It appears, therefore, that in interpreting a statute one should first look to its reason, then to its logical consistency, and finally to the history of social movements. The following is an example. The statute defines the difference between a design and an invention in such a way that the interpreter may choose from a number of meanings. The reasonable choice would be to find the distinction in this, that the one refers to the utilization of natural forces, the other to an arrangement in space. This form of interpretation will give to industry the best possible protection; it is the most liberal that can be imagined and most capable of promoting the beneficial efforts of industry. By reason of the fact that an arrangement in space comprehends both simple and complicated forms, such a conception of the subject affords especially an opportunity to protect the same article from different sides, to make it capable of receiving both an invention patent and a design patent. Such an interpretation, moreover, will make our industrial legislation a definite, organic body and enable it to develop in a consistent manner. All other considerations should yield to that. Especially, there is no need of troubling ourselves about the fact that the movement for the adoption of a patent law of designs contemplated no such far-reaching consequences but rather desired to protect new ideas of minor importance which were contrasted with "real inventions." Still less can anything of value in this matter be learned from expressions in preliminary reports or parliamentary speeches. Any interpretation based on such considerations is sure to prove defective and cannot succeed in promoting the just requirements of the industrial world.