A breach which goes to the entire performance may relieve the party in default from further liability under the contract except to pay damages occasioned by such breach.1 This is not, however, on the theory that the party in default may pay damages as an alternative performance of his contractual obligation,2 but rather on the theory that it is the duty of the party who is not in default to do nothing to increase damages.3

14 Arkansas. Evans v. Ozark Orchard Co., 103 Ark. 212, 146 S. W. 511.

California. Boone v. Templeman, 158 Cal. 200, 139 Am. St. Rep. 126, 110 Pac. 947; Stevenson v. Joy, 164 Cal. 279, 128 Pac. 751.

Kansas. Knipe v. Troika, 92 Kan. 549, 141 Pac. 557.

Minnesota. Tingue v. Patch, 93 Minn. 437, 101 N. W. 792.

Oregon. Gray v. Pelton, 67 Or. 239, 135 Pac. 755.

South Dakota. Burchfleld v. Hage-man, 35 S. D. 147, 151 N. W. 47.

Washington, Shorett v. Knudsen, 74 Wash. 448, 133 Pac. 1029; Garrison v. Newton, 96 Wash. 284, 165 Pac. 90.

The application of this principle to the performance of concurrent covenants is discussed elsewhere in detail. See Sec. 2967 et seq.

1 United States. Yates v. United States, 15 Ct. Cl. 119.

Maryland. Black v. Woodrow, 39 Md. 194.

Massachusetts. Hyland v. Giddings, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 232.

Michigan. Wigent v. Marrs, 130 Mich. 609, 90 N. W. 423.

Minnesota. Gibbons v. Bente, 51 Minn. 499, 22 L. R. A. 80, 53 N. W. 756.

Nebraska. Hixson Map Co. v. Nebraska Post Co., 5 Neb. (unoff.) 388, 98 N. W. 872.

New York. Lord v. Thomas, 64 N. Y. 107.

North Carolina. Heiser v. Mears, 120 N. Car. 443, 27 S. E. 117.

North Dakota. Davis v. Bronson, 2 N. D. 300, 33 Am. St. Rep. 783, 16 L. R. A. 655, 50 N. W. 836.

Pennsylvania. Unexcelled Fire Works Co. v. Polites, 130 Pa. St. 536, 17 Am. St. Rep. 788, 18 Atl. 1058.

Rhode Island. Collyer v. Moulton, 9R.I. 90, 98 Am. Dec. 370.

South Carolina. Wando Phosphate Co. v. Gibbon, 28 S. Car. 418, 13 Am. St. Rep. 690, 5 S. E. 837.

Tennessee. Chicago Building & Mfg. Co. v. Barry (Tenn. Ch. App.), 52 S. W. 451; Gardner v. Deeds, 116 Tenn. 128, 4 L. R. A. (N.S.) 740, 92 S. W. 518.

Vermont. Danforth v. Walker, 37 Vt. 239.

Virginia. Clark v. Franklin, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 1; Rowland Lumber Co. v. Ross, 100 Va. 275, 40 S. E. 922.

West Virginia. Rowan v. Hull, 55 W. Va. 335, 47 S. E. 92; Acme Food Co. v. Older, 64 W. Va. 255, 61 S. E. 235; Comstock v. J. R. Droney Lumber Co., 69 W. Va. 100, 71 S. E. 255.

Wisconsin. Malueg v. Hatten Lumber Co., 140 Wis. 381, 122 N. W. 1057; Lincoln v. Charles Alshuler Manufacturing Co., 142 Wis. 475, 28 L. R. A. (N.S.) 780, 125 N. W. 908.

2 See Sec. 3024.

If the adversary party has already performed his part of the contract fully, such breach fixes the right of the parties in any event, and the question of the effect of further performance by such party can not arise. More difficult questions arise when the adversary party, not being himself in default, has still covenants to be performed when the breach occurs. The adversary party can not ignore the breach, perform the covenants of the contract on his part to be performed, or tender performance, and recover the entire contract price at law as if no breach had occurred,4 at least in cases in which the party not in default could not have had specific performance.5 This state of facts often exists in breach by renunciation.6

3 See ch. LXXXVII.

4 United States. Yates v. United States, 15 Ct. Cl 119.

Arkansas. Deutsch v. Dunham, 72 Ark. 141, 105 Am. St. Rep. 21, 78 S. W. 767.

Iowa. Moline Scale Co. v. Beed, C2 la. 307, 35 Am. Rep. 272, 3 N. W. 96; Pate v. Ralston, 158 la. 411, 51 L. R. A. (N.S.) 735, 139 N. W. 906.

Massachusetts. Collins v. Dela-porte, 115 Mass. 159; Barrie v. Quin-by, 206 Mass. 259, 92 N. E. 451.

Michigan. International Text-book Co. v. Jones, 166 Mich. 86, 131 N. W. 98; Ayer v. Devlin, 179 Mich. 81, 146 N. W. 257.

Missouri. Peck v. Kansas City Metal Roofing & Corrugating Co., 90 Mo. App. 212, 70 S. W. 169.

Nebraska. Hixson Map Co. v. Nebraska Post Co., 5 Neb. (unoff.) 338, 98 N. W. 872.

New York. Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 317, 43 Am. Dec. 670; Butler v. Butler, 77 N. Y. 472, 33 Am. Rep. 648.

North Dakota. Stanford v. McGill, 6 N. D. 536, 38 L. R. A. 760, 72 N. W. 938; Hart-Parr Co. v. Finley, 31 N. D. 130, L. R. A. 1915E, 851, 153 N. W. 137.

Vermont. Danforth v. Walker, 37 Vt. 239 [s. c, 40 Vt. 257].

West Virginia. Comstock v. J. R.

Droney Lumber Co., 69 W. Va. 100, 71 S. E. 255.

Wisconsin. Milwaukee Boiler Co. v. Duncan, 87 Wis. 120, 41 Am. St. Rep. 33, 58 N. W. 232; Tufts v. Weinfeld, 88 Wis. 647, 60 N. W. 992; Ward v. American Health Food Co., 119 Wis. 12, 96 N. W. 388; Merrick v. Northwestern National Life Insurance Co., 124 Wis. 221, 102 N. W. 593; Woodman v. Blue Grass Land Co., 125 Wis. 489, 103 N. W. 236, 104 N. W. 920; Badger State Lumber Co. v. G. W. Jones Lumber Co., 140 Wis. 73, 121 N. W. 933; Richards v. Manitowoc & Northern Traction Co., 140 Wis. 85, 121 N. W. 937; Lincoln v. Charles Alshuler Mfg. Co., 142 Wis. 475, 28 L. R. A. (N.S.) 780, 125 N. W. 908.

"It is the rule in this state that a party to an executory contract may always stop performance by the other party by an explicit direction or renunciation of the contract, and refusal to perform further on his part, and that he is thereafter liable only upon the breach of the contract.

"The contract price is recoverable only upon the theory of performance, never upon the theory of inability to perform. That the contract was not performed fully by plaintiff is obvious, as we said in International Textbook Co. v. Schulte, 151 Mich. 151, 114 N. W. 1031. The case of Wigent v. Mam, 130 Mich. 609, 00 N. W. 423, completely covers this case. We must assume that the jury found that the plaintiff was informed by defendant that he renounced and refused further performance of the contract at a time when only a few instalments had matured." International Text-book Co. v. Jones, 166 Mich. 86, 131 N. W. 98.