This section is from the book "Science Of Legal Method", by Ernest Bruncken. Also available from Amazon: Science of Legal Method.
It is not uncommonly urged at the present time that executive officers be given a right to appear on the floor of the houses of the legislature and to participate in debate. It would not be a much more radical step to give the chief executive a right to introduce bills. He has now by all constitutions the right to recommend legislation and as a matter of power there is no reason why he should not present his recommendations in form of bills. This would not give the measure recommended the parliamentary status of a bill and as a matter of politics might prejudice it; but to give it such status would not even require a constitutional amendment, a house rule would be sufficient. As a matter of fact, the chief executive can readily find members to bring in bills known to come from him and spoken of as administration bills, and they have been officially recognized as such by house rules (7 Am. Pol. Sc. Review, 239); but their status would gain if the executive could formally appear as their sponsor. The constitution of Alabama (art. 4, sec. 70) provides that the governor, auditor, and attorney-general shall, before each regular session of the legislature, prepare a general revenue bill to be submitted to the legislature for its information, to be used or dealt with by the House of Representatives as it may elect. This seems to give the bills submitted a regular parliamentary standing, although not a preferred standing. It would not be for the present practicable or wise to curtail substantially the right of members to introduce bills, and any initiative given to the chief executive would have to be left to work out its own inherent possibilities. Even in Europe the Government has no legal monopoly of the initiative, and its practical monopoly is the result of constitutional relations which do not exist in America. It is not impossible that even under our conditions the executive may finally obtain a preponderant share in legislative initiation. But such a development would take a long time and there can be no thought of forcing it. We should therefore not look in that quarter for a controlling influence upon principles of legislation.