2 In the case of Washburn v. Gould, 3 Story, 162, Mr. Justice Story says: "There is no magic in particular words; but we must understand them as they stand and are used in the particular instrument; and, in searching for the true interpretation, we must look at all the provisions of the instrument, and give such effect to it as its obvious objects and designs require, without nicely weighing the precise force of single words." So, also, Lord Hobart, in Trenchard v. Hoskins, Winch, 93, says: "Every deed ought to be construed according to the intention of the parties, and the intents ought to be adjudged of the several parts of the deed, as a general issue out of the evidence, and intent ought to be picked out of every part, and not out of one word only." Lord Ellenborough, in Barton v. Fitzgerald, 15 East, 541, thus states the rule: "It is a true rule of construction that the sense and meaning of the parties in any particular part of an instrument may be collected ex antecedentibus et consequentibus. Every part of it may be brought into action in order to collect from the whole one uniform and consistent sense, if that may be done."

3 Hill v. Huntress, 43 N. H. 480 (1862). In construing a written agreement, the court will not only look at the surrounding circumstances, but will read the preliminary agreement as well as the papers referred to in the agreement to be construed, with a view to discover the intention of the parties, and the sense in which terms apparently ambiguous or inconsistent were used by them. Salmon Falls Manuf. Co. v. Portsmouth Co., 46 N. H. 249 (1865).

1 See a thorough discussion of this matter, in Miller v. Travers, 8 Bing. 244; 1 Evans's Pothier on Oblig. 96, and note 6; Winch, 93; 1 Domat, 37, § 10; Shep. Touch. 87; Knower v. Emerson, 9 Pick. 422; Wheelock v. Freeman, 13 Pick. 167; Hcywood v. Perrin, 10 Pick. 230; Morey v. Homan, 10 Vt. 565; Cobbs v. Fountaine, 3 Rand. 487; Colvin v. Newberry, 8 B. & C. 166; Warren v. Merrifield, 8 Met. 96; Chase v. Bradley, 26 Me. 531.

2 Browning v. Wright, 2 Bos. & Pul. 13. In Sumner v. Williams, 8 Mass. 217, Parker, J., calls this judgment "a triumph of common sense." See also 1 Leigh's Nisi Prius, 613, 614; Stannard v. Forbes, 6 Ad. & El. 572; Foord v. Wilson, 8 Taunt. 543; Milner v. Horton, M'Clel. 647; Sicklemore v. Thistleton, 6 M. & S. 9; Sugden on Vendors, ch. 13; Gains-ford v. Griffith, 1 Saund. 58, and notes; Howell v. Richards, 11 East, 633; Nind v. Marshall, 1 Br. & B. 319; Cole v. Hawes, 2 Johns. Cas. 203; Whallon v. Kauffman, 19 Johns. 97; Knickcrbacker v. Killmore, 9 Johns. 106; Barton v. Fitzgerald, 15 East, 530.

3 Goodtitle v. Southern, 1 M. & S. 299.

S.,"lying within certain specified abuttals," with all the houses thereto belonging, which are in the occupation of said S.; " it was held, that a house lying within the said abuttals, though not in the occupation of S., would pass.1

§ 807. So, also, where two lessees of a colliery "jointly and severally covenanted in the manner following, that is to say," and among other covenants, was one that the moneys appearing to be due "should be accounted for and paid by the lessees, their executors" (omitting the words "and each of them"); it was held, that this covenant was joint as well as several, in like manner as the other covenants, by reason of the introductory words.2

§ 808. Another rule, which springs immediately from that just stated, is, that the exposition should, if possible, give effect to every part of a contract which neither violates the rules of law nor the intention of the parties. If, therefore, a deed may operate in two ways, the one of which is consistent with the intent of the parties, and the other is repugnant thereto, it will be so construed as to give effect to the intention indicated by the whole instrument.3 Thus, " if I have in D., blackacre, whiteacre, and greenacre, and I grant you all my lands in D., that is to say, blackacre and whiteacre, yet greenacre shall pass too."1 So, where A., being the owner of three parcels of land described in a certain deed conveying them to him, made a deed of conveyance of "three parcels or lots, situated in Portland, and bounded as follows, to wit, the first lot beginning," etc. (setting forth the boundaries of that lot only), "being the same which was conveyed to me by J. Wylie, by deed dated," etc.; it was held, that the deed conveyed all these parcels, upon the ground that otherwise the words, "three parcels," must be rejected as useless; for, to restrict them to the one parcel described particularly, would have been to contradict and destroy their natural meaning. Yet if no reference had been made to the deed, it would have been impossible to ascertain with any certainty what the two undescribed lots were, and, therefore, the lot specified would alone have passed.2 And it is a general rule that when the description of an estate intended to be conveyed includes several particulars, all of which are necessary to ascertain the estate to be conveyed, no estate will pass, except such as will agree with every particular of the description. Thus, if a man grant all his estate in his own occupation in the town of W., no estate can pass, except what is in his occupation, and is also situated in that town. But if the description be sufficient to ascertain the estate intended to be conveyed, although the estate will not agree with some of the particulars of the description, yet it will pass by the conveyance, that the intent of the parties may be effected. Thus, if one convey his house in D., " which was formerly R. C.'s," when it was not R. C.'s, but S. C.'s, the house will pass if the grantor had but one house in D.8

1 Doe v. Galloway, 5 B. & Ad. 43. Mr. Justice Parke, in that case, said: " The rule is clearly settled, that when there is a sufficient description set forth of premises, by giving the particular name of a close, or otherwise, we may reject a false demonstration; but that if premises be described in general terms, and a particular description be added, the latter controls the former.1' In Stukeley v. Butler, Hob. 171, it is said: "It is vain to imagine one part before another; for though words can neither be spoken nor written at once, yet the mind of the author comprehends them at once, which gives vitam et modum to the sentence." See Goodtitle v. Southern, 1 M. & S. 299.