This section is from the book "A Treatise On The Construction Of The Statute Of Frauds", by Causten Browne. Also available from Amazon: A treatise on the construction of the Statute of frauds.
[9th May, 1828].
V. And be it further enacted, That no Action shall be maintained whereby to charge any Person upon any Promise made after full Age to pay any Debt contracted during Infancy, or upon any Ratification after full Age of any Promise or Simple Contract made during Infancy, unless such Promise or Ratification shall be made by some Writing signed by the Party to be charged therewith.2
VI. And be it further enacted, That no Action shall be brought whereby to charge any Person upon or by reason of any Representation or Assurance made or given concerning or relating to the Character, Conduct, Credit, Ability, Trade, or Dealings of any other person, to the Intent or Purpose that such other Person may obtain Credit, Money, or Goods upon,8 unless such Representation or Assurance be made in Writing, signed by the Party to be charged therewith.4
VII. 'And Whereas by an Act passed in England in the Twenty-ninth Year of the Reign of King Charles the Second, intituled
1 Commonly called Lord Tenderten's Act. See ante, in the text, § 181.
2 As to the memorandum required by this section, see Harris v. Wall. 1 Exch. 122; Hunt v. Massey, 5 Barn. & Adol. 902; Hartley v. Wharton, 11 Adol. & Ell. 934; Hyde v. Johnson, 2 Bing. N. R. 776.
3 SIC. See ante, in the text, § 181.
4 See Swann v. Phillips, 8 Adol. & Ell. 457; Turnley v. Macgregor, 6 Man. & 6. 46; Devaux v Steinkeller, 6 Bing. N. R. 84; Hasock v. Fergusson, 7 Adol & Ell 86.
An Act for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, it is, among other Things, enacted that from and after the Twenty-fourth Day of June, One thousand six hundred and seventy-seven, no Contract for the Sale of any Goods, Wares, and Merchandizes, for the Price of Ten Pounds Sterling or upwards, shall be allowed to be good except the Buyer shall accept Part of the Goods so sold, ana actually receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the Bargain, or in part of Payment, or that some Note or Memorandum in Writing of the said Bargain be made and signed by the Parties to be charged by such Contract, or their Agents thereunto lawfully authorized: And ' whereas a similar Enactment is contained in an Act passed in Ireland in the Seventh Year of the Reign of King William the Third: And Whereas it has been held, that the said recited Enactments do not extend to certain Executory Contracts for the Sale of Goods, which nevertheless are within the Mischief thereby intended to be remedied; and it is expedient to extend the said Enactments to such Executory Contracts;' Be it enacted, That the said Enactments shall extend to all Contracts for the Sale of Goods of the Value of Ten Pounds Sterling and upwards, notwithstanding the Goods may be intended to be delivered at some future Time, or may not at the Time of such Contract be actually made,, procured, or provided, or fit or ready for Delivery, or some Act may be requisite for the making or completing thereof, or rendering the same fit for Delivery.
X. And be it further enacted, that this Act shall commence and take effect on the First Day of January one thousand eight hundred and twenty-nine.
An Act to amend the Laws of England and Ireland affecting Trade and
Commerce [29ih July, 1856].
, III. No special Promise to be made by any Person after the passing of this Act to answer for the Debt, Default, or Miscarriage of another Person, being in Writing, and signed by the Party to be charged therewith or some other Person by him thereunto lawfully authorized, shall be deemed invalid to support an Action, Suit, or other Proceeding to charge the Person by whom such
Promise shall have been made, by reason only that the Consideration for such Promise does not appear in Writing, or by necessary Inference from a written document.
38 & 39 Vict. Ch. 77, Order XIX.
23. When a contract is alleged in any pleading, a bare denial of the contract by the opposite party shall be construed only as a denial of the making of the contract in fact, and not of its legality or its sufficiency in law, whether with reference to the Statute of Frauds or otherwise.