2 1 Powell on Cont. 372, 384; Graves v. Key, 3 B. & Ad. 313. The words "more or less" in a broker's note for the sale of goods as follows : "Sold to N". W. for account of S. C, five hundred bundles, more or less, gunny bags," do not create a latent ambiguity, and parol evidence is inadmissible to show the understanding between the parties. Cabot v. Winsor, 1 Allen, 546 (1861).
3 Hinnemann v. Rosenback, 39 N. Y. 98 (1868)
4 Richardson v. Beede, 43 Me. 161 (1857). But a written receipt for money, showing that it was received in full payment and satisfaction for all claim for damages and costs in a suit, cannot be controlled or varied by parol evidence. Brown v. Cambridge, 3 Allen, 474 (1862). And see Bus-well v. Poineer, 37 N. Y. 312 (1867). C. transferred to E. a note paynot being evidence of a contract, but only of payment.1 But parol evidence is not admissible to show that a promissory note in the usual form was intended as a receipt, and that the sum for which the note was given was in fact a payment by the payee to the maker of an antecedent debt, and not a loan or advancement.2 So parol evidence is inadmissible to prove that a promissory note was intended as a receipt for money put into the defendant's hands, by the payee, to be loaned for him.3 So, an order for the payment of money in the hands of the payee, or his assignee, is evidence in writing of his title to the payment, which cannot be varied or contradicted by parol evidence.4 But a common invoice, or bill of parcels, as " A. B. bought of C. D., etc," is not such a contract, but that oral evidence is admissible to show what the real contract was, and that C. D. was not in fact the seller of all the articles mentioned.5
§ 830. Ambiguity of language is, however, to be distinguished from unintelligibility and inaccuracy,6 which latter able to bearer, and took E's receipt for it, agreeing " to account for the same on demand." In an action by E. against the maker, it was held that the receipt was not in itself a contract of bailment, and that the exclusion of the parol testimony of the parties to the contract, to prove its nature, was erroneous. Eaton v. Alger, 2 Keyes, 41 (1865). So, while a bill of lading, in so far as it is a contract, cannot be explained by parol, yet being a receipt as well as a contract, it may in that regard be so explained, especially when used as the foundation of a suit between the original parties to it. The Lady Franklin, 8 Wall. 325 (1868).
1 Tucker v. Maxwell, 11 Mass. 143; Johnson v. Johnson, ib. 359, 363; Johnson v. Weed, 9 Johns. 310; Putnam v. Lewis, 8 ib. 389; May v. Bab-cock, 4 Ohio, 346; Wilkinson v. Scott, 17 Mass. 249; Delaney v. Towns, 1 Allen, 407 (1861). If the facts of a case taken together exhibit no latent ambiguity, parol evidence is inadmissible. Dascomb v. Sartell, 1 Allen, 281 (1861).
2 Billings v. Billings, 10 Cush. 178 (1852) ; City Bank v. Adams, 45 Me. 455 (1858).
3 Shaw v. Shaw, 50 Me. 94 (1863).
4 Parker v. Syracuse, 31 N. Y. 376 (1865).
5 Holding v. Elliott, 5 H. & N. 117.
6 Thus, a committee was appointed to assign dower in lot 4, and an undivided half of lot 3. They assigned fifty acres "of the south-westerly side of said lots, and it was held that there was no ambiguity in the terms of the assignment, and that parol evidence was inadmissible to show that all the may render a contract void.1 A word may often be unintelligible to one person when it is intelligible to another, and may be exceedingly inaccurate, without being ambiguous.2 Thus, in the will of Nollekins, the sculptor, "all the marble in the yard, the tools in the shop, bankers, mod, tools for carving," were devised to Alex. Goblet. A controversy arose on the word "mod" which, although inaccurate, and to inexperienced persons, perhaps, unintelligible, was recognized by sculptors as a common abbreviation for models, and such the court decided to be its meaning.3 Words cannot be said to be ambiguous unless their signification seem doubtful and uncertain to persons of competent skill and knowledge to understand them.4 And if the terms are clear, evidence is not admissible that they were understood in a different sense. Thus, a recorded note of the directors of a corporation, being a written instrument, must be construed by its terms alone, with reference to the subject-matter to which it applies; and parol evidence is not admissible of the sense in which it was understood by a director.6 So parol evidence is not admissible to determine the intention of the parties to a deed. That is to be gathered from the deed itself.6 parties understood the part assigned to be the easterly half of lot 3. Young v. Gregory, 46 Me. 475 (1859).
1 See Nichols v. Williams, 7 C. E. Green, 63 (1871).
2 Wigram on Interpretation of Wills, 174, 175, pi. 200-204; 1 Greenl. on Evid. § 298.
3 Goblet v. Beechey, 3 Sim. 24; Wigram on the Interpretation of Wills, 179, 185.
4 1 Greenl. on Evid. § 298.
5 Gould v. Norfolk Lead Co., 9 Cush. 338 (1852). The following language in an agreement, "containing twice as many rods as there is to" another tract, is of such plain and obvious import that it cannot be controlled by parol evidence of the intention of the parties. Fitzgerald v. Clark, 6 Gray, 393 (1856).
6 Rogers v. McPheters, 40 Me. 114 (1855) ; Whitney v. Slayton, 40 Me. 224 (1855).