By Karl Georg Wurzel

Introduction

Sec. 1. jurisprudence and other social sciences.

I. Nature and Qualities of Juridical Thinking

Sec. 2. POPULAR NOTIONS.-Sec. 3. POSTULATES OF JURISPRUDENCE.-Sec. 4. LACK OF BIAS OF THE JUDGE.-Sec. 5. CERTAINTY OF THE LAW.

II. The Prevalent Theory of Interpretation: Critical Examination of its Principal Tenets

Sec. 6. general survey; the principal defect. - Sec. 7. the results of interpretation classified in accordance with the prevalent theory. - Sec. 8. criticism of this classification . -Sec. 9. the methods of interpretation classified in accordance with the prevalent theory. - Sec. 10. reason ("ratio") of the law. - Sec. 11. need for a theory of juridical thinking.

III. Scope of Juridical Thinking, Especially its

Relation to Interpretation

Sec. 12. its limitation in principle.-Sec. 13. some positive observations regarding the scope of juridical

1 Translated from the monograph entitled "Das Juristische Denken," Vienna, 1904 (Verlag Moritz Perles), by Ernest Bruncken.

THINKING . -Sec. 14. A LOGICAL DIGRESSION.-Sec. 15. APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES TO LEGAL CONCEPTS; PROJECTION. - Sec. 16. THE LEGISLATOR.

IV. The Principal Methods of Interpretation

Sec. 17. GENERAL SURVEY. - Sec. 18. THE TENDENCY TOWARDS UNITY. - Sec. 19. THE CONSERVATIVE TENDENCY.

V. The Subject-Matters of Projection

Sec. 20. GENERAL SURVEY. - Sec. 21. RELATION BETWEEN JURIDICAL THINKING AND ETHICAL INFLUENCES .-Sec. 22. RELATION BETWEEN JURIDICAL THINKING AND ECONOMIC PHENOMENA. - Sec. 23. THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT-MATTERS OF PROJECTION IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE ENTIRE SUBJECT-MATTER OF JURIDICAL THINKING INTO FACTS AND RULES.

VI. Various Special Subjects

Sec. 24. THE ANALOGY OF PARTICULAR LEGAL RULES .-Sec. 25. THE PROOF OF SO-CALLED MENTAL FACTS, ESPECIALLY THE INTENTION OF PARTIES. - Sec. 26. "SAFETY-VALVE CONCEPTS." - Sec. 27. "SAFETY-VALVE CONCEPTS" CONTINUED.

VII. Conclusion

Sec. 28. THE PREVALENT THEORY OF INTERPRETATION AS EXPRESSION OF A SOCIAL NEED. - Sec. 29. LEGAL TRUTH - Sec. 30. SOME RANDOM REMARKS ON BRINGING JURISPRUDENCE INTO CLOSER RELATIONS WITH OTHER SOCIAL SCIENCES.