Within the meaning of this section, a judgment for death by wrongful act, which was caused by operating an automobile at a high rate of speed and attempting to pass another automobile in violation of law,1 or a judgment for assault,2 even if such judgment has been entered on a recognizance,3 or for false imprisonment,4 or for malicious prosecution,5 or slander,8 or libel,7 or for criminal conversation,8 or for alienating the affections of the husband 9 or wife10 of the judgment creditor, or for seduction of the judgment creditor's minor daughter,11 or for the seduction of the judgment creditor herself, recovered under a state statute giving an action therefor,12 is not barred by a subsequent discharge in bankruptcy.

On the other hand, a judgment in an action for breach of promise in which seduction is not alleged is not an action for wilful and malicious injury;13 and accordingly it is barred by a discharge in bankruptcy.14 A judgment based on a cause of action for negligence, in which there is no element of wilfulness or malice, is barred by bankruptcy.15

4 Tinker v. Colwell, 103 U. S. 473, 48 L. ed. 754 [quoted in Mclntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U. S. 138, 61 L. ed. 205].

See discussion in Wellman v. Mead, - Vt. -, 107 Atl. 396, which is not, however, a bankruptcy case.

5 Winfree v. Jones, 104 Va. 39, 1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 201, 51 S. E. 153.

6 See Sec. 3136.

1 Ex parte Cote, - Vt. -, 106 Atl. 519.

2 McChristal v. Clisbee, 190 Mass. 120, 3 L. R. A. (N.S.) 702, 76 N. E. 511.

3 In re Cololuca, 133 Fed. 255.

4 McChristal v. Clisbee, 190 Mass. 120, 3 L. R. A. (N.S.) 702, 76 N. E. 511.

5 McChristal v. Clisbee, 190 Mass. 120, 3 L. R. A. (N.S.) 702, 76 N. E. 511; Mason v. Perkins, 180 Mo. 702,

103 Am. St. Rep. 591, 79 S. W. 683.

6 Sanderson v. Hunt, 116 Ky. 435, 76 S. W. 179; Parker v. Brattan, 120 Md. 428, 87 Atl. 756; Drake v. Vernon, 26 S. D. 354, 128 N. W. 317.

7 McDonald v. Brown, 23 R. I. 546, 91 Am. St. Rep. 659, 58 L. R. A. 768, 51 Atl. 213.

8 Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 48 L. ed. 754 [affirming, Colwell v. Tinker, 169 N. Y. 531, 98 Am. St. Rep. 586, 58 L. R. A. 765, 62 N. E. 668].

Compare In re Tinker, 99 Fed. 79; In re Freche, 109 Fed. 620; Colwell v. Tinker, 169 N. Y. 531, 98 Am. St. Rep. 586, 58 L. R. A. 765, 62 N. E. 668.

9 Leicester v. Hoadley, 66 Kan. 172, 71 Pac. 318.

10 Exline v. Sargent, 3 Ohio C. C. (N.S.) 66, 13 Ohio C. D. 180. 11 In re Freche, 109 Fed. 620. 12 In re Maples, 105 Fed. 919.

Whether costs rendered against the bankrupt in an action for wilful and malicious injuries to persons or property are barred by a discharge in bankruptcy is a question on which there has been a conflict of authority, due to a conflict of opinion as to the nature of costs. Where costs are regarded as an incident to the judgment, costs rendered in an action of this sort have been held not to be barred by a discharge, since the judgment to which the costs are incident is not barred.16 Where costs are regarded as a statutory liability they are held to be barred, since they are not within any of the exceptions named by the bankrupt act.17