This section is from the book "Science Of Legal Method", by Ernest Bruncken. Also available from Amazon: Science of Legal Method.
No rule is just for all times. Every form of justice, like all formulated law, is the outcome of historical development. We have already pointed out that lawyers' law, the child of free decision, is composed of rules derived from the nature of social relations and changing as these change. The great mass of rules of decision are determined, at any given time, by the changing social conditions to which they are applied. Stammler seems to have found the right way of putting it; he refers to the story of Herodotus concerning the Medes, who, after their separation from the Assyrians, living without statutes, elected Dejoces their King, because in their contentions he had proven himself a just judge; then he adds: "The skillful judge whose decisions delighted the people, had understood well how to adjudicate newly arising issues on the basis of principles derived from traditional customs. For we may safely assume that there also such things existed as property, binding contracts, family authority, individual right of inheritance, etc., and that the question was how to maintain these principles in each particular controversy. It would be idle to imagine that he administered his function of arbitrator without any such basis of positive institutions."