1 Kimball v. Keyes, 11 Wend. 33; Mott v. Comstock, 8 Wend. 544; Baker v. Barney, 8 Johns. 72; Cany v. Patton, 2 Ashm. 140. And see Boardman v. Silver, 100 Mass. 330 (1868).
2 Hunter v. Boucher, 3 Pick. 289; Johnston v. Sumner, 3 H. & 1ST. 261 (1858); post, § 72.
3 Stone v. Macnair, 1 Moore, 126; S. c. 7 Taunton, 432; Marlow v. Pitfeild, 1 P. Wms. 558; Stejphenson v. Hardy, 3 Wilson, 388; Walker v. Simpson, 7 Watts & Serg. 83; Grindell v. Godmond, 5 Ad. & El. 755; Earle v. Peale, 1 Salk. 387; Darby v. Boucher, 1 Salk. 279; Franklin v. Foster, 20 Mich. 75 (1870); KnoxV Bushell, 3 C. B. (n. s.) 334.
4 Earle v. Peale, 1 Salk. 387; Harris v. Lee, 1 P. Wms. 66; Marlow v. Pitfeild, 1 P. Wms. 558; May v. Skey, 16 Sim. 588; West v. Wheeler, 2 Car. & Kir. 714.
5 Seaton v. Benedict, 5 Bing. 28; s. c. 2 Moo. & P. 66; Montague v. Benedict, 3 B. & C. 631; s. c. Montague v. Baron, 5 Dowl. '& Ryl. 532.
6 Seaton v. Benedict, 5 Bing. 28; s. c. 2 Moo. & P. 66; Atkins v. Cur-wood, 7 C. & P. 756; Freestone v. Butcher, 9 C. & P. 643. See Furlong v. Hysom, 35 Me. 333; Eames v. Sweetser, 101 Mass. 78 (1869).
7 Reneaux v. Teakle, 8 Exch. 680; 20 Eng. Law & Eq. 345.
8 Montague v. Benedict, 3 B. & C. 631, 638. There is a pleasant the same category. . . . Even that limited authority must, however, be subject to this condition, that the goods be suitable to the position which the husband allows his wife to assume, or to the trade which he allows her to carry on."1 But the wife's authority in the management of household affairs is more extensive when the husband is absent from home for long periods of time than when he remains at home in the management of his business.2
§ 164. Necessary medical advice and attendance are within the rule,1 unless the credit is given directly to the wife,2 and also the funeral expenses of the wife, so that the husband, if he neglect to provide them, is liable to any one volunteering to perform such reasonable duty.3 But fees of counsel and attorneys furnished to the wife on a bill for divorce, or charged in defending her against a libel of divorce by the husband, are not considered as necessaries.4 Bovill, C. J., thus states the compass of the wife's authority to pledge her husband's credit: "The domestic arrangements of the family being usually left to the control of the wife, her authority extends to all those matters which fall within her department; as, for instance, the supply of provisions for the house, clothing for herself and children, and things of that sort. Or, if the wife, with the concurrence of her husband, carries on a separate trade, goods supplied to her for the purposes of that trade would fail within passage in the opinion of Mr. Justice Hyde, dissenting from the judgment of the court in Manby v. Scott, 1 Sid. 109, reported in 1 Mod. 128, which I cannot refrain from giving place here, that the student, weary with knitting his brows over the dry text, may here relax into a smile at the judge's quaint representation of a wife's occupations. " Admit that in truth the wife wants necessary apparel, woollen and linen, and thereupon she goes into Paternoster Row, to a mercer, and takes up stuff, and makes a contract for necessary clothes; thence goes into Cheapside, and takes up linen there in like manner: and also goes into a third street,-and fits herself with ribbons, and other necessaries suitable to her occasions, and her husband's degree. This done, she goes away, disposes of the commodities to furnish herself with money to go abroad to Hyde Park, to score at gleeke, or the like. Next morning this good woman goes abroad into some other part of London, makes her necessity and want of apparel known, and takes more wares upon trust, as she had done the day before; after the same manner she goes to a third and fourth place, and makes new contracts for fresh wares, none of these tradesmen knowing or imagining she was formerly furnished by the other, and each of them seeing and believing her to have great need of the commodities sold her; shall not the husband be chargeable and liable to pay every one of these, if the contract of the wife doth bind him ? "
1 Wood v. O'Kelley, 8 Cush. 406. But the dreams and revelations or visions of a person in a mesmeric sleep are held in this case not to be necessaries. 2 Carter v. Howard, 39 Vt. 106 (1866).
3 Ambrose v. Kerrison, 10 C. B. 776; 4 Eng. Law & Eq. 361; Jenkins v. Tucker, 1 H. Bl. 90.
4 Coffin v. Dunham, 8 Cush. 404; Wing v. Hurlburt, 15 Vt. 607; Shelton v. Pendleton, 18 Conn. 417. See post, § 176.
§ 165. Where a married woman, living with her husband, carries on trade, his liability in her contracts and debts, in relation to the trade, is one purely of agency or partnership, and depends upon his assent and authorization. If he share in the profits, or they are applied to the maintenance of the family, the law implies an authority by the wife to bind him in all necessary acts in the business.3 So, also, her authority to draw or indorse bills, sign notes, and make purchases, would be implied, whenever it necessarily belonged to the business, or whenever it can be shown that it was her habit to do such acts, and that her husband had constantly assented thereto.4 And her indorsement by his consent of a note made payable to her during coverture, passes a good title to the indorsee.5 But her authority to draw a bill or note cannot be inferred from the mere fact that she was known to the husband to be engaged in carrying on business, and that the note was given in the course of such business; and such a note would not be available against the husband even in the hands of a bond fide indorsee,6 without circumstances showing authorization by him. Wherever notes or bills are drawn by a wife, she acts as the agent of the husband, and the note or bill should exhibit her agency, - otherwise, as in all other cases of agency, she alone would be bound, and her liability is nothing alone.1 The husband might, however, by subsequently assenting to a bill accepted by his wife, render himself personally liable.2