2 Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258, 271, 276; The George, TheBoth-nea, and the Janstaff, 1 Wheat. 408; The George, 2 Wheat. 278; Tenant v. Elliott, 1 Bos. & Pul. 3; Farmer v. Russell, 1 Bos. & Pul. 296; Cannan v, Bryce, 3 B. & Al. 179; Filson v. Himes, 5 Barr, 452.
§ 761. There seems also to be a distinction between cases where the statute is merely directory in its terms, and the terms which are not complied with are only collaterally connected with the contract, and cases where the statute is directly prohibitory, and its requisitions are conditions precedent, directly affecting the contract. And, in the former case, it would seem, that the contract was merely voidable, and not void.1 Thus, although an assignment of a patent, or a deed, is required by statute to be recorded, yet as this requisition is merely directory, and for the purpose of giving notice to bond fide purchasers for a valuable consideration, it does not render the assignment void.2
1 Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 271, 276.
2 Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258.
3 Tenant v. Elliott, 1 Bos. & Pul. 3; Farmer v. Russell, 1 Bos. & Pul. 296; Simpson v. Bloss, 7 Taunt. 246; Petrie v. Hannay, 3 T. R. 418; Aubert v. Maze, 2 Bos. & Pul. 371; Gas Light Co. v. Turner, 5 Bing. N. C. 666; s. c. in error, 6 Bing. N. C. 324; Story on Sales, § 508. See also Phalen v. Clark, 19 Conn. 421; Fisher v. Bridges, 3 El. & B. 642; 25 Eng. Law & Eq. 210.
§ 762. Again, wherever goods are sold, or money lent, for the express purpose of enabling a party to violate either the statute or the common law, an action cannot be maintained on the sale or loan,3 even though, it is held, the illegal purpose be not carried out.4 Thus, where a person sold goods, in order that they might be exported to a place, exportation to which was forbidden by statute, and a bond was given for the price, it was held, that the vendor could not recover in an action on the bond.5 So, also, where a vendor knowingly sold certain drugs to a brewer, to be used in his brewery, contrary to the provisions of a certain statute, it was held, that he could not recover the price, although it did not appear that the drugs were actually used in the brewery.6 The same rule also applies to spirituous liquors sold contrary to law; 7 to money lent for the purpose of settling illegal stockjobbing transactions,1 or of ransoming a ship contrary to statute 45 George III.;2 and to money paid on the loss of an illegal wager.3 But the mere fact that the seller knows that goods sold will be applied to an illegal purpose, will not, of itself, be ordinarily sufficient to deprive him of his right of payment therefor; but he must, in some manner, be implicated in the transaction and privy thereto.4 And the test is, as has been said, whether the contract on which the claim is founded can or cannot be wholly disconnected from the illegal transaction, or whether it was in furtherance thereof.5 Thus, where lottery tickets were sold in a State where the sale was lawful, to a citizen of another State where the sale was prohibited by statute, the contract was enforced, although the seller knew that the Buyer intended to resell them in violation of the statute, the two transactions being completely separable and independent.1 But whenever goods have been sold for the express purpose of enabling a party to violate a statute, the contract has been held to be void.2
1 Fergusson v. Norman, 5 Bing. N. C. 84; Cope v. Rowlands, 2 M. & W. 149; Little v. Poole, 9 B. & C. 192; Warren v. Manuf. Ins. Co., 13 Pick. 518; Ward v. Wood, 13 Mass. 539; the Brig Draco, 2 Sumner, 157; Brooks v. Byam, 2 Story, 542; Johnson v. Hudson, 11 East, 180.
2 Brooks v. Byam, 2 Story, 542.
3 See White v. Buss, 3 Cush. 448; Ex parte Bell, 1 M. & S. 751; Light-foot v. Tenant, 1 Bos. & Pul. 551; Langton v. Hughes, 1 M. & S. 596, 597; Story, Confl. Laws, § 246, etc.; Craig v. The State of Missouri, 4 Peters, 410; Spurgeon v. McElwain, 6 Ohio, 444. But see Ex parte Bulmer, 13 Ves. 313; and Hodgson v. Temple, 1 Marsh. 5; s. o. 5 Taunt. 181; Cam-bioso v. Maffet, 2 Wash. C. C. 98.
4 Kingsbury v. Flemming, 66 N. C. 524 (1872). But if the lender of money for an illegal purpose afterwards repent and prevent the intended use, he can doubtless recover it. See Bailey v. O'Mahony, 33 N. Y. Superior Ct. Rep. 239 (1871).
5 Lightfoot v. Tenant, 1 Bos. & Pul. 551. See Parkin v. Dick, 2 Camp. 221; s. c. 11 East, 502; Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341; Billard v. Hay-den, 2 C. & P. 472.
6 Langton v. Hughes, 1 M. & S. 593.
7 Briggs v. Campbell, 25 Vt. 704. See Aiken v. Blaisdell, 41 Vt. 655 (1869).
1 Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & Al. 179, which finally decided this long-mooted question, in respect of this transaction. Steers v. Lashley, 6 T. R. 61.
2 Webb v. Brooke, 3 Taunt. 6.
3 Clayton v. Dilly, 4 Taunt. 165; Simpson v. Bloss, 2 Marsh. 542; s. c. 7 Taunt. 246.
4 Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341; Clarke v. Shee, 1 Cowp. 197; s. C.
2 Doug. 698, n.; Pellecat v. Angell, 2 C. M. &. R. 311; Waymell v. Reed, 5 T. R. 599; Oxford Iron Co. v. Spradly, 46 Ala. 99 (1871); Michael v. Bacon, 49 Mo. 474 (1872); Welker v. Jeffries, 45 Miss. 160 (1871). See Gardner v. Barger, 4 Heisk. 6G8 (1871), where the sale of a horse within the Confederate lines for use in the Confederate cavalry was held valid; The Teutonia, Law R. 4 P. C. 171; McKinnell v. Robinson, 3 M. & W. 442; Waugh v. Morris, Law R. 8 Q. B. 202 (1873); Edelmuth v. McGaren, 4 Daly, 467 (1872); Roquemore v. Alloway, 33 Tex. 461 (1871). In Powell v. Smith, 66 N. C. 401 (1872), a surety upon a promissory note given for an illegal purpose paid the same and took a note for reimbursement from his principal for the amount; and the note was held valid though the surety knew the character of the original note. See also Kingsbury v. Suit, 66 N. C. 601; State v. Hays, 49 Mo. 604 (1872).
5 Simpson v. Bloss, 7 Taunt. 246; s. c. 2 Marsh. 542; Petrie v. Hannay.