Projection is not alone the discovery of the will of the legislator but comprises still more. The legal concepts are merely the points of convergence and starting, where new phenomena (phenomena of transition) Which are not already contained in the original concept are joined thereto. The same is true, in even higher measure, of analogy. Now by what means is this connection made? Whence does the process of projection take the grounds for deciding whether a transition phenomenon ought to be joined to one or the other concept akin to it? Clearly the grounds are not to be found in the legislative will; the synthetic character of projection implies that they must be sought either in experience or in some emotion which deceives us regarding the existence of some connecting link or renders us willing to disregard it. All this has already been touched upon before, but then it was expressly stated that the question what the subject-matters were with which projection had to deal was still an open one. Now that question is again presented.

124 See Thol, "Einleitung in das deutsche Privatrecht," Sec. 54, and "Handelsrecht," Sec. 14.

I must confess that this question will be solved but imperfectly in this paper. To furnish a complete solution, to comprehend logically the means by which projection, and for that matter analogy, proceed, and an accurate tracing of their several varieties, would be one of the ultimate goals of the theory of juridical thinking. It would imply an amount of positive labor in describing and comparing, such as, on account of the multifariousness of legal activities, must exceed by a great deal the limits set for this paper. I shall limit myself, therefore, to designating in general terms the principal fields of social phenomena whence the subject-matters of projection are drawn to a great extent, and to exploring some of the best denned ways by which these phenomena enter into juridical thinking and affect its results. Thus the possibility and existence of such influences will be illustrated and many a peculiar characteristic of juridical thinking will in addition be set in a clearer light.

In doing so I shall - as was done in the preceding chapter - retain the dynamical manner of representing the subject, together with a dynamical nomenclature. That is, I shall speak about forces, influences (e.g. ethical influences), rather than about methods, premises, and the like, for the latter or logical terminology could not be conceived without logical definitions and mutual delimitations which in some cases would be premature. This simplification appears to me all the more justifiable because even in those methods of juridical thinking which are apparently elaborated with logical accuracy, to wit, the systematic and the historical methods, currents of volition have crept in that tend to push them beyond the purely logical cognition of truth and to make them appear, in part at least, as being of a purposive character.