This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by William Herbert Page. Also available from Amazon: Commercial Contracts: A Practical Guide to Deals, Contracts, Agreements and Promises.
Whether a natural person is to be regarded as an alien enemy or not, within the meanings of the rule which forbid trading with the enemy, is to be determined by his personal domicile or his business domicile, rather than by his nationality.1 If the person who has assumed a domicile in the country of the enemy, is in fact a native subject of such country, and if he has assumed a domicile in the country of his nationality in anticipation of the outbreak of war, he is still to be treated as an alien enemy.2
6 Porter v. Freudenberg , 1 K. B. 857.
"This law was founded in earlier days upon the conception that all subjects owing allegiance to the crown were at war with the subjects of the state at war with the crown, and later it was grounded upon public policy, which forbids the doing of acts that will be or may be to the advantage of the enemy state by increasing its capacity for prolonging hostilities in adding to the credit, money or goods, or other resources available to individuals in the enemy state" Porter v. Freudenberg , 1 K. B. 857.
1 Porter v. Freudenberg , 1 K. B. 857.
"Trading with a British subject or the subject of a neutral state carrying on business in the hostile territory is as much assistance to the alien enemy as if it were with a subject of enemy nationality carrying on business in the enemy state, and, therefore, for the purpose of the enforcement of civil rights, they are equally treated as alien enemies. It is clear law that the test for this purpose is not nationality but the place of carrying on the business. Wells v. Williams (1 Ld. Raym. 282); McConnell v. Hector, per Lord Alvanley C. J. (3 Bos. & P. 113); .Janson v. Drie-fontein Consolidated Mines [(1002) A. C. 505], per Lord Lindley. When considering the enforcement of civil rights a person may be treated as the subject of an enemy state, notwithstanding that he is in fact a subject of the British Crown or of a neutral state. Conversely, a person may bo treated as a subject of the Crown notwithstanding that he is in fact the subject of an enemy state." Porter v. Freudenberg , 1 K. B. 857.
The same result is ordinarily reached in prize cases and the property of persons whose business domicile is in the enemy country, is regarded as subject to capture as enemy property, even if the individuals are neutrals. The Friendschaft, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 105, 4 L. ed. 525; The Nayade. 4 C Rob. 251; The Vigilantia. 1 C. Bob. 1 (15).
2 Tingley v. Muller , 2 Ch. 144 [following, Porter v. Freudenberg (1015), I K. B. 857, and applying, Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. (1916), 2 A. C. 307].
While a corporation is prima facie to be regarded as a subject of the country which creates it, and as domiciled therein,3 the courts may inquire as to the actual ownership of the stock of such corporation, and as to the actual control thereof, in case it attempts during the war to enforce obligations which are owing to it.4 In like manner the courts may inquire into the actual ownership and control of a corporation which is formed under the laws of a neutral power for the purpose of determining the effect of war upon a contract between such corporation and a corporation which is formed under the laws of the belligerent power in whose courts the question of the effect of war upon such contract is presented for adjudication and which is there controlled.5