjects of the state in whose courts an action is brought thereon, the fact that it is made across the lines of war renders it invalid.5 No action can be brought upon a note which was given during the war by a citizen of one of the belligerent powers who is domiciled therein, to a citizen of the other belligerent power, who was domiciled therein, even though such note was given for a valid preexisting debt.6 It has, accordingly, been held that no action can be maintained, on a note which was executed and delivered during the war, which was executed by a citizen of a state which adhered to the Southern Confederacy, to a citizen of a state which adhered to the United States.7 If such a note is given for a prior valid indebtedness, it has been held that such note might be sufficient consideration for a promise made after the war to pay such note.8 In this respect a contract of this sort, although invalid if entered into by a communication across the lines of war, is not treated as the ordinary illegal contract is treated.9 The fact that a letter is sent by a citizen of a state which adhered to the United States during the Civil War, to a citizen and resident of a state which adhered to the Confederacy, containing a promise to pay such debt, car. not prevent the operation of the Statute of Limitations.,10

7 Ware v. Jones, 61 Ala. 288.

8 Shepherd v. Reese, 42 Ala. 329.

9Milner v. Patton, 49 Ala. 423.

10 Oxford Iron Co. v. Spradley, 46 Ala. 98.

11 Oxford Iron Co. v. Quinchett, 44 Ala. 487.

12Hanauer v. Doane, 70 U. 6. (12 Wall.) 342, 20 L. ed. 439.

13Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 430, 21 L. ed. 224.

14Isaacs v Richmond, 90 Va. 30.

1 United States. United States v. Grossmayer, 76 U. S. (0 Wall.) 72, 10 L. ed. 627; United States v. Lapene, 84 U. S. (17 Wall.) 601, 21 L. ed. 693.

Arkansas. Rice v. Shook, 27 Ark. 137, 11 Am. Rep. 783.

Indiana. Perkins v. Rogers, 36 Ind. 124, 9 Am. Rep. 630.

Louisiana. Irwin v. Levy, 24 La. Ann. 302.

Tennessee. Nelson v. Trigg, 3 Tenn. Cas. 733.

2 United States. United States v. Grossmayer, 76 U. S. (9 WalL) 72, 19 L. ed. 627.

Arkansas. Bice v. Shook, 27 Ark. 137, 11 Am. Rep. 783.

Indiana. Perkins v. Rogers, 35 Ind. 124, 9 Am. Rep. 639.

Louisiana. Irwin v. Levy, 24 La. Ann. 302.

Tennessee. Nelson v. Trigg, 3 Tenn. Cas. 733.

Fee Intercourse with Alien Enemies, by T. Baty, 31 Law Quarterly Review,

30, and Trading with the Enemy Amendment Act, by Frank Evans, 32 Law Quarterly Review, 249.

3 Clements v. Yturria, 14 Hun (N. Y.) 151.

4 Nelson v. Trigg, 3 Tenn. Cas. 733. -5 Rice v. Shook, 27 Ark. 137, 11 Am.

Rep. 783; Perkins v. Rogers, 35 Ind.

124, 9 Am, Rep. 639.

6 Wrtght v. Graham, 4 W. Va. 430.

7 Rice v. Shook, 27 Ark. 137, 11 Am. Rep. 783.

8 Ledoux v. Buhler, 21 La. Ann. 130.

The objection in these cases is to communication across the lines of war, rather than of breach of permanent allegiance.11

If the lines of war are advancing or retreating, the question of allegiance possibly enters into the consideration of the validity of the contract.12 If a note is executed and delivered during war by a citizen of a state which adheres to the Confederacy, to a citizen of a state which adhered to the United States, such note is invalid, although it was dated at a town which at that time was in the actual possession of the forces of the United States.13 In this case, however, the court did not insist upon breach of allegiance; and the result which was reached may have been due to the fact that the court declined to take judicial notice of the domicile of the party to the contract with reference to the lines of war at the time of the transaction. If a principal appoints an agent while both are domiciled in enemy territory, and subsequently by an extension of the lines of war the domicile of the principal is in territory which is held in the military occupation of the enemy, the agent has no power to enter into contracts on behalf of his principal for the purchase of goods which are located within the territory of the government in which both originally were domiciled.14

If the contract is not only made across the lines of war, but it requires performance across the lines of war by its terms, its illegality is even more clear.15 A contract by which one who resides within the Confederate lines agrees to sell and deliver goods to one who resides within the Union lines, is illegal16

9 An illegal contract is generally held not to be a sufficient consideration for a subsequent promise (see Sec. 1040), unless the illegal contract is entirely eliminated by the new contract (see 5/3 1041).

10 Perkins v. Rogers, 35 Ind. 124, 9 Am. Rep. 630 (obiter, as the statute of limitations was suspended by reason of the war).

11 Montgomery v. United States, 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 395, 21 L. ed. 97.

A contract by which a British subject who was a resident of a city originally in the confederacy, which had been seized by Union troops, agreed to purchase property which was situated in the Confederate lines, from one who was a resident within such lines, was held to be illegal and to pass no title to such property as against the United States. Montgomery v. United States, 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 395, 21 L. ed. 97.

12 Rice v. Shook, 27 Ark. 137, 11 Am. Rep. 783.

13 Rice v. Shook, 27 Ark. 137, 11 Am. Rep. 783.

1 4 United States v. Lapene, 84 U. 8. (17 Wall.) 602, 21 L. ed. 693.

15 Nelson v. Trigg, 3 Tenn. Cas. 733.